


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# ***JPRS Report***

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# **Soviet Union**

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***KOMMUNIST***

No 4, March 1989

# Soviet Union KOMMUNIST No 4, March 1989

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[Translation of the Russian-language theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee published in Moscow 18 times per year.]

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## KOMMUNIST

No 4, March 1989

### Heading Perestroika and Generating the Energy of Renewal; On the Results of the Accountability and Election Campaign in the Party Organizations. Answers to KOMMUNIST Questions

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[Discussion with Georgiy Petrovich Razumovskiy, CPSU Central Committee Politburo candidate member and CPSU Central Committee secretary]

[Text]

[KOMMUNIST] Georgiy Petrovich, the purpose of the last accountability and election campaign conducted by the party organizations was to take further steps in the implementation of the resolutions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference. To what extent were the basic targets of the campaign reached? To what extent did the accountability reports and elections confirm the role of the party organizations as the main motive force of perestroika?

[Georgiy Petrovich] I would start the discussion on the accountability reports and elections which were held by pointing out that we can clearly distinguish between two different stages in the perestroika process: the stage of formulation of theoretical concepts and policies and making strategic decisions, and the stage in which the main emphasis is on their practical implementation. The campaign which took place in the party organizations may be the most characteristic event of the present stage of perestroika which we have entered today, during the preparations for and holding the 19th All-Union Party Conference and after it. What is characteristic, above all, is that the accountability reports and elections took place entirely on the basis of the political concepts formulated at the party forum. Yet another strong and profound connection may be seen: the accountability and election campaign adopted and strengthened the essentially revolutionary and democratic and renovative spirit of the party conference. The reports and the elections emphasized within the party's image and in the party community the features the development of which is taking place not only in the life of the party itself but in all aspects of our reality related to the April change and the subsequent changes which followed it. This meant emancipation of the mind, practicality, intolerance of stagnation, open-mindedness in assessments and loftiness of moral criteria, and the rejection of falsehood. It meant concentrating on the tasks raised by our time, which is one of unprecedented difficulty and novelty.

It is becoming increasingly clear today that the success of perestroika can be guaranteed only through its internal targets, which develop in its course. The exceptionally

important political feature of the reports and elections was that they were a structural component of perestroika and were fully consistent with it. By strengthening the perestroika forces in the party, they contributed a great deal to making it irreversible. We were able substantially to enhance the democratization of internal life and all activities of the party organizations, without which the democratic renovation of society as a whole is impossible.

At the time that the CPSU Central Committee discussed the tasks of the forthcoming accountability reports and elections, at its July 1988 Plenum, it unanimously agreed that they must not be allowed to become an ordinary routine step. It was emphasized that by developing the activeness of the party members and concentrating their efforts on the main directions of perestroika and firmly rebuffing conservatism and leftist sallies, the accountability reports and elections could and should provide an additional powerful impetus in the implementation of the reform of the political system, the reorganization of the economy, the development of the new economic mechanism, and improving the working, living and leisure time conditions of the people. I believe that I would not be sinning against the truth by saying that, as a whole, the accountability reports and elections produced the type of impetus which is felt today in all things.

It was obvious from the very start that the present accountability and election meetings in the party would inevitably exceed the framework of internal party life in terms of their importance. Interest in them was tremendous and comprehensive. It was based on the understanding that outside the directing, organized and organizing actions of party committees on all levels, and without competent cadres loyal to the cause, perestroika could not be secured and, therefore, nor could the comprehensive progress of socialism. That which the party must do can be done by it alone. It can be done by a party which is theoretically, organizationally and morally strong.

The Soviet people expected a great deal of the party meetings and conferences. Could the party members ignore that which affects the people, the rich debates, the clashes of opinions and various viewpoints which literally flooded social life? Equally natural was the fact that the party members could not ignore or leave unanswered criticism addressed at party authorities at various public rostrums. We believe that, all in all, consistency between assignments and results was maintained.

[KOMMUNIST] The problems discussed in the last accountability and election conferences were extremely varied. Nonetheless, what can we single out as the main topic of all party organizations, as a strategic trend?

[G. Razumovskiy] The pivotal topic of the meetings and conferences was to determine the party's potential, as the political vanguard of society. Starting with the 27th

Congress and, after it, the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum but, particularly, the 19th All-Union Party Conference and more recently, what prevailed in the party was a more productive understanding of its functions in society, in perestroika, consistent with the scale and nature of its contemporary role and tasks. During that period the next step was also taken: a system of practical measures for the reorganization of our political system was formulated. Their implementation will help the party fully to concentrate on its specific functions.

It was the view of the CPSU Central Committee that the accountability and election conferences were to be the decisive stage in preparing the party organizations for applying new political methods under contemporary conditions and would bring to light and eliminate the weak spots in organizational and political-education work. The past campaign made it possible to achieve a substantial renovation within the party itself and to show progress in the reform of the entire political system.

Let me emphasize two important aspects. First, the unifying, the integrating function of the party in our society at a crucial stage in its development became clearly apparent. Under conditions in which changes in social life and in our awareness highlight the variety of interests, positions and views, the party's vital concern is to prevent centrifugal trends from prevailing over centripetal ones. It is impossible to achieve a societal consensus and to coordinate the aspirations of social and ethnic groups without a right domestic and foreign party policy, tested in accordance with humanistic priorities. This policy will be a platform for the consolidation of all population strata. This basic topic was clearly and strongly voiced at the overwhelming majority of party meetings and conferences.

Second, the year 1988 was a difficult one. The country experienced serious difficulties in economics and the social area. The inertia of the old approaches was felt as well. And, as is frequently the case, different people reacted differently to the trials. Some of them were unable to withstand them, and gave up. Naturally, the eyes of the people turned to the communists: How would they behave in the face of difficulties? Essentially, it was a question for the party to prove through action, through intensive intellectual efforts and through increased intensive work and the personal example of the party members, not only its right to lead society politically but also to be the moral leader of the people. "In surmounting difficulties and obstructions," the electoral Central Committee address read, "the CPSU becomes more exigent above all toward itself and the party members." The accountability reports and elections proved that this was the party's dominant approach.

[KOMMUNIST] The democratization of internal party life and the restoration to their fullest extent of the Leninist principles of the party's functioning as the political vanguard of society, are today the focal points

in the work of the party members. What contribution did the accountability and election campaign make to the solution of this essential problem? To what extent were the democratic foundations used extensively and effectively in the preparations for and holding of the accountability and election meetings and conferences?

[G. Razumovskiy] The vanguard role of the CPSU can be secured today only through the profound democratization of its internal life and the elimination of distortions and accretions. On this level as well the full restoration of the Leninist understanding of the principle of democratic centralism, which calls for free debates at the stage of the discussion of problems and unity of action after a majority decision has been reached, is of prime significance. The accountability and election campaign in the party organizations was oriented toward the intensification of internal party democracy, so that all CPSU units could function in an atmosphere of comradeship, free discussion of all topical problems of policy and practical activity, criticism and self-criticism, collectivism, conscious discipline and personal responsibility.

Ensuring the freedom of discussion was paid the most serious attention at meetings and conferences. The majority of accountability reports and draft resolutions of meetings and conferences were prepared with the extensive participation of the elected aktiv, on the basis of the critical study of the situation and taking the views of the primary party organizations and party members into account. The draft documents or their theses were submitted to the virtually entire population of the individual areas, as a rule via the mass information media.

It is gratifying that in the course of the accountability and election meetings the party topic played a major role in the press and in television and radio broadcasts. Thanks to the television and the press, one could say that all working people became participants in meetings and conferences. The publication of the accountability materials, information about party members recommended for membership in elected authorities, surveys conducted among the labor collectives with a view to determining their opinion about candidates, the press centers and direct telephone surveys were only a few of the methods used, which made it possible to concentrate everyone's attention on problems of party life and the development of party democracy. Such openness met with good response among the people. It put the activities of party authorities under the control of public opinion. The opinion of the public was taken into consideration not only in the formulation of decisions on ordinary practical problems but also in assessing the activities of bureaus, secretaries and all party committee members. Conditions for active participation in the discussions were provided at the meetings and conferences themselves, where nearly 12 million people spoke and formulated 5.2 million specific remarks and suggestions.



The distinguishing feature of the present accountability and election meetings and conferences was that in frequent cases they were attended by nonparty people. This feature, which introduced a number of new elements in the atmosphere of the meetings and conferences, is particularly worth emphasizing. Several million nonparty people attended the meetings of party groups and primary party organizations. They frequently took the floor voicing their remarks and the instructions of labor collectives, and submitting practical suggestions. Consultations with nonparty people are exceptionally important, for it would be insufficient and erroneous for any party organization to limit itself strictly to its own, albeit very self-critical, assessments. In order to be able to judge oneself with the necessary objectivity and greater impartiality, it is necessary to compare one's self-evaluation with the evaluations of the working people. This is an irreplaceable cure for placidity, complacency and conceit.

Judging by the responses of the participants and personal impressions, as a whole the accountability and election meetings took place in a way very different from those in the past, when meetings and conferences were orchestrated. The atmosphere of openness and free expression of views was beneficial. As a rule, the party members began to speak daringly and openly, as the masters of their organization, interested in all of its affairs. Frequently, on the request of the delegates themselves, conferences were extended by many hours or for an entire day. At some of them more than 40 delegates spoke. The full equality of participants and the possibility to discuss various views, and to formulate rejoinders, both from the floor and the rostrum, were ensured.

The time when discussions within a party circle were equated with violations of unanimity is in the past. The true, rather than ostentatious, unanimity can develop only in the course of creative discussions, in the course of practical arguments and of collective searching. It is only thus that a responsible and conscious attitude toward adopted decisions can be developed. Incidentally, the interest and informality with which draft resolutions were discussed and formulated at the conferences eloquently prove the increased activeness of the party members. There were principled debates and some items were discussed and put to a vote separately.

Nonetheless, for the sake of being objective we must acknowledge that despite a noticeable overall increase in exigency, openness and democracy, many of the conferences suffered from the old approaches. It was as though time had stopped in the case of some party committees. The power of inertia, holding on to hackneyed ways, excessive organization and stereotype were felt. In frequent cases both featured and other speakers showed no exigency toward themselves and on numerous occasions criticism of secretaries and bureau members was loose and vague. Often there was a total lack of specific personal remarks, with an analysis of the style and work methods

of one leader or another. But what kind of criticism could this be if it is not addressed at anyone specifically, for every party member is personally responsible for something?

Democracy was enriched in the course of the campaign and the elections. This was helped by the new CPSU Central Committee instruction on electoral procedures. It is no secret that critical remarks had been expressed on the subject of this instruction. Probably, taking into consideration the practical experience acquired in its application, some of its stipulations should be updated and improved. The fact remains, however, that the instruction enhanced the democratization of the electoral process. The primary party organizations submitted nominations for superior party authorities. The lists of the candidates were published in the press and broadcast on the radio; surveys of party and nonparty people were conducted, and other types of public opinion surveys were applied. In other words, the party masses and the population had a real opportunity for influencing the shape of the elected party aktiv. This also led to phenomena which could not have been considered ordinary in the past. For example, the delegates attending the Katangskiy Rayon Party Conference, Irkutsk Oblast did not stop at criticizing the former first secretary of the raykom, who had been recently dismissed for callousness and an authoritarian management style, but expressed major complaints concerning the party committee as a whole, and judged its work unsatisfactory. A number of such cases were reported in the press.

Briefly, in this accountability and election campaign the party organizations acquired a good training in democracy. It is important now for democracy and glasnost, exigency, and a constructive approach, which were the trademarks of the conferences, to be further developed and adopted as a standard of party life.

[KOMMUNIST] In the course of the accountability and election campaign great attention was paid to the activities of the primary party organizations. What can you tell us about their increased activeness? Are all of them fully assuming the leadership role in the positive processes occurring in the labor collectives, and what new and interesting features have appeared in their lives after the 19th Party Conference? Have relations between primary party organizations and party raykoms and gorkoms changed?

[G. Razumovskiy] There is solid proof that the accountability and election campaign made the majority of party organizations and their committees stronger. The political vigilance of the party members is growing and so is their feeling of responsibility to the people. It is of great importance that these trends were manifested in the primary organizations, where a critical mood predominated and where demands formulated toward the elected individuals were specific and the choice of candidacies for leading party authorities on all levels was made most thoroughly and democratically. This means that the

party masses are beginning to move and directly to participate in active political work. Now it is important not to allow the initiative and autonomy of the primary party units to vanish. Their way must be cleared of all bureaucratic regulations. Now that the collective resolutions have been passed, the primary party organizations assume the main burden for their implementation. If they work as they should, things will go well.

The accountability and election meetings indicated that the primary party organizations, the majority of them in any case, should most clearly realize their responsibility and try to be in step with our time. What was discussed at the meetings? The discussions dealt with converting the ideas of perestroika to the level of practical use and mental energy into the energy of action. It is on this that all the forces of the party organizations and their entire attention are concentrated today. This applies, above all, to the decisive area—economics—which is the material foundation for the renovation of society and which affects the foundations of popular life. The party members realize that changes in the economy and in social development will decide the future of perestroika and that in undertaking long-term tasks it is important not to ignore even for a minute the urgent problems, those which affect the daily life of each family and every individual.

Let me particularly emphasize that an active stance in perestroika is inconceivable without the purposeful efforts of the party members and their organizations in solving strictly practical problems and truly improving results production and the social area. The accountability and election meetings formulated specific work programs for the primary party organizations, aimed at achieving real changes in priority areas. Big and small primary and shop party organizations and party groups, as practical experience indicates, can do a great deal for the people, providing that they establish specifically and concretely the main points in satisfying the vital needs of the working people and concentrated on doing so.

Naturally, so far by no means are all party organizations fulfilling their role as political leaders of labor collectives. The reasons for this are numerous, including the inability promptly to organize party work, the insufficient combativeness of the elected aktiv, and errors in the choice of secretaries. Why conceal it, in the past frequently not the most reputable and best trained party members who were elected to such positions but people who had a less demanding job, were deemed more "accommodating," and were easier to get along with. The party members are no longer willing to tolerate such a situation. More than one-third of secretaries of primary and shop party organizations were replaced. With increasing frequency authoritative party members, who can lead the people, are taking over the leadership of party organizations.

The possibilities of the primary party organizations become entirely clear when they are properly guided by the party raykoms and the other superior party authorities. Petty supervision, the imposition of views, not to

mention diktat, should become forever things of the past. Quite properly, the party members raised at the meetings the question of how to help secretaries of primary party organizations, above all in mastering political work methods. The party committees on all levels must seriously consider ways of giving methodical aid to the primary aktiv.

[KOMMUNIST] Georgiy Petrovich, how can we assess changes in the work style of the party committees? Is the process of mastering political methods proceeding at the required pace and is it possible to demarcate more clearly among the functions of party, soviet and economic authorities?

[G. Razumovskiy] More pointedly than in the past, the question of eliminating bureaucratic administration and arbitrary methods and organizing new types of relations between party committees and soviet and economic authorities and with the mass associations of working people was raised in the course of the accountability and election meetings. It was noted most rightfully that relieving the party authorities from extraneous operative-executive and economic functions does not mean at all that they must remove themselves from dealing with economic problems. The party has always dealt and will continue to deal with the economy. It is not removing ourselves from the economy but restructuring the methods of party work in the economic area that should be our position for the foreseeable future.

In a number of conferences, including those in Moscow city and oblast, Leningrad, Kiev, Minsk, Gorkiy, Volgod, and Murmansk Oblast, it was pointed out that political approaches and political methods are becoming increasingly part of the activities of party committees. The attention of the party committees is focused on problems of developing the activeness of workers, kolkhoz members and intellectuals, their participation in perestroika processes, and the needs and concerns of labor collectives and primary party units, and the solution of problems which directly influence improvements in the living conditions of the people.

At this point, it would be pertinent to recall the following fact: during the period under consideration, despite an overall noticeable reduction in the number of problems discussed by the local party committees, the share of problems are directly related to improving the style and methods of party and political leadership and cadre work, updating the activities of the soviet authorities, increasing glasnost, moral and international upbringing, perfecting relations among nationalities and ensuring law and order increased substantially. Such changes in the nature of the problems under consideration led to a sharp decrease (30-40 percent) in the number of traditional production and management questions. This trend was approved and was further developed at the meetings and conferences.

As to the question of demarcating between the functions of the party and the soviets, which was a topic of lively discussions at many party meetings and conferences, let us note the following: on the one hand, after the All-Union Party Conference, this matter was reorganized on a practical basis, concerning the party and soviet apparatus, the establishment of new management structures in the national economic sectors, and the adoption of new economic management conditions by enterprises and associations. As a result, the accountability and election campaign encouraged the establishment of new soviets with greater powers.

On the other hand, the accountability and election meetings reflected the true complexity of this process, which is not developing smoothly in all areas. The participants in meetings and conferences noted that, in frequent cases, matters do go beyond making statements about changes in functions and taking new requirements into consideration. In a number of areas, the soviets are still not showing readiness fully to assume their obligations in solving problems which they alone should deal with at this point. Is this not the reason for which, with changes in the structure of the apparatus, as was noted by the participants in a number of conferences, economic problems had to be dealt with by the organizational departments of raykoms and gorkoms?

The delegates justifiably criticized party committees which, to this day, as in the past, wait for recommendations from their superiors and display hesitations and indecisiveness in mastering the new ways and means of work. A great deal of organizational confusion and mutual forgiveness of shortcomings remain in this area. At the same time, all kinds of doubts are being expressed as to the efficiency of political approaches and their nature is being misinterpreted. This too can be explained. According to some people, lack of total supervision, command and pressure, power may be lost and the role of the party may decline. The economic ties among enterprises would weaken or even break down without raykom and obkom "coordinations" or managing activities. Some people, furthermore, cannot do without learned definitions, such as "what does a political approach mean?" Unquestionably this problem exists, as do many other problems related to perestroika in the party, and all need serious scientific work and not the reiteration of elementary truths.

Characteristically, as a rule those who are indifferent to the ordinary concerns and needs of the people tend to engage in abstract and scholastic considerations as to "what is a political approach." Such people are frequently well familiar with production technology and always ask questions about the use of the equipment or the condition of the winter crops, showing no interest in the moral and psychological climate in the collective or working and living conditions. Such an approach, which I would describe as technocratic, clashes with the political, the party approach.

To find out the way the people live, what worries them, whether they have a solid roof over their heads, and do they eat well in the worker cafeteria, determining whether they are being cheated in the stores, and helping bring order in everything means to act as a political worker should. In order to understand the essence of this approach, in the words of Lenin, "one does not have to be theoretician. Suffice it to be a **party member**" ("Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 52, p 233). This means, as was emphasized at many meetings and conferences, to assess facts and actions precisely on the basis of a human, a party-oriented position, to give them a political assessment and not to ignore the requests of the people but to support their good initiatives. At that point the people will see that the party members are indeed acting as politicians.

[KOMMUNIST] Let us elaborate on the following: What, within the framework of a political approach, is the correlation between organizational and ideological work?

[G. Razumovskiy] Today less than ever could ideological work be isolated from organizational work. Ideological work is interwoven in all of our practical activities. It is noteworthy that in frequent cases reports at meetings and conferences began with an analysis of the political situation and ideological work. This too was a reflection of the understanding that the influence of the party committees on the views and moods of the people and on upgrading the activeness of the masses is the key to achieving the necessary results in the solution of production and social problems.

With the new situation it has become both easier and more difficult for party committees and ideological cadres to do their work. It has become easier because many obsolete concepts and dogmas and many stereotypes which confused our workers and which nurtured red tape and formalism, have been rejected. It has become more difficult, for in an atmosphere of discussions and occasional polarizing of opinions, the party workers have been asked to adopt to the fullest extent principle-minded positions and display a broad range of views and the ability to engage in dialogue, which are qualities of true political fighters who daringly engage in an open debate and discussion regardless of the nature of the audience, and who can convince people. Not everyone turned out prepared for this. Those who fail to notice changes, who do not feel the new trends and requirements, who hold on to the old cliches and are unable to detect the moods of the people or to understand their interests find themselves in a particularly difficult situation.

As the meetings and conferences indicated, the renovated content and methods of organizational and ideological work are not keeping up with life everywhere, by any means. Some of the personnel trail behind events or are merely defending themselves from attacks "from the left" and "from the right." Relations between party



committees and mass information media are not always constructive and mutually profitable. Wherever the party organizations have fallen behind the restructuring of organizational and ideological work and are trailing behind life, possibilities arise for the development of political structures, hiding behind general democratic slogans, the purpose of which is to promote nationalism and extremism and to compromise and defeat perestroika. The party organizations neither can nor should tolerate such occurrences.

Reality reminds us of the importance for the party committees to control developments and clearly to formulate in front of the masses their own position in the changing circumstances. They must not limit themselves to noting the facts but act and find optimal decisions, for the people follow those who know where they are going and not those who, themselves, cannot see the road ahead.

[KOMMUNIST] As we know, in the course of the accountability and election meetings, there was a renovation in the structure of secretaries of primary organizations and party bodies. How can such changes be characterized? How close have we come to the objective set by the party's Central Committee of implementing a cadre policy within the framework of the democratic process?

[G. Razumovskiy] There has been a great deal of renovation. In this respect, as in many other areas, for a long time there has been no accountability and election campaign in the party such as this one. In the course of the elections in the primary party organizations more than 160,600 secretaries were replaced and more than 2,300 of them were voted down. This accounted, respectively, for 37.2 and 1.5 percent, as compared to 25.4 and 0.1 percent 3 years ago. These figures indicate that the party members approached the evaluation of their leaders with a high degree of exigency.

As to the party authorities on the rayon, city and okrug levels, 62 percent of those who were elected were not members of the previous managing bodies. On the oblast and kray levels, the share of newly elected members of party committees reached 58.6 percent. The corps of party committee secretaries was noticeably renovated as well. A total of 1,433 new secretaries assumed the leadership of raykoms, gorkoms and okruzhkoms, and 62 of obkoms and kraykoms (including 3 first secretaries). This in addition to the fact that significant changes in the structure of party leaders had already taken place during the period under consideration.

The participants in the meetings, the conference delegates and those whom they represented spoke out quite clearly, and backed their views with their secret ballots, in support of the fact that the party agencies and organizations must be headed by the people who think daringly and originally, and who respect the opinions and experience of their comrades and are able to achieve

real results in their work. Thorough consultations with party and nonparty members in choosing and nominating candidates for leadership proved to be an effective way of establishing and taking into consideration the preferred choices at the stage of preparations for the elections. This is a reliable protection from errors. It can be said that the use of such methods is becoming a standard of internal party life.

In the course of the elections at meetings and conferences and plenums of party committees, one-third of all party group organizers, one-half of secretaries of shop and primary party organizations, 1,117 raykom and gorkom secretaries (including 269 first secretaries), and eight secretaries of party obkoms and raykoms were elected from among two or more candidates. The active participation of party members and nonparty working people in nominating and discussing candidates for party bodies and providing choices in the voting itself make it possible to highlight authoritative and initiative-minded party members who are leading perestroika forward.

[KOMMUNIST] What can be said about the very atmosphere of the party meetings and conferences? What, in your view, should be noted as positive and what were the typical shortcomings? What lessons should be learned for the future?

[G. Razumovskiy] The scale of the accountability and election campaign was impressive: between September 1988 and January 1989 some 1.7 million meetings and conferences were held in the party organizations, from shop to oblast and kray. Understandably, such quantitative features predetermined the tremendous variety of specific situations which arose in the course of the accountability and election meetings. However, some basic trends were bound to emerge.

Press articles and radio and television broadcasts enabled us to realize the heterogeneous nature and variety of the situations which arose. Let me merely emphasize that all of them developed within the framework of the normal democratic process. The open and sharply critical discussions held on a wide variety of problems on which the party organizations focused their attention, and the collective formulation of programs for action for the future were, unquestionably, the distinguishing features of the meetings and conferences.

Here are a few facts in support of this conclusion: at the Saratov Oblast Party Conference, at which 25 delegates spoke, another 30 delegates expressed, verbally or in writing, specific wishes to the press center on how to improve matters. All of them were reflected in the expanded resolution and the appeal adopted by the delegates to all oblast party members and working people. One of the features of the Irkutsk Oblast Party Conference was working in various sections, which enabled the delegates to formulate additionally more than 100 suggestions on the draft resolution.

Critical remarks on the candidacies under discussion were voiced by the speakers, who addressed the party obkom at the Odessa Oblast Conference on the subject of the new elective authorities. The ideas of those who were unable to participate in the discussions of the accountability report will be published in the newspapers, in addition to the featured speeches. Another feature was the use made at many rayon, city and oblast conferences of the intermissions in the work of the accountability commissions, during which questions and remarks were answered.

Unquestionably, the rejection of ostentatious unanimity or efforts to "equalize" the views of party members are positive phenomena. The main lesson which can be drawn from the accountability and elections campaign is to realize that there neither is nor will there be any return to the past. We are reforming the political system and thus providing scope for the development of internal party and socialist democracy, self-management by the working people, the assertion of collectivism and true comradeship. Understandably, those who are called upon to guide the political process must fear not the activeness and interest of the people but indifference and the alienation of the masses from social affairs.

Particularly important in this connection are the daily, painstaking and persistent efforts to implement the remarks and suggestions expressed by the party members and to inform the public of the steps which are being taken. It is important not to waste the painstakingly collected and collectively analyzed experience, but to use and multiply it.

[KOMMUNIST] In the post-April period the topic of changes in the structure and composition of the party apparatus was frequently mentioned in the discussions of pressing problems of restructuring party work. What are the most characteristic features and trends of its reorganization?

[G. Razumovskiy] The reorganization of the party apparatus marked the actual beginning of the implementation of the political reform. It is no secret that the sectorial principle of its structure, starting with raykoms and gorkoms, all the way to the Central Committee, is a reflection of the command-administrative management methods. In order to eliminate the distortions which took place here, as we know, the July 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum passed the resolution "On Basic Trends In the Perestroyka of the Party Apparatus." The plenum called for abandoning its sectorial structure and strengthening subdivisions dealing with basic problems of internal party life, ideological work and domestic and foreign policy and, at the same time, substantially reducing its overall size.

By now this has been virtually completed. The sectorial departments and sectors have been closed down in the central committees of communist parties of Union republics, kraykoms, obkoms, gorkoms and raykoms.

The number of departments of central committees of Union republics and party kraykoms and obkoms have been reduced by 1,064 or by 44 percent; the number of sectors has been reduced by 465 or by almost 25 percent. More than 8,000 industrial-transportation, agricultural and other sectorial departments of city and rayon party committees have been abolished. Now the party gorkoms and raykoms have, as a rule, only organizational and ideological departments. The gorkoms which operate in large industrial centers have socioeconomic and state-legal departments while those in large rural areas have agrarian departments. New positions have been introduced for party apparatus personnel, such as responsible organizers, and in the kraykoms and obkoms—inspectors and consultants. Highly competent people are appointed to such positions. This will make it possible to provide more skillful aid to party committees and organizations.

Along with optimizing the structure of the apparatus, the size of its personnel is being substantially reduced. Particular attention is being paid to upgrading the professional standards of the personnel, to promoting within the apparatus convinced supporters of perestroyka, and to developing in the cadres the ability to work in a new way and to implement party policy under the conditions of democracy and glasnost.

Thus, the CPSU Central Committee apparatus is being reduced by approximately 40 percent. That of the central committees of communist parties of Union republics and party kraykoms and obkoms, by 30 percent; the size of the personnel of party gorkoms in cities with rayon divisions is being reduced by 10-20 percent. The number of party gorkom, obkom and kraykom, and central committees of communist parties of Union republic secretaries has been reduced. Some of the personnel were assigned to work in lower party organizations and some in soviet agencies or in economic areas, not counting those who were retired. As to the rayon and city committees, it was deemed inexpedient to reduce the size of their personnel, for it was small and most of the work directly related to the party organizations is done by such officials. Let us particularly emphasize the change taking place in terms of the supremacy of elected party authorities over their apparatus. Naturally, this feature should be understood not in a formal-bureaucratic manner or on the level of purely administrative hierarchy. It is a question of supremacy in work and of the fact that in many areas, particularly in drafting of accountability reports and preparing for elections, the members of the elected authorities themselves were truly active. Here is one feature: at the Kiev Oblast Conference, the fact that a related topic of the accountability report submitted by the obkom was the work of the members of the oblast committee was deemed of great interest. The following figures are equally indicative: 140 of the 174 obkom members and candidate members participated in drafting the list of problems which were considered at the plenums and by the buro and 116 spoke at such plenums.



As the press reported, in a number of party organizations—Moscow Oblast and city, Krasnodar Kray, Kiev Oblast and city, Tula, and Alma-Ata Oblast, on an experimental basis, in addition to the party committees, control-auditing commissions as well as corresponding committees were set up. They were made accountable to the conferences, so that by the next 28th CPSU Congress experience will have been gained in the practices of the unified party control authorities.

Positive experience in involving the elected aktiv in the collective work of party committees is being gained in many party organizations. Task forces consisting of elected authorities, or headed by their members, participated in the preparations for the meetings and conferences, including in areas such as reorganizing the style of party leadership. It was particularly noteworthy that, in accordance with the recommendations of the 19th All-Union Party Conference, at their organization plenums the party committees set up commissions, made up of their own members and candidate members, to be in charge of the main areas of work. Now it is a question of making their creative investigations and organizational activities truly purposeful and permanent.

[KOMMUNIST] In this connection, we would like to ask you, Georgiy Petrovich, as chairman of the CPSU Central Committee Commission On Problems of Party Construction and Cadre Policy, to describe to us, albeit briefly, the tasks and activities of this new Central Committee subdivision.

[G. Razumovskiy] The functions of the Central Committee commissions created in accordance with the stipulations of the 19th All-Union Party Conference were defined at the November 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum. Let me recall the most important among them: study of problems and formulation, for the CPSU Central Committee, of proposals aimed at improving the activities of party organizations; implementing the party's political concepts and analyzing the course and results of the implementation of party resolutions and the decisions of party congresses and conferences. Another important function is preliminary work on the most important aspects of life in the party and the country and the drafting of documents and analytical materials for the Politburo or the Central Committee plenums.

Our commission as well is guided by these stipulations. Furthermore, we take into consideration our own specifics, defined above all by the nature of the questions with which we deal. We began our work with the elaboration, formulation and concretizing of such problems. We discussed our problems, and every member of the commission expressed his views and submitted suggestions. Obviously, we are concentrating above all on problems related to the democratization of party life and the restructuring of party work under the conditions of the separation of functions of party, soviet and economic authorities.

Unquestionably, the most important feature in the work of the commission is to deal with problems of party cadre policy. It is important to establish the priority areas in this case. By concentrating on them, we shall formulate suggestions on establishing a concept for a contemporary cadre policy in accordance with the new conditions which are developing in the course of the democratization of life in the party and society, the political reform, and so on. We are ascribing a major role to cadre training and retraining.

The commission will also study the practical experience acquired in the democratization of party life and will draft recommendations on the further development of this process. In this connection, it is necessary systematically to analyze and to sum up available experience in holding accountability and election campaigns and bureau submissions of reports to their committees and party committees, and by party bureaus to primary and shop party organizations. It is precisely the summation of the results of the accountability and election campaign we are discussing here that was the topic of discussion at the recently held meeting by the commission.

The time is approaching when we shall directly undertake preparations for the forthcoming 28th CPSU Congress. The commission will most actively participate in this work. On the instructions of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo we shall draft proposals on matters of party building, which will be considered at the congress, and formulate conclusions on draft party documents, including those which will be offered for party-wide or nationwide discussion.

How is our work structured? Naturally, we try to carry it out on a basis of collective and democratic principles. This also applies to formulating the range of problems to be solved on a priority basis and allowing every member of the commission to specialize in the study of problems of greater interest to him. We are essentially relying on the initiative of the members of the commission in the formulation of the various problems which are based on real life and which appear in the course of perestroika.

In its activities, the commission relies on the help of the CPSU Central Committee departments and the broad party aktiv. Firm ties are being established with party and soviet officials, primary party organization secretaries and scientists. We are organizing the study of public opinion and organizing cooperation with the mass information media. I am confident that all of this will help us to develop and solve more profoundly and comprehensively the problems which face the commission.

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### APK: Old and New Problems

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[Article by Vladimir Vasilyevich Miloserdov, VASKH-NIL corresponding member]

[Text] No socially strong policy can be pursued without solving the food problem. However, for decades this problem remained rather pressing in the country. Clearly, the lagging here has become chronic. Short periods of progress were followed by declines, stagnation and even crises. In the course of the development of agriculture there have been only three 5-year periods in which output grew at a sufficiently high pace: 1922-1926, when gross farm output nearly doubled; 1954-1958, when it rose by 50 percent; and 1966-1970, when it rose by 21 percent. The rest of the time the growth rates were insignificant or else none or even declining. We cannot say that agriculture was not considered significant. It was the exact opposite. In 1988 alone capital investments in excess of 65 billion rubles were made in that area of the economy, in addition to huge quantities of raw materials, fuel, metal, machinery, fertilizers, mixed fodder and others which were supplied. An innumerable number of various types of advice, recommendations, innovations and plans were submitted. The paradox however was that, in all likelihood, the rural worker would have been much better off without supervision and without the numerous controllers or instructions as to what to sow and what technology to use, what kind of cattle and how much livestock to raise, what to feed the livestock, and so on. In L.N. Tolstoy's novel "*Anna Karenina*," Levin pondered who knew farming better, he personally or the peasant. Since then, however, the habit of such thoughts and questions essentially disappeared. To this day many are those who believe that one can always see more clearly from higher up.

The study of the various stages in the development of agriculture indicates that the main thing is the extent to which agrarian policy is consistent with the real needs of society, the existence of substantial incentives and the interest shown by the rural workers in their work and work results. Whenever such interest has existed, growth rates have been fast; conversely, whenever agrarian policy became distorted and when incentives to work dropped, apathy and indifference—the first symptoms of stagnation—appeared. The establishment of a rigid bureaucratic management system and uprooting any manifestation of independence wrecked the social activeness of the masses and virtually destroyed their interest in end results. The peasant became alienated from the land.

Efforts were made to compensate for this process by quickly expanding the size of the administrative apparatus, which reached 2.3 million employees in the kolkhozes and sovkhoses and 360,000 in the Gosagroprom agencies. In Tula Oblast, for example, 24,000

people were employed in the agroprom administrative area. There were 400 rayon administrations and organizations for 415 farms. The situation in the other oblasts was similar.

Despite repeated resolutions on increasing the autonomy of the farms and encouraging kolkhoz labor, in practice pressure management methods continue to dominate agriculture. For that reason neither the steadily growing investments and scientific potential nor any increase in the management apparatus were beneficial. The growth rates of food production substantially lagged behind the unparalleled high pace of increased investments, assets and material resources.

Compared to 1975, in 1987 basic productive capital in agriculture was higher by a factor of 2.1 and gross production had increased by 24.4 percent. Whereas during the 9th 5-Year Plan for each percentage of increase in gross APK output production capital had to be increased by 4.2 billion rubles, in the 11th 5-year period the figure had already reached 7.3 billion.

Stagnation phenomena in the APK led to a drastic increase in imports of food and raw materials for food production. Between 1970 and 1987 purchases of meat and meat products abroad increased by a factor of 5.2; fish and fish products, 12.4; vegetable oil, 12.8; grain, 13.8; sugar, 6.9; and butter, 183.2! In 1988 purchases abroad included 36 million tons of grain while the country's kolkhozes and sovkhoses produced no more than 61 million tons. The fast increases in food imports occurred against a background of higher world prices. Between 1970 and 1987 prices of meat and dairy products increased by 90 percent; grain prices doubled and the prices of sugar and confectionery goods increased by a factor of more than 7. This worsened difficulties in the foreign economic and credit-financial areas.

In the last 3 5-year periods per-capita consumption of meat in the country rose to 14 kilograms. In principle, this is a good increase. However, it was achieved by increasing imports of meat and feed grain for meat production and by no means by improving the work of the sectors in the agroindustrial complex. In 1987 imports accounted for 6.6 percent of meat consumption in the country, 19.7 percent of butter, 22.5 percent of vegetable oil and 25.5 percent of unrefined sugar. The overall cost of food imports and imports of raw materials for food production increased by a factor of 6, reaching 10 billion rubles. This was a tremendous burden for our economy.

Radical changes and a sharp break with the stereotypes of economic management and traditional concepts on APK development were needed in order to surmount stagnation. However, the steps which were taken to implement the 1982 Food Program failed to yield any radical results. All we were able to accomplish was to prevent a crisis in agriculture. Farm output increased by 11.5 percent between 1983 and 1987. This pace was

clearly insufficient and could not have any noticeable influence on increased per-capita consumption of food product, for it only slightly exceeded the population growth rates.

In our view, the main reason for this situation is found in the absence of an integral and thoroughly weighed agrarian policy, consistent with the changed conditions and needs of society, the unbalanced nature of the economic mechanism and the clash between simultaneously functioning old and new elements of this mechanism. This applies, above all, to investment and structural policies. Despite significant capital investments, the structure of the complex was not improved, disproportions worsened and discoordination increased. Frequently developments conflicted with progressive world trends.

Thus, in the advanced countries the share of sectors related to the transportation and storage, processing and marketing of agricultural commodities has been steadily increasing. In the United States, for example, between 1980 and 1983 it averaged 87.3 percent of the entire volume of output in the agroindustrial area, as compared to some 30 percent in the USSR.

Return on capital investments, in one sector or another were not analyzed. Capital investments were frequently made not where they could have yielded the best results. Whereas in Hungary, for instance, the correlation of capital investments in agriculture and in the processing of agricultural commodities was 4.8:1 in 1966-1970 and had dropped to 1.6:1 in 1984-1986, in our country it continued to increase, from 5.6:1 to 7.9:1. This led to a significant lagging in processing capacities behind the volumes of purchases of agricultural commodities and, consequently, to tremendous commodity losses and worsened quality.

Today nearly one-third of agricultural commodities do not reach the consumer: they become lost, spoiled or wasted. Every year the country loses about 1 million tons of meat products; nearly one-half of the entire dairy protein in cattle feeding is lost because of lack of refrigeration and processing facilities and an inefficient processing structure. This is largely the result of the wrong strategy of capital investments. Excessive investments are being made in some sectors, without yielding necessary results. Extremely few funds are being invested in other, although here their returns could be high and quick. For example, huge investments have been made in reclamation, although returns on such investments are low. Millions of hectares of reclaimed lands become salinized and are written off. Between 1971 and 1987 25.5 million hectares of irrigated and drained land were put to use but the available useful area increased by no more than 14.9 million hectares, which means that 10.6 million or more than 40 percent of the reclaimed land had been written off or simply left unused. Tens of billions of rubles were wasted.

Investments in agricultural machine building were made in such a way that the obsolete technical structure of production assets was preserved. The funds were concentrated not on modernizing and technical retooling but on the construction of new and expansion of functioning enterprises, i.e., on the creation of additional jobs although, at best, existing ones did not exceed 1.4 shifts daily.

As a result, domestic machine building ensures merely the mechanical increase of technical facilities. Essentially uncoordinated and material-intensive machines and equipment of obsolete models are being supplied to agriculture and the food industry. This adversely affects labor productivity, material and energy intensiveness of output and the process of asset renovation. Thus, whereas in 1975 the share of equipment produced in under 3 years accounted for 18.1 percent of the overall volume of output, by 1987 it had dropped to 12.5 percent. Correspondingly, the share of equipment produced in more than a 10 year period had risen from 24.6 to 37.4 percent.

The huge volume of substandard equipment and its high degree of wear demanded tremendous outlays for maintaining it in a working condition. In 1987 1 million workers with a payroll of 2.3 billion rubles were engaged in repairing tractors and agricultural machinery; fixed productive capital worth 9.2 billion rubles was invested in this area (for the sake of comparison let us say that in the entire area of tractor and agricultural machine building and the production of equipment, packaging and inventory activities 1.1 million workers were employed with a payroll of 3.2 billion rubles and that the value of fixed capital in this area was 12.2 billion). Clearly, it would have been better to channel such funds into modernizing and technical re-equipping of the sector and the production of better quality and more advanced agricultural machines which are currently needed.

In recent years major steps were taken radically to change the investment policy in the APK. Investments in the machine building sectors in the 12th 5-year period were to be increased by a factor of 2.2; they were to be increased by a factor of 2.9 in the microbiological industry, 1.7 in the production of chemical fertilizers and plant protection preparations and 1.4 in the processing sectors. It appeared as though the investment restructuring should have significantly improved the APK structure and, consequently, upgraded its efficiency. However, this did not happen. No more than 80 to 85 percent of the funds appropriated for the first years of the 5-year plan were invested. The share of the processing sectors remains very low. In 1988 capital investments in agriculture exceeded investments in processing by a factor of 8.9.

Cattle productivity and farm crop yields are increasing extremely slowly. According to the specialists, no more than 60 to 70 percent of their biological potential is being



used. This is also related to the tremendous overexpenditure of feed grain which, even according to most modest estimates, totals 20-25 million tons. Disparity in feed expenditures is high. Thus, it takes 21.6 quintals of feed units per quintal of beef in the Checheno-Ingush ASSR, compared with 15.5 in Stavropol Kray and 9.6 in Leningrad Oblast. Feed units per quintal of pork average 12.1 for Kursk Oblast, and 5.6 quintals in Yaroslavl Oblast.

In short, the outlay, extensive method prevails in the development of agriculture in many parts of the country. The entire increase in output is achieved through the use of additional material resources, the cost of which is increasing much faster than the value of the increased net APK output. As a result, the material, capital and energy intensiveness of output increase and returns on invested funds diminish.

Dairy animal husbandry is one of the rare exceptions. For more than 5 years the entire increase in milk production in kolkhozes and sovkhozes has been achieved as a result of increased dairy cattle productivity. This means that no additional funds are required for building new cow barns; nor is there any need to increase the number of milkmaids; the share of the feed in the rations is being reduced and milk production efficiency is improving. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said of the other sectors.

Major disproportions have developed also in the correlation between capital investments in the production and social areas of the countryside. Whereas the cost of area per cow is about 4,000 rubles, in most cases a rural family would be living in a small hut the price of which does not exceed 600-700 rubles. The migration of the rural population is continuing. In some farms, particularly in the Nonchernozem zone of the RSFSR, there is virtually no manpower left. In the past 3 years alone 1.1 million working people have abandoned their villages.

Developing an anti-outlay economic management system in the countryside becomes a necessary prerequisite for the efficient use of investments. Today the countryside needs less material and financial resources than do owners, who would use them and obtain real returns. Such is the purpose of the radical economic reform. In the APK, however, for the time being it is being applied inconsistently.

It was believed that the creation of the USSR Gosagroprom system would make the elimination of departmental discoordination among the sectors possible, and result in the conversion to economic management methods, democratize management, increase the autonomy of enterprises and enhance the human factor. So far, this has not been achieved. The economic interconnection among Gosagroprom units have not been subjected to major changes. In many cases some subdivisions were closed down while others were created.

Therefore, without waiting for instructions from superiors, in some local areas a search has been initiated for new organizational forms of management. Thus, rayon cooperative associations are being created, replacing the RAPO. They include kolkhozes, sovkhozes and servicing and processing enterprises. In our view, this is the basic way, as indicated by reality, for reorganizing the structure of APK management leading to the creation of a multiple-level democratic cooperative system. The accuracy of the system was emphasized also at the CPSU Central Committee conference on problems of improving APK management. The elected agencies of the cooperatives and their associations should not command or rule but serve the people, for the renovation of society and taking the people out of their state of apathy and leading them into creativity and initiative cannot be achieved through command-administrative methods. The extensive application of collective and leasing methods provide a good foundation for the implementation of such objectives.

According to statistical data, the contracting collectives in the country today farm approximately 90 percent of the land and handle two-thirds of the cattle and the poultry. Such collectives frequently achieve high economic results. Nonetheless, we should point out that no real changes have taken place. In the majority of cases the work done by contracting collectives differs little from that of ordinary ones. Many of them were created on a formal basis and exist on paper only. Furthermore, a significant percentage of them dissolve in the course of the year.

Leasing collectives proved to be more viable and efficient. By June 1988 the leasing system had been adopted by 15,000 kolkhozes and sovkhozes. Operating under conditions of economic independence and property responsibility, the lessee becomes the true proprietor of the land and the other means of production, and his personal interests most fully coincide with those of society. In numerous cases, after 1 or 2 years of freeing the initiative and enterprise of the farmer, under leasing conditions, leads to an increase in grain yields by 10-15 quintals per hectare and milk by 1,500 to 2,000 kilograms; labor productivity increases several hundred percent and material outlays decline. For example, at the Bereg Kolkhoz, Nevelskiy Rayon, Pskov Oblast, the average daily weight increase in cattle achieved by lessees was 1,050 grams, compared to under 500 for the farm as a whole. Differences in outlays per 1 quintal of weight increase were nearly 300 percent.

Leasing is a key feature in contemporary agrarian policy. It is the shortest and most reliable way for obtaining adequate food supplies and one of the most promising forms of socialist ownership. It is important today to provide the necessary conditions for the comprehensive conversion to leasing and full cost accounting. I am convinced that there is no other way for turning back

into peasants the rural working people and making fuller use of their intellectual and moral potential and their active involvement in social life and production management.

However, the development of leasing does not lead exclusively to positive results. There have also been cases of excessive haste, misunderstanding of the nature of leasing relations and pitting leasing against other forms of economic management. Alarming indications have become apparent of turning the promotion of leasing into one more campaign. Thus, according to the Kazakh SSR Gosagroprom, as early as June 1988 leasing was practiced by 78 percent of the farms in the republic and in several of its oblasts, by 100 percent. Once again, we are concentrating all our efforts on reporting. Reports, however, create neither milk nor meat.

A study has indicated that even in the farms which have pioneered the use of leasing, frequently not the principles of leasing but contracting with wages based on the residual principle is applied. Once and for all, we must realize that running after percentages can only discredit leasing.

It would be equally dangerous to hinder the development of new relations. Today such development is frequently held back by the insufficient economic knowledge of cadres, the conservative stance adopted by enterprise heads and specialists and their concealed or, sometimes, even overt opposition.

The existing management system, with regulated production activities, rigid planning system, accounting, price-setting and centralized distribution of material and technical resources clashes with the new economic management methods. The leasing collective or primary cooperative has no time to deal with drafting the tremendous number of reports, supplying information based on standard tractors and hectares and data relative to the individual brigade leader's accounts, weighing the fattened cattle monthly, etc. Therefore, we must radically change and simplify the accounts and accountability system.

The lack of legal foundations in the use of leasing relations is a major obstacle to the development of the system. We need a law on leasing. We also must improve the organizational and economic aspect of the work. The lessees are given land and other means of production for long-term use and for pay. It would appear that under such circumstances he should own his output and develop his own production structure and relations with the farms and other enterprises and organizations on a commercial basis. For the time being, he has no such independence. Without this we cannot emancipate the working person entirely and ensure the efficient farming of the land.

An important part of the economic reform in the APK is the application of full cost accounting and self-financing. The conversion to economic management methods reduces the cost of equipment purchases and write-offs. Thus, in 1988 the RSFSR kolkhozes and sovkhozes refused to purchase underproductive and expensive equipment worth 500 million rubles.

However, despite some positive changes, we have been unable to determine the full extent of the great potential opportunities provided by the new economic relations. One of the reasons for this is the obsolete system of material and technical procurements and services. The servicing organizations, as owners of capital assets, continue to increase their volume of work by offering kolkhozes and sovkhozes expensive services in order to earn bonuses at their expense.

The use of cost accounting and self-financing in the losing farms remains a difficult problem. In 1987 there were 6,500 such farms in the country, some 1,500 of which had been steadily losing over the past 6-7 years. The reason for such losses is the extremely low level of output and the intensive farming method based on outlays. There are 6,700 farms (one out of seven) in the country, in which grain yields do not exceed 10 quintals per hectare; there are 13,300 farms (one out of three) whose yields are under 50 quintals of potatoes per hectare, i.e., seed potatoes is all they harvest! In 7,900 farms milk production per cow is under 2,000 kilograms. A kolkhoz chairman has said that a farm in which a cow yields under 2,000 kilograms is more terrible than fire, for this makes the cost of milk quite high. Therefore, in our country such a fire is raging in 20 percent of the farms.

About 11 billion rubles in price mark-ups have been allowed, with a view to supporting the economically lagging farms this year. However, economic errors were allowed to occur in the allocation of the funds. Instead of taking efficient steps to increase output and lower its cost, in a number of areas excessive mark-ups were added to the prices of some commodities. Thus, at the Kasibskiy Sovkhoz, Solikamskiy Rayon, Perm Oblast, mark-ups on milk and cattle are 365 percent over and above the purchase price. As a result, a kilogram of milk costs 1.7 rubles and the cost of pork and beef exceeds 18 rubles per kilogram!

Frequently the rates of withholdings for the centralized funds are raised. In the Russian Federation more than 23 percent of kolkhoz and sovkhoz profits and more than 7 percent of amortization withholdings were collected in a centralized fund; the figures for a number of areas were even higher. Thus, the agroindustrial committee in Astrakhan Oblast, set a withholding rate on profits of 35.2 percent and amortization of 13.2 percent. In frequent cases, a significant percentage of the funds earned by kolkhozes and sovkhozes are used to cover their expenditures. In Starorusskiy Rayon, Novgorod Oblast,



for example, the rate of reimbursements is 67 percent. What is given with one hand is taken away with the other. That is how the office works.

Another topical problem is that of formulating the plan for state purchases and deliveries of goods to Union stocks. Until recently, only 10 to 20 percent of the overall volume of purchased goods were delivered to the Union stocks. The remainder, although consumed locally, was also purchased on a centralized basis. The procedure which was practiced was that whoever produced more contributed more. All that was left to the individual areas was seeds and roughly the same percentage of grain to feed the cattle.

Under such circumstances the central authorities had to take over supplying the population of each area with food products and providing concentrated fodder for the livestock. The local authorities unwittingly found themselves in the position of depending on the state. Such equalization led to the fact that the local managers cared little about the storing and comprehensive processing of agricultural raw materials, dedicating all their efforts to extracting from the centralized state stocks meat, milk, mixed feeds and seeds. The prosperity of a given area greatly depended not on the amount of the goods it produced, but on procurements from state resources.

Another major shortcoming is the free financing of reclamation projects and the procurement of material and technical resources at subsidized prices. In 1987 the overall amount of subsidies for equipment and chemical fertilizers to agriculture alone totaled 5.8 billion rubles. Free financing and the compensation of production expenditures out of budget distort the actual production efficiency, prevent making economically substantiated decisions, and stimulate requests for more capital investments and material and financial resources.

Demands for state resources increased like a snow avalanche. For example, deliveries of concentrated fodder rose from 17.4 million tons in 1965 to 65.6 million in 1987, i.e., by a factor of 3.8. For that reason, grain purchases had to be doubled and imports increased significantly. The same situation exists in the case of chemical fertilizers, equipment, fuels and lubricants, etc.

Of late the principle governing the situation with food stocks has changed drastically. Firm 5-year figures for delivery of goods to the Union and republic stocks have been set. Now anything produced over and above such amounts is left for internal regional consumption. A kind of tax-in-kind has been introduced. The heads of the party committees and the economic authorities are now finding it more difficult to hide behind the broad back of the center. The local population can determine the efficiency of the work of the local managers by the stocks available in the stores. This approach requires a search for nonstandard ways for increasing food production and reducing its losses. The local managements have realized that under the new conditions their prime

obligation is not to the superior authority but to the population of their area. In this case accountability figures will not do. The population wants the actual goods.

Furthermore, despite lengthy discussions about the unacceptability of the gross production indicator, it continues to be applied. The entire world relies on the production of finished goods whereas we rely on gross output, regardless of its cost. In Czechoslovakia meat per head of cattle is 1.5 and in Hungary it is twice the Soviet average; respectively, it is 1.7 and 1.8 for pigs. This means that in order to produce the same amount of meat we must raise cattle and spend capital investments and keep more personnel at the livestock farms by a factor of 1.5 or 2. We produce 85 million tons of potatoes and, at best, 10 percent of this crop finds its way in the cooking pots. The country's needs for the various types of grain become the victims of gross output. Their structure, as received in the Union granaries, is by no means optimal. Higher-quality but lower-yielding crops are being reduced. We are short of groats and rye. The country grows more than 90 million tons of wheat although the need for wheat does not exceed 45 million. Meanwhile, we are short of hard and strong wheat strains of which we import some 20 million tons, while a significant share of the wheat grown domestically is used to feed the cattle.

The country's kolkhozes and sovkhoses are given approximately as much concentrated fodder as the amount of grain purchased from them. In some republics deliveries of state concentrated fodder substantially exceed the amount of purchases. Thus, in 1987 grain purchases from the Belorussian farms totaled 2,020,000 tons while deliveries of feed grain and fodder from state resources to the republic totaled 6,959,000 tons; the respective figures were 483,000 and 2,245,000 for the Lithuanian SSR, 365,000 and 2,284,000 for the Latvian SSR and 173,000 and 1,220,000 tons for the Estonian SSR. This leads to huge unproductive transportation costs. Obviously, it would be better not to purchase the grain from these republics (with the exception of some varieties of groats) but add concentrated feed until a balance has been reached. This would enable us to make more efficient use of the farmland. The notorious gross output leads also to the fact that the share of net agricultural output is steadily declining within the gross output, currently accounting for under 35 percent. As a result, we do not compute labor productivity the way everyone else does. Throughout the world labor productivity is the correlation between net output and labor outlays; in our country we use the gross output. Therefore, officially labor productivity is 300 percent higher than it actually is. In 1987 labor productivity in the APK, computed on the basis of gross output, was 11,200 rubles per worker; on the basis of net output, it was no more than 3,800.

As a whole, let us note the fact that, for the time being, the economic reform in the APK has not progressed. Some of its elements must be substantially amended

whereas others are as yet to be formulated and applied. Many problems exist, some of which must be resolved immediately. Everything possible must be done so that we may begin the new 5-year period with a properly formulated farm policy.

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**Conditions in Society. Social Regulators. Man**  
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[Article by Anatoliy Grigoryevich Vishnevskiy, doctor of economic sciences]

[Text] Of late the concept of the "qualitative condition of society" is becoming increasingly popular in science and political journalism. Intuitively, we sense the extent of this concept and its ability to encompass various aspects and results of social development. Meanwhile, its content remains insufficiently identified. Without claiming to provide a comprehensive study, we would like to draw attention to one of the most important factors which determine the qualitative condition of society, which is a historically defined regulator of human activities.

Entering this world, the tracks along which we must advance have already been laid and the traffic rules formulated. A system has been developed governing relations among people and illumining and protecting their institutional and ideological armor. There are values, standards and rules of behavior based on different situations. There are prohibitions and penalties for violating them. There are cultural mechanisms which, as they influence our minds and feelings, make sure that the majority of people accept the social order. The most important role here is the one played by economic relations such as, for example, relations of ownership, and the rules on which such relations are based. However, they by no means apply to the entire richness of life. They do not determine all the mechanisms of social regulation. We cannot hope for radical changes in society without radical changes in its economic structure. However, it would be mistaken to believe that such changes are independent of the **entire** system of social regulators or that changes in economic relations automatically entail immediate changes in the entire system.

During the period of industrialization, when millions of peasants were turning into industrial workers, both the economic and social structures of Soviet society changed quite rapidly. Could all social regulators of human activities change at the same pace? Hardly. Such regulators do not develop arbitrarily. In terms of complexity and organizational principles, they must be consistent with the complexity and principles governing the organization of the regulated object, i.e., man. In Marxism, this concept of the general theory of management is

consistent with the law of the consistency between production relations and the nature of production forces. It seems to me however that, regardless of everything that has been said and written on this subject, the present view on this law is still underestimating the role of man, for revolutionary changes in production forces always mean revolutionary changes **in man himself, in the human personality**. If prerequisites for changes in man, in the entire range of his sociocultural and sociopsychological characteristics, have appeared, possibilities arise for changes in the entire system of social relations and, therefore, in the respective regulators of human activities. Otherwise, such changes are being obstructed and held back.

Therefore, the question of the qualitative status of society is, perhaps, above all a question of the social type of man and his correlation with the existing system of social regulators, a question of man's readiness or lack of readiness to accept the changes in such regulators or, in other words, the ability or inability of the regulators to ensure the scientific realization of the historically established human potential.

#### 'The Unprepared Man'

Social regulators are effective when they not simply exist as institutions, standards, regulations, and so on, accepted as normal for a given society, but also when they are accepted by the people without difficulty, when they are natural for the people and consistent with their inner potential. If such potential grows while the social regulators remain unchanged, the balance is disrupted, the regulators lose their strength and turn into a purely superficial shell which paralyzes the development of man and his production forces and hinders his development. The removal of such a shell is quite difficult for, usually, it is supported by the force of beliefs, traditions and other links in the chain of social regulators.

However, something else may occur as well. Seventy years ago the entire old system of social regulators was completely eliminated in our country and many were those who believed that one could freely build a new system, "from scratch." Subsequently, however, it became clear that "free building" has very strict objective limits and that their main limitation was in man himself, in his lack of preparedness for many changes which appeared almost complete.

It is true that this was no major discovery. In contemporary terms, the problem of the "human factor" in Russia became apparent not before the second half of the 19th century. Marxist analysis linked it to the underdeveloped nature of capitalism and to the urban population strata, the industrial proletariat above all. However, the "unpreparedness" of man and the disparity between his requirements and the times were felt and, naturally, interpreted in their own way, and not only by the Marxists. For example, here is what F.M. Dostoyevskiy

wrote: "People, people, that is what matters most. People are even more precious than money. People cannot be bought at any market and with no amount of money, for they are not for sale or purchase. They take centuries to develop. However, these centuries mean time, they mean 25 or 30 years, even in our country, where a century has long stopped being worth anything. The man of ideas and science, the independent man takes shape only as a result of the long and independent life of the nation and after centuries of hard work by the nation. In short, such a man is formed by the entire historical life of the country. Our historical life for the past 200 years has not developed all that autonomously. It is absolutely impossible to hasten artificially the necessary and permanent historical aspects of popular life" (F.M. Dostoyevskiy, *"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works] in 30 volumes. Vol 21, p 93).

Not everyone shares Dostoyevskiy's view of the impossibility of accelerating the "aspects of popular life." At that time P.N. Tkachev, for instance, called for making the fastest possible revolution which "could take place only when the minority is unwilling to wait for the majority to become aware of its needs" (P.N. Tkachev, *"Soch."* [Works] in 2 volumes, Moscow, 1976, vol 2, p 17). This was an "original thought," as G.V. Plekhanov sarcastically noted. However, the concept that in their majority the people are by no means "what they ought to be," "fail to realize their needs," are "unprepared," and so on, was quite widespread and did not disappear even after Dostoyevskiy's "25 or 30" years had gone by. In slightly less than 50 years the country found itself at a decisive historical point and the same question arose with new urgency. In 1919, V.I. Lenin wrote about the millions of "forgotten peasants... oppressed by the landowners for centuries," with whom, nonetheless, one had to build socialism. "We want to build socialism immediately with the material left to us by capitalism, immediately, and not with people who will be raised in hothouses...." (*"Poln. Sobr. Soch."* [Complete Collected Works], vol 38, pp 54, 59).

Why, however, did this sensation of the unpreparedness of the people develop? For we were dealing with the population of a very big state, who had played for centuries quite a noticeable role in world affairs, a people with a thousand-year old economic, political and spiritual culture.

I believe that in the course of the new historical spiral, as a result of changes in the socioeconomic situation in the country and not without the influence of the changes occurring in the West, that entire integral culture as well as the entire system of relations on which it was based had reached their historical limit and entered a period of crisis, and that this occurred before most people were prepared to convert to the new system of relations and before the adoption of new social regulators of economic, political and spiritual life, and to a culture of a different type.

The bolsheviks believed that the crisis of the semicapitalist and semifeudal relations in tsarist Russia could be solved through their elimination and the creation of new socialist relations. However, whereas in solving the first part of the problem the "unpreparedness" of the bulk of the people was no major obstacle, the basic contradictory nature of the situation immediately became apparent during the second, the constructive part in building the new society.

On the one hand, speaking of the tasks of building socialism, Lenin quite clearly noted that "to assume that all 'working people' are equally capable of doing this would be totally meaningless or an illusion on the part of an antediluvian, a pre-Marxist socialist, for this capability does not come by itself but can grow...only on the basis of the material conditions of large-scale capitalist production. It is **only** the proletariat that has this ability, at the start of the road from capitalism to socialism" (op. cit., vol 39, pp 15-16). On the other hand, the proletariat trained in large-scale capitalist production, was in the minority in the country's population; the majority consisted of the peasantry which, as a whole, was still loyal to the old patriarchal culture and which supported the old mechanism of social behavior.

While admitting the entire difficulty of the situation and the low level of production forces and insufficient degree of "civilization," Lenin nonetheless did not reject the historical initiative. He deemed possible to begin with the assumption of political power "and **only then**, on the basis of the worker-peasant power and the Soviet system, catch up with the other nations." He ascribed in this case great hope to the urban workers, who were better prepared to solve the problems facing the country and to assist the countryside "which is within urban culture. The peasant needs urban products, urban culture, and we must give him that" (op. cit., vol 45, p 381; vol 38, p 257).

Now, as we look at the distance we have covered since 1917 and as we try to learn lessons from the past, let us not forget the starting point of this movement. It was extremely difficult for a number of reasons—economic, political, military, and so on; let me especially emphasize, however, the social and sociocultural aspects of this difficulty. However we may be assessing the influence of the urban industrial proletariat on the country's development during the first decades of the Soviet system, we cannot fail to see that, by itself, this stratum in Russia was relatively small, particularly after the losses suffered during the revolution, World War I and the Civil War. Furthermore, the prevalence of the rural population could not fail to leave its mark, to leave an ineradicable stamp on the very concepts of socialism as the ideal of the future society (which was sometimes imagined like a big peasant community in which the principles of equalization, physical distribution of products, and so on, triumphed).



### 'Urban' and 'Rural' Regulators

Today the country is far beyond that starting point in the development of society and man with which it came out of the period of revolution and Civil War. However, recent events do not shed a most flattering light on the situation in which our society finds itself.

How to assess this situation in the context of the question of the social regulators we are discussing? We already noted that our knowledge of the economic and social structure, at as we have become accustomed to seeing it, is insufficient for such an evaluation. However, there is yet another structural level to which we usually ascribe a lesser significance although Lenin, for example, ascribed to it, as we saw, an exceptionally important role: the affiliation with two types of culture—urban and preurban (Lenin used a comma: "urban, industrial, large-scale capitalist culture." see op. cit., vol 38, p 387). In the context of this topic, town and country are considered as two foundations for the organization of social life, and the conversion from a "rural" to an "urban" community and man (urbanization) one of the main vectors in the progress of society toward a new qualitative status.

Urbanization, as a mechanism for changing the qualitative condition of society, is a relatively recent historical phenomenon. Cities appeared a long time ago but, existing inside an essentially rural community, for a long time they did not become the bearers of alternate forms of social organization. As Marx wrote, in the Middle Ages even industry "in cities and in urban relations duplicated the principles of rural organization" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "*Soch.*" [Works], vol 46, part I, p 44). Independent principles of urban organization appeared much later, in connection with the development of capitalism, the increased number and size of cities and, above all, in connection with the unparalleled differentiation of urban activities. What is the difference between these two principles?

For millennia the people were dominated by an agrarian economy and the types of social system it created. Both were more or less consistent with the social regulators of ordinary behavior and activities, which were shared by all nations. Because of the small size and relative isolation of rural communities within which the life of most people was spent, man was always in direct touch with his fellow villagers, with the rural "world." It was under the supervision of this world that he lived in a state of reciprocal responsibility and mutual insurance. Under these circumstances, the main feature in the mechanism for the social control of his behavior was external control, an orientation toward the constant repetition of existing behavioral models and the preservation of his fixed place within a strictly hierarchical social structure. Hence the sociopsychological features of the person raised within the framework of such traditional relations: the dissolved personality of the individual within the community, low social mobility, dislike of new

developments, and faith in the inviolable firmly established order and in the authority of its guardians: the institutionalized representatives of the social order, ranging from the head of the family, the "big man," to the tsar, and so on.

That man is a "cog" within the system of such relations, something which, for a long time, was accepted by the social consciousness as natural and legitimate but which subsequently, in the period of the all-round crisis of agrarian and rural communities caused by the development of capitalism, became questioned, became the subject of defense or else criticism. Such was the case with all nations, and such was the case with Russia as well.

In the 19th century, the principle of the "cog" man had both proponents and opponents. For example, I.V. Kireyevskiy pitted Russia against the West, where "the entire private and social life.... is founded on the concept of the individual, the separate independent person," and where "every individual... is an independent individual." He wrote approvingly that in Russia the "forms of community life, which express the overall integrity of life, have never accepted the individual, the separate development, alienated from the life of the entire people.... No individual in a community has ever wanted to display his original features as some kind of merit: the entire ambition of the individual was limited to the aspiration accurately to express the main spirit of society" (I.V. Kireyevskiy, "*Kritika i Estetika*" [Critique and Aesthetics]. Moscow, 1979, pp 147, 285-286).

A different approach to the same principle is found in the words which G.I. Uspenskiy put in the mouth of his character: "I try to die for the good of the common harmony, for the common future happiness and well-being. However, I aspire toward this because I personally am destroyed.... Thanks to our historical destiny, the people... have developed themselves not as individuals but as "ma:ses," ready to serve the common good, the common cause and the common harmony and truth of human relations. Everyone separately.... **needs nothing**, and he can survive somehow.... He personally would withstand any kind of disgrace and would even agree to a disgrace simply for a piece of bread, he would wipe off the spit on his face, and so on. He can relax only in the common cause which totally absorbs his personality" (G.I. Uspenskiy, "*Sobr. Soch.*" [Collected Works] in 9 volumes, Moscow, 1956, vol 6, pp 96-97).

Despite the entire difference in viewpoints (expressed within that same interval of several decades), both authors proceed from the inevitability of the fact itself: the lack in the Russia of that time of a person with a developed individuality (we are speaking of a mass human type; in 19th century Russia, naturally, there already were many people who stood out). Since Uspenskiy's time, criticism of Russian reality has gathered a great deal of strength but, like any polemical criticism, it has not been free from distortions. For the benefit of

those who still consider these human features and social relations rather critically, seeing them just as virtually absolute evil, let us note that such features were the result of 1,000 years of experience of the nations and that it was on the basis of such "rural" relations that all world civilizations had developed, and cultural and moral values of permanent and universal significance had been created. The fact that at a certain stage in social development alternate forms of organization of social life arose, which proved their efficiency and attractiveness and put on the historical agenda the item of the shaping of a new "urban" person and of "urban" regulators of his behavior, is a different matter.

The sharply increased division of labor in the cities and the scale and complexity of city life made the old rules of behavior inefficient. Life in the city is anonymous and social relations are indirect (such as a market at which a producer and consumer may perhaps never meet). Outside supervision of the individual is impossible. In order for society not to plunge into chaos some new regulatory mechanisms are needed and they were indeed developed by the new social practice. In addition to the urban social space, which is much more complex and differentiated than the rural, an unparalleled development occurs in the inner space of the individual, his self-awareness, his ability to reflect, his moral and emotional experiences, and so on. It is precisely this that makes the new principles of social management possible: all human behavior is now regulated "from within" to a much greater extent than "from without," and this type of regulation is accepted by the individual as freedom, compared to the nonfreedom under the conditions of the external "rural" censorship. This gives a new meaning to the medieval maxim that "the city makes man free." Naturally, freedom in this case does not mean permissiveness but precisely a separate way of existence within the system of social regulation of activities, another aspect of internal human responsibility. It is only a responsible person who can make use of freedom without harming himself and his friends or strangers. It is only the free person, who has the possibility of making a choice, who can develop within himself a responsibility for his choice and thus become an "independently practical" person like the one described by Dostoyevskiy. The very structure of urban activities creates and makes widespread a new type of individual, who is relatively more general and initiative-minded than the old one, and who is potentially able to master the new and unparalleled variety of the outside world and become part of an essentially different and much more complex system of social relations.

The development of commodity-monetary relations is an exceptionally important prerequisite and, at the same time, the result of the appearance of the "urban" man. Currently we are writing a great deal about the harm which underestimating commodity-monetary relations is causing the economy. However, we ignore their tremendous general social significance. At some stage in history, the market and money, which have existed

forever, become the most powerful regulator of all social life. The appearance and existence of the universal man are inconceivable without the universal nature of money. The "contradiction between the quantitative limit and qualitative limitlessness of money" (K. Marx and F. Engels, *op. cit.*, vol 23, p 144) is like a mirror reflection of the contradictions existing within the universal man in a world of always limited possibilities or, perhaps, a world requiring constant choices.

Naturally, it does not follow from all this that the "urban" man automatically becomes the focal point of all possible virtues, the embodiment of harmony, etc., while commodity-monetary relations become the peak of any conceivable development of social relations in general. The new situation has many internal contradictions of its own. "The invisible hand" of the market cannot cope with maintaining the socially necessary economic ratios, and the market element becomes a terrible social danger. The individualization of the person may lead to extreme individualism; freedom could turn into alienation and the possibility of a choice into a painful reflex which paralyzes the ability to act; variety could turn into standardization, and so on. Furthermore, what we said does not, naturally, mean that the "urban" man becomes somehow superior to the "rural." (It is important to emphasize this, for Marxist tradition has never included a purely negativistic attitude toward peasant awareness; the peasant is the "practical worker and the realist;" the peasantry is the bearer of simple standards of morality, without which no human community is possible.)

The conversion from one historical type of personality to another also means gains and losses and I do not wish to start drawing a balance on the basis of some kind of absolute scale. Nonetheless, if we consider this conversion within the framework of an overall historical motion, we are bound to see that by creating a new type of individual, history gave people new opportunities which they must know how to use. In a certain sense, we could say that the historical argument between capitalism and socialism is an argument on the ways leading to the assimilation of the new human wealth and the identification and realization of previously unknown opportunities of the human individual. However, neither has the possibility of retreating.

Numerous historical changes contribute to the birth of the new man. The primary role is that of radical changes in the production structure (industrialization) and in ownership relations. However, it is precisely urbanization that acts as a sort of integrator of disparate influences resulting from all such changes and, in the final account, that shapes the new man himself, his way of life and his respective standards. Therefore, the level of urbanization of society becomes one of the main characteristics of its qualitative condition and mandatorily must be reflected in man's concept of his social structure.



Unfortunately, today we have at our disposal rather scant information on the extent of urbanization of Soviet society. Superficially, we could definitely describe it as "urban," for today the urban population accounts for two-thirds of the country's entire population. In fact, however, not everything is all that simple. Statistically, anyone with a city residence permit is considered an urban resident. The sociologist, however, who seeks the "urban man" in the sense we described, cannot be satisfied with such a formal criterion. He considers the place of birth, the type of parents he had, and the environment in which he became a social being important.

Soviet society became "urban" only quite recently. As late as 1926, the urban population accounted for no more than 18 percent of the total, and the big cities with a population in excess of 100,000, for no more than 6.5 percent. By 1987 these indicators had risen correspondingly to 66 and 40 percent. Six decades had passed between these two dates, which is less than a life span. In frequent cases today's urban resident is yesterday's peasant. Unfortunately, between 1926 and 1989 no single Soviet population census took into consideration a most important feature, such as place of birth, for which reason most valuable information on the course of urbanization and on shaping the country's urban population is irretrievably lost. Today one can engage only in approximations, based on the correlation between the number of people born in the cities and in the countryside at different times. Such approximations indicate that no more than 15 percent of today's 60-year old citizens of the USSR were born in cities; 35 to 40 percent of the 40-year old were born in the cities and no more than 50 percent of those who are 20. By 1980 the urban population accounted for 59 percent of all births. The share of people born in the cities, who will be 20 in the year 2000, may be somewhat higher.

Such estimates become even more difficult to make on a regional basis (because of significant interregional migration), although, understandably, in many cases the figures could be quite different from the Union average. Furthermore, in any case, such assessments are based on the official classification of the population into urban and rural, something which does not reflect the entire situation. On the one hand, even in the cities, particularly cities which grew rapidly as a result of the influx of the rural population, over a long period of time many of the typical features of the "rural" way of life remain and are, to a certain extent, reproduced. On the other hand, the closer we come to our time, the more extensively many of the fundamental elements of the "urban" way of life exceed the limits of settlements officially classified as cities. Furthermore, we are becoming increasingly aware of the task of advancing the further rapprochement between town and country, not in the primitive sense of erecting urban skyscrapers in the countryside or, in general, moving to it the external features of our not all that well organized cities which, unfortunately, is sometimes believed to be the case, but in the sense of the

adoption by the countryside of the fundamental "principles of urban organization," which implies the involvement of the peasant-farmer with a broader system of social relations, commodity-monetary relations, increased autonomy, independence and elimination of the "second class" feeling which had been imposed upon our countryside by recent reorganizers. Perhaps the success of perestroika depends above all on the extent to which this problem will be solved successfully. The problem itself, however, is part of a more general problem of surmounting the elements of transition, which are still strong among us.

### The Social Condition and Transitional Processes

Actually, in many of its aspects our contemporary society remains transitional. It consists of generations which began life during a period of quite rapid social change, for which reason their training in socialization was different (let me reemphasize that urbanization is not the only process which determines such differences but is a very important one, which includes within itself many other). Perhaps, however, the most important feature of such "transition" is the existence of many millions of people who have had to change their way of life in their already mature years, essentially as a result of mass migration from country to town. Yesterday's rural resident adapts as best he can to unaccustomed urban conditions and, to a certain extent, becomes resocialized. In the course of this process there develops an intermediary—half rural and half urban—type of person. A man no longer can (although he sometimes would like to) live in accordance with the "rural" behavioral standards, which were assimilated in the course of his primary socialization. Nonetheless, within himself he is not as yet entirely ready to observe "urban" rules. He can only see the "tips" of a culture new to him or else exclusively its negative sides (actually, the uncritical and unconditionally high rating of "urban" culture and the unwillingness to see the values of traditional rural culture are part of those same phenomena which lead to the transitional situation: neophytes are always the most zealous worshippers of a new god).

I do not think that a reader would find in general sociological publications a great deal written on the problem which is radical to our country, that of transitional social conditions and transitional strata. The problem is as yet to be studied. Let us touch only upon one of its aspects related to the functioning of social regulators.

Today there seem to be in our society two values and instrumentally different systems of such regulators. The first is oriented toward physical economic indicators, an egalitarian distribution, the traditional "cog" collectivism, external control over human behavior, command management methods, bureaucratic administration, and so on. The other system concentrates on wages, market mechanisms, economic discipline, the individual capabilities of the person, freedom of choice, based on his

internal feeling of responsibility, conscious cohesion among people rallied on the basis of common interests, and so on. Both systems are objectively determined by the condition in which society finds itself.

The first is indicated or, rather, even imposed by the insurmountable experience of the past. The "power" and limitations of Stalin, with whom most frequently this system is identified, was precisely that as a social type he entirely belonged to that past.

There was nothing unexpected in the appearance of such a social type in the peasant Russia which proclaimed the start of building socialism. As early as 1926, for example, A. Platonov wrote the novel *"City of Cities,"* whose main character Shmakov, who was laboring on the manner in which he would be signing documents in the future, "as though accidentally copying, in terms of simplicity, Lenin's signature," assumed that "an official and any person in an official position is the most valuable agent in socialist history, and is the living tie under the tracks of socialism." This satirical person, who died "from exhaustion in writing a major sociophilosophical work entitled 'Principles of Depersonalization of Man With a View to Converting Him Into the Absolute Citizen With Legitimately Organized Actions at Any Moment in His Life,'" was borrowed from real life, and Platonov's story itself was one of the many warnings which, at that time, remained unheard.

The durability of that which is today described as the administrative-command system was based on the existence of social strata (the affiliation with which was by no means determined exclusively by the attitude toward ownership or the professional status at any given moment but, to a very large extent, by social and sociocultural origins), receptive to the regulatory influences inherent in this system of rigid noneconomic pressure, order, centralized preprogrammed social opinion, and so on.

As long as these strata, yesterday's peasants, alienated from their customary soil, poorly adapting to the new sociocultural conditions, deprived of elementary material sufficiency, were large, the administrative-command system could find in them a reliable support and was relatively efficient. Platonov's Shmakov could triumph by claiming that "the bureaucracy has made contributions to the revolution: it glued together the scattered part of the people, it imbued them with the desire for order and taught them to understand ordinary things in the same way." The historical paradox, however, was that the stronger the administrative-command system became at a given stage of development, the sooner came the end of this stage and the more thoroughly it kept destroying its own support. By ruining and bleeding the countryside white and moving its population to the city, promoting industrialization "at all cost," and truly converting people into "living ties under the tracks of

socialism," it trained ever new generations in becoming initially perhaps "semi-urban" and, subsequently, truly "urban" people. This did not apply to the city alone.

Today the word "urban" is not considered a quality but merely an indication of specific social qualities inherent in a given type of person toward whom the second of the two existing systems of social regulators in our country is oriented. This system has been accepted officially, so to say. It is reflected in the most important documents and many of its elements have been codified into laws.

However, as Lenin said, "in addition to the law there is also a cultural standard which does not obey any law" (op. cit., vol 38, p 170). In reality, the regulatory mechanisms we are discussing such as, for instance, the market mechanisms for controlling commodity-monetary relations, election mechanisms for shaping the power agencies, and judicial mechanisms for the resolution of conflicts, do not always work. As a whole, they are more efficient when society consists of more people who have developed as "universal," "independent," and "initiative-minded" persons. Such characteristics are not made in the sense of evaluations and, depending on the views of the reader, could be considered positive or negative. However, since they nonetheless exist, the entire system of social regulators should be structured respectively: it must not suppress the manifestations of the different individualities but encourage them; it must not demand the "uniform understanding of usual things" but acknowledge that thinking differently is natural; it must not restrict the comprehensive mobility of the people but contribute to it, and so on. The sense of this strategy is that obedience is the virtue of someone who is not free, who is subordinate to someone else. But if a person is free, society can rely only on his responsibility. Responsibility is developed when the potential of the free person is realized and not suppressed.

Neither system of social regulators can exist by itself. They are intertwined, sometimes quite strangely while, at the same time, they are in a state of confrontation. This strange twin power can be seen everywhere.

A noted Soviet economist wrote the following: "Imagine an army whose generals would issue written orders stating one thing, while on the telephone give their subordinates entirely opposite instructions. You may say that this is impossible, that it conflicts with common sense. In economic practice, such a phenomenon has become so ordinary that some theoreticians began to consider it a law governing socialist production...." In this case we are discussing the economic mechanism (the different "commands" issued by the plan and the market). Essentially, however, such a contradiction can be seen everywhere in our social life and is typical also of social awareness.

We welcome the creation of cooperatives as a method for freeing economic initiative and immediately express the fear that the members of the cooperatives will be concerned more with their income than the well-being of the

consumers; we try people according to the law but also listen to the telephone calls of our superiors; we may seem to be electing but, nonetheless, we mostly appoint, and so on. Anyone of us could extend this list of examples. At all times we keep receiving two sets of control signals and we must act on the basis of compromise which greatly depends which signal is more clearly received by a given person, but also on the overall authority enjoyed by one set of signals or another.

### What Happens Next?

At this point we have approached the very important question of the actual dynamics of the two systems of social regulators in Soviet society and the true present-day authority enjoyed by each one of them. This is a complex matter.

It is more or less obvious that the administrative-command system had its starry hour a long time ago. Its social base is steadily shrinking, as a result of which its typical social regulators are operating with growing inefficiency. Allowing this system to retain its dominant position, albeit with a certain number of superficial repairs, led to the progressive slow-down of the overall motion and, in the final account, to its virtual halt ("stagnation"). The course of development calls for a "retuning" to the other system of regulators which has always existed in a cut-down aspect but was unable to expand because of the lack of adequate "human material."

It may seem that we should come out of stagnation as soon as possible and focus our economic, social and cultural policy on the definitive elimination of the obsolete system of regulators and conversion to the unchallenged power of the new regulatory mechanisms. At the same time, we should quite seriously consider the mechanisms of the social protection of man under the new circumstances, when many currently customary forms of such protection may turn out anachronistic and stop satisfying the person and, at the same time, clash with the ruling system of social regulators.

Generally speaking, perestroika enhances progress precisely in that direction. However, here as well there are difficulties. Initially they may seem unexpected. If the appearance of a new and differently trained person has depreciated the former authoritarian method of social management, can it fail to make possible a wide transition toward democratic methods? It is this view, however, that may be mistaken. The fact that the present generations of people are, in their majority, unreceptive to the system of signals of administrative-command management was proved by life itself. However, does this mean that they have fully matured so that they may become receptive to the signals of the other system? So far, reality has not provided any particular confirmation of this fact. Unnecessary qualities are being rejected while the necessary qualities are being promoted by

social practice. However, there is no automatic synchronizing in this case. For all too long our social practice did not favor the molding of people who would feel quite at home in a world of total economic and political democracy.

The inspiring words that we must learn democracy reflect a very essential feature of the present. All of us must undergo training in social practice of a new type, for otherwise the social qualities which the person and the worker need will not be developed. Nonetheless, we are still marking time on the threshold of this school, we fear sitting behind unaccustomed desks. It seems to me that the main obstructions which prevent us from moving ahead exist in the realm of social awareness.

Social regulators, as we pointed out, have instrumental and value components. Although to the outside observer the entire complex system of social relations and the sociocultural superstructure above them are only a means of self-organization for a given human community, to the person who lives within that society they have their intrinsic value. The people are not aware of the instrumental role of economic or moral principles or religious or ethnic symbols. They ascribe an independent significance to and see in them a supreme meaning and, frequently, are ready to defend them at all cost, even when the instrumental role of one or another regulator has been exhausted. For a while, by inertia they may retain their old prestige in the social awareness and nurture it with conservative trends.

The fact that some structures exist only by virtue of age-old inertia does not make them any less real. On the contrary, feeling their historical doom, they defend their place under the sun with particular stubbornness, finding zealous defenders. This is a manifestation of the tremendous viability of a national culture. No sensible policy should ignore this reality.

As we mentioned, typical of the current status of Soviet society are numerous intermediary, marginal strata. The situation is worsened by the significant territorial heterogeneity of the population with, if one may say so, different degrees of marginality in various parts of the country. The behavior of the marginal person is no longer part of the old system of social regulation but is still not included in the new system. Such a person inhabits simultaneously two worlds. He is not fully adapted to either. The integration of the personality of this man is hindered. His mind is split. He easily loses his guidelines and becomes a convenient target for political manipulation, engaging in asocial behavior, becoming aggressive or, conversely, displaying social apathy, etc.

Separated from his social roots, man feels a constant dissatisfaction. He justifiably considers this the main reason for social change. Hence his potential readiness to accept conservative slogans.



Several decades ago it was precisely the multi-million strong marginal strata who were the social support of the Stalinist dictatorship, which came to power on the crest of a wave of extreme revolutionism but which felt itself secure only by adopting extreme conservatism. Naturally, today the level of marginality of our society is by no means the same. Nonetheless, we should not underestimate it. To this day an excessively hasty advance toward the total domination of "urban" relations and, therefore, "urban" social regulators in the areas of economics, politics, ethnic processes or family or cultural life, particularly if they touch upon still strong traditional values, could trigger a conservative reaction. The latter, in turn, with the support of the marginal strata, could not only reduce to naught the efforts of the policy of perestroika but even throw society back (let us note that by following conservative slogans the marginal strata do not mandatorily uphold their true interests. They could act even against those interests, which is usually realized in hindsight. Therefore, any assessment of the sociopolitical situation only on the basis of the analysis of the objective interests of the various population groups is incomplete).

In order to avoid such a turn of events, the policy of perestroika must be extremely flexible. It must constantly check its objectives and tasks against that which can be truly accepted and achieved by society in its current condition. In principle, our social science could provide substantial help to the politicians by supplying them with objective and differentiated analyses of this condition although, for the time being, we believe, the social sciences have rather demonstrated their lack of preparedness for such work. Nonetheless, no science can guarantee a 100 percent accuracy of political decisions. Naturally, the general, the strategic trends in politics cannot be defined without a clear, a scientific understanding of the objective trends in social development. However, even in a most consistent and scientific policy, it is based on its lack of dogmatism and its ability to react to feedback signals and correct itself taking into consideration the reaction of the various social strata.

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### Political Reform and the Evolution of the Soviet State

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[Text] Revolutionary times invariably give priority to the questions of power, the political system and the state. Such is the case today in our restructuring society. "If we do not back today the political reform with processes

initiated in the field of economics, the social restructuring of society and the improvement of the spiritual area, if we fail to develop a corresponding system of management and fail to radically renovate the work of the soviets and our cadres," M.S. Gorbachev said in his report at the Extraordinary 12th Session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, "all perestroika processes will inevitably get bogged down.... A political reform is like oxygen needed for the functioning of the social organism."

Having formulated a number of important practical tasks, the political reform also faced our social science with major theoretical problems requiring comprehensive and complex study. They include the question of the ways and prospects of the evolution of the Soviet state as the nucleus of the political system, and its place and role in social life. Naturally, this is not a simple question and a great deal here remains unclear. The cleansing of the Marxist-Leninist theory of the state of anything extraneous, and its development on the basis of acquired experience will require, quite clearly, the joint efforts of the representatives of the different social sciences. This article is an effort by the authors to make their contribution to the solution of this problem.

### I

As we know, Marx, Engels and Lenin invariably paid most serious attention to the problem of the state. A number of essential ideas, which were formulated by the founders of Marxism in the early stages of their work, were confirmed by them subsequently as well on the basis of new historical experience. One of them is the idea of the withering away of the state in a communist society. "Since 1845," Engels wrote, "Marx and I have held the view that one of the end results of the future proletarian revolution will be the gradual withering away and, in the final account, the disappearance of the political organization known as the state" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 36, p 9).

This takes place when, after the disappearance of the social classes, "all need for coercion over people in general, of subordinating one person to another" vanishes (V.I. Lenin, "Poln. Sobr. Soch." [Complete Collected Works], vol 33, p 83), when people who have been raised in new and free social conditions "become gradually accustomed to observing the elementary age-old rules of community life, which have been repeated for millennia in all maxims, and observe them without coercion, without force, without subordination, without any special apparatus for coercion known as the state" (ibid., p 89).

Arguing against those who, in principle, while acknowledging the idea of the withering away of the state postpone this matter for the distant future, the founders of Marxism emphasized that although this process is of a lengthy and gradual nature it must begin as early as under socialism, i.e., in the first phase of the communist society.

The victory of the October Revolution and the experience acquired in the first years of revolutionary changes in Russia provided Lenin (as the Paris Commune had provided Marx and Engels) with primary empirical data with which to concretize the Marxist theory of the state and to review and refine his "prerevolutionary" views. It was indicative that even despite the most dramatic turns of history, during the most difficult periods, when it became necessary to reject the old illusions and when it became clear that prevailing conditions made it necessary to have a "firm machinery," even then Lenin continued to support the view that the state should, nonetheless, begin to wither away, as of that day, under those circumstances. In any case, the revolutionary vanguard should act and lead the masses precisely in that direction. In short, Lenin did not retreat from the essential conclusion he had previously expressed, to the effect that although "the special apparatus, the special machinery of suppression, the "state," was still necessary, this was already a transitional state. This was no longer a state in the strict meaning of the term..." (ibid., p 90).

What specifically, however, does the withering away of the state mean and how should it take place?

The experience of the Paris Commune enabled Marx to formulate the general idea of this process: "...The reverse absorption of state power by society, when the forces which subordinate and enslave society are replaced by societal live forces..." (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 17, p 548).

Based on the experience of the Russian Revolution, Lenin ascribed a practical side to this idea: "The conversion **through** the Soviet state to the gradual elimination of the state by systematically involving an increasing number of citizens and, subsequently, **all** citizens in direct and **daily** contribution of their share in the burden of managing the state" (op. cit., vol 36, p 74).

The development of people's self-government and the broadest possible and constant participation of the citizens (above all through the soviets) in solving the problems facing society, and restricting the functions and role of the state apparatus while retaining for the party the "overall leadership," upgrading the level of political consciousness and standards of all members of society are ideas which are repeated, in one form or another, in many of Lenin's postrevolutionary works, outlining his concept of the essential ways leading to the withering away of the state.

The actual process of evolution of Soviet statehood turned out, as we know, to be different. Under the conditions of the Stalinist regime, the party-state apparatus steadily expanded, subordinating the soviets. The punitive and repressive functions of the state machinery were unjustifiably strengthened. The social organizations became a secondary appendage to the state. A "theoretical" foundation was laid under this concept. "The withering away of the state will come about not by

weakening the power of the state," Stalin said at the joint plenum of the Central Committee and Central Control Commission, in January 1933, "but through its maximal strengthening, which is necessary in order to finish off the vestiges of the dying classes and to organize the defense against the capitalist encirclement which is by no means destroyed yet, and which is not about to be destroyed soon."

The stipulation of the "maximal strengthening" of the state was further developed in Stalin's report submitted at the 18th VKP(b) Congress, and in the speeches of many of its delegates, who attacked the "anti-Leninist theory of the withering away of the state of the working class" ("*Stenograficheskiy Otchet XVIII Syezda*" [Minutes of the 18th Congress]. Moscow, 1939, pp 144-145).

Essentially, the course charted toward strengthening the all-embracing "apparatus" state was maintained in the post-Stalinist period as well. Looking at the past decades, we can see that the retained concentration of political and economic power in the hands of the party-state apparatus and its alienation from society became one of the main reasons why the reforms initiated by N.S. Khrushchev bogged down, while the tremendous potential of the awakened popular initiative remained, as it were, unused.

It may have seemed that in the "thaw" of the subsequent years, the acceptance of the growth of the state of dictatorship of the proletariat into a state of the whole people should have raised the question of transferring the power from the apparatus to the democratized soviets and, at the same time, make the state less comprehensive in terms of its actual functions, granting the citizens greater freedom in solving the problems created by social life and making life less "regulated."

This, however, did not happen. Furthermore, the task of perfecting the "mature" socialist society, which was subsequently formulated, was directly linked to the comprehensive growth of the state. This was reflected in theoretical elaborations and in practical actions. As the official rules of that time show, although in principle the possibility of the withering away of the state was not rejected (Stalin as well did not reject it), it was nonetheless postponed for the indefinite future. It was claimed that, allegedly, "in the course of time in a communist society" the management of social processes will take place in a nongovernmental form. At the present time, however, under the conditions of "mature" socialism, such management must be provided "above all on a governmental basis," which requires the "precisely the steady progress of state management."

We have here a metaphysical gap between the "now" and the "later," between the present and the future and between the objective and the means to achieve it. This is a gap which was bound to be reflected in the current Soviet Constitution (although, let us point out, a great



effort was made for its text to fit the Marxist-Leninist concepts on the evolution of the state). The result was that the ever expanding state seemed to take itself to a threshold which, if crossed, would miraculously and instantaneously turn it into the kingdom of communist self-management.

In short, the course toward social statism, i.e., toward an actually total (comprehensive) subordination of society to the "apparat-state", which reached inflated dimensions, not justified by objective necessity, remained during the period of stagnation as well. To a certain extent, it was the consequence of stagnation but, to an even greater extent, it was one of its reasons.

This does not mean that we question even in the slightest the fact that at all stages in its development, Soviet society has needed a state. When it was a question of the need "to keep our powder dry," i.e., to have a powerful armed force, intelligence and counterintelligence, and efficient mechanisms for the fast mobilization of material resources, and so on, the real facts were taken into consideration along with the real international situation. Had this not existed, we would have been simply swept off and destroyed. The basic self-preservation interests forced Soviet society to improve the various entities of the state machinery needed for its protection against attack and subversive activities from the outside.

Here as well, however, the statist trend proved to be a heavy burden. The existing threat from aggressive imperialist forces began to be used, at some stages in our history, as a pretext for the unjustified expansion of a number of areas of activities of the state and its respective machinery, in promoting a system of personal power and instilling mores and customs alien to socialism within the country (let us recall the fact that the monstrous mass repressions took place as a rule precisely under the pretext of the struggle against spies, saboteurs and "hirelings of imperialist intelligence").

There also was a certain alienation of the Armed Forces and the defense sectors of the economy from society and its requirements and needs. This was manifested particularly noticeably after the war. Their activities were concealed behind a profound and by no means always justified secrecy, exempt from criticism and from social and party control. This cost society a great deal.

However, even that is not the main thing. The country's security did not require at all, as a mandatory condition, the obstruction of socialist democracy and abandoning the Leninist strategy of development of social self-government. Paradoxically, in the 1920s, when the external threat was much more serious, the revolutionary activities of the masses were also greater. As the defense power of the country increased and as its influence on world affairs grew, there was an unjustified "tightening up of the bolts," and restricting the social and political autonomy of the people and creative discussions and initiatives.

Let us also consider other arguments which were extensively used in the past to justify the strengthening of the state, such as the need to "suppress the opposition of the overthrown exploiting classes" and carry out economic-organizational and cultural-educational activities in a backward country such as Russia. Unquestionably, suppressing the resistance of counterrevolutionary forces (at that time such forces indeed existed), the overall management of economic and cultural building and control over the measure of labor and consumption required the establishment of a firm and strong state. However, as was the case with ensuring the country's defense capability, the solution of these problems did not make necessary in the least the strengthening of statist trends. The familiar concept of the increased resistance of the overthrown classes, as socialism becomes stronger, was needed by Stalin not only in order to justify the mass repressions. He needed it also to substantiate the trend toward further domination of society by the state, which both Stalin and those around him considered a guarantee for the preservation of the existing political system and, therefore, their own power.

Equally unjustified was the course of excessive development of the state in the 1960s and 1970s. Suffice it to recall the tasks which the Constitution set to the state ("laying the material and technical foundations for communism, perfecting socialist social relations and their conversion into communist relations, educating the members of the communist society, and upgrading the material and cultural living standards of the working people," not to mention, naturally, ensuring the country's security and contributing to strengthening peace and developing international cooperation), to realize that their solution did not require in the least the strengthening of the governmental machinery. Conversely, it was precisely through the gradual conversion to social self-administration and limiting state coercion, i.e., through the withering away of the state, that such problems could be solved in practical terms. However, during that time as well the Leninist strategy was not given theoretical support, and neither did it become a manual for action.

## II

We are forced to note today that the course of social statism not only did not contribute to the development of socialism and to the progress of the country toward communism but, in the final account, proved to be pernicious.

The state, the intended purpose of which was to strengthen socialism by ensuring the development of production forces, to emancipate the individual, and to promote the growth of culture and popular well-being, and so on (a state which, in the course of time, developed into an "apparat"-based hyperstate) largely turned into

its opposite, becoming into a mechanism for the distortion of socialism and the corruption of socialist ideals. This affected all areas of social life, including economics, where the statism of structures and relations had grave consequences.

Social ownership was, essentially, identified with state ownership (cooperative-kolkhoz ownership was allowed, for a while, as second-rate, "second quality" ownership). Equating socialist with state ownership, which is by no means a specific attribute of socialism and which plays a major role in property relations in virtually all presocialist systems, including the system of contemporary monopoly capitalism is, possibly, the most serious and dramatic economic error of the post-Leninist period in our history in terms of its results.

This problem is still waiting for its researchers. As of now, however, it is already obvious that state ownership proved to be a very plastic system, which easily yielded to a lesser or greater (or even total) alienation from society and from the ideals and objectives of socialism, functioning on the basis of several interrelated hipostases.

One of them was departmental ownership, i.e., ownership apparently put (naturally, "for the good of the entire society") at the disposal of departments but, actually, by the departmental apparatus. The classical example is that of ministries which were given a permanent mandate to handle soil, timber, water, and food resources and huge fixed capital and funds. The way this mandate worked is very well-known. This is a question not only of the extremes such as, for example, the largely useless and, occasionally simply harmful activities of some ministries or their predatory and parasitical attitude toward natural resources and the habitat. In general, there is probably no economic ministry in the activities of which there were no manifestations of departmental self-seeking interests and scorn toward the broader public interests.

The other hipostasis is the "intermediary" ownership, which is based on handling material goods on their way from producer to consumer: in trade, public catering and services. Here, more likely, a separate social stratum developed, with its own corporate interests (possibly, even with a trend toward becoming a kind of separate class), which uses the opportunity of handling state property for the sake of extracting and appropriating a huge share of the added value created by others. Millions of people are employed in these areas. People who, in addition to their wages (low, as a rule) have access to huge material values, the distribution of which they have actually monopolized, for which precise reason they can "absorb" without a trace any increase in commodities and services. Furthermore, this stratum gained tremendous power not only as a result of illegally appropriated

funds and connections with organized crime but also through its ability to corrupt important units in the state or, in some places, even party authorities and law enforcement organs.

There is yet another hipostasis of state ownership: the anonymous, "nobody's" property which appears as a result of the fact that that which is common property, unless it has a specific owner, is conceived as "nobody's." This is an ownership which can be destroyed, eliminated, stolen or appropriated with virtual impunity, the more so since its boundaries are wide and quite loose and because in this anonymous area inevitably, it turns out, we find, in addition to land and water or, in general, nature, some of the property of departments and the "middlemen." It is precisely for that reason that said variety of state ownership proves to be the most destructive, both economically and morally.

Social statism led to pernicious consequences in politics as well. This was manifested in the fact that the state took over virtually all mechanisms which open access to social management by the masses. This trend became noticeable as early as the start of the 1920s, when a discussion broke out on the trade unions, in the course of which one could clearly see the aspiration of a number of noted party leaders to put the trade unions under state control. As we know, Lenin most firmly opposed this trend, emphasizing that the trade unions are not part of the production management apparatus but a "school for unification, a school for cohesion, a school for the protection of interests, for economic management and for administration.... The state," Lenin went on to say, "is an area of coercion.... Administration and an administrative approach here are mandatory. The party is the immediate directing vanguard of the proletariat and its leader.... The trade unions are a source of state power, a school of communism, a school of economic management" (op. cit., vol 42, pp 292, 294). Nonetheless, the actual development of the Soviet trade unions in the decades which followed that debate took place precisely through their statification and conversion into a "wheel" of the huge governmental mechanism. This adversely affected the trade unions themselves as well as society and the state, the "overburdening" of which with extraneous elements and tasks made it cumbersome, clumsy and inefficient.

But how did the party develop? The task formulated at the 19th Party Conference of making the content and methods of CPSU activities consistent with the Leninist concept of the leading role of the party in society and separating the functions of the state from those of the party confirms that the process of state takeover affected this organization as well and led to the merger of the party with the state apparatus. This was manifested in the duplication by the party of the functions of state authorities, the professionalizing of party work even on the lower levels and, in that case, the inevitable evolution of the trend toward the bureaucratization of the party and the creation of a peculiar symbiosis of party-state bureaucracy.

The state takeover led to major negative results in the spiritual area. For nearly 7 decades the dynamics of the creation of a superstate created a certain type of mentality, a type of mass consciousness which cannot be described other than "statist." This was a consciousness according to which, as Engels said, "the state is a field in which the eternal truth and justice are implemented or should be implemented. Hence the superstitious veneration of the state and of anything related to the state—a superstitious veneration which finds it easier to sink roots when the people become accustomed from childhood to think that the projects and interests common to the entire society cannot be implemented and protected other than through the old means, i.e., through the state and through its officials, rewarded with profitable positions" (K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 22, p 200).

A statist awareness is imbued with fear of the state, represented by any "superior" and, naturally, above all, the punitive authorities which, in previous decades, were granted tremendous strength and power, incompatible with the real needs in ensuring the security of the state and maintaining law and order. In turn, fear led to civic passiveness, time-serving, loss of ability to display initiative and alienation from social affairs. Characteristic of many people became the view that "I mind my own affairs," "the chiefs know better," etc.

A statist awareness is also imbued with a clearly manifested spirit of dependency on the state, a spirit created by the fact that the citizens were unable to use the economic and political opportunities for displaying individual initiative and energy. An equally negative role was played by the propaganda stereotype instilled from childhood, according to which the state thinks of everyone of us, night and day, and that all that is left for us is to accept its favors with a feeling of profound satisfaction and gratitude.

What makes this type of awareness even easier to reproduce as a mass phenomenon is that its roots (like the statist trend as a whole) could be found in Russia's prerevolutionary political structure in which, over many long years of serfdom and autocracy, durable paternalistic and statist orientations had taken shape. Naturally, it had little in common with a true collectivistic awareness with which official propaganda identified it.

Today, as we recreate the true picture of our recent past, we are trying to unravel, along with other secrets, the sources and mechanisms of mass repressions. What was their origin? Were the arbitrariness and uncontrolled actions and even pathological state of Stalin's mind their profound roots? Without alleviating the personal responsibility of those who controlled the "guillotine," we must not forget the objective incentive for unjustified coercion and the establishment of an atmosphere of universal fear, such as the state leviathan with its excessive punitive authorities.

The bureaucracy of the punitive authorities, like any other bureaucracy, puts in the center of its activities its corporate interests, presented as those of the state. It seeks and finds—it must find!—work for itself, thus proving its social usefulness. Revolutionary coercion creates a corresponding apparatus. If the latter assumes a hypertrophied dimension, it becomes itself a source of unrestrained coercion aimed against the entire society.

Most of our Soviet history took place under exceptionally difficult and truly unique conditions, for which reason the following thought arises: could this have been the inevitable price which had to be paid for the survival of socialism? In the final account, a strong state somehow compensated for our other weaknesses in economics, foreign policy, and so on, thus preventing them from threatening the gains of socialism. This simple explanation, which is attractive because it helps us to tolerate the past and our conscience, however, cannot withstand criticism, for the state which seems strong through its extreme centralization (with a single omnipotent "leader" at the top of the power pyramid), and the obedience of the subjects, cannot be economically or politically efficient. Many examples can be quoted of the way in dramatic situations (sociopolitical crises, natural catastrophes, and so on) such a state revealed its functional weakness and inability for self-organization. We know from the historical experience of many empires, including the Russian, that such a "monolithic" force inevitably leads to a breakdown or to lengthy periods of "times of trouble." We have more recent examples as well of a virtually instantaneous breakdown of sociopolitical structures which, until that time, appeared monolithic, firm and noted by the unanimity of thought of the citizens.

It is from this viewpoint that we could consider our country as lucky. It was lucky in the sense that, despite the unprecedented casualties, mass repressions and distortions in the economy, the political superstructure and social awareness, the Soviet people not only endured but even found within themselves the strength to take the path of a revolutionary renovation of society. But would we be lucky one more time should we fail to take this process to its victorious conclusion?

### III

The experience of our old and more recent past, as well as the fresh lessons of perestroika, lead to the conclusion of the need to "rehabilitate" the Marxist-Leninist concept of the withering away of the state as a process inherent in the communist system and applicable during all its phases, and on all levels of its development.

Naturally, the historical experience of socialism makes it necessary for today's theoretician and practical worker to interpret the withering away of the state more cautiously, without the kind of romanticism or, sometimes, even utopianism which occasionally colored the views of past revolutionaries. Today, as we look back, we can see



more clearly that "the absorption of the state by society," as well as the building of socialism as a whole are a more difficult and contradictory process than could be imagined at the end of the 19th or even the beginning of the 20th century. It is a process which develops unevenly, gradually. It is dialectical and is manifested, in particular, in the fact that the general trend toward reducing the scale and functions of the governmental machinery does not exclude the simultaneous development and increased complexity of one or another of its "assemblies," as prerequisites for the implementation of the general trend under specific circumstances.

We could hardly begin to deny at this point the fact that the country's defense, maintaining relations with other countries, providing the strategic leadership needed by the national economy and the sociopolitical processes, and the maintenance of public order make the existence of the state in our society inevitable for the foreseeable future. Therefore, in terms of the present stage of historical development, the withering away of the state does not mean a conversion from state to full social self-administration, which would have been pure utopia, but a conversion from the superstate, which today acts as a powerful mechanism for the obstruction of perestroika to a "semistate." It is a question of replacing control of society by an "apparatus" state by social control over the debureaucratization of the state. In this case, we must emphasize that the concept of "state" and "society" are not synonymous, although our mass awareness tends to accept them as different names for the same phenomenon. In the same way that the strengthening of the state does not have mandatorily at all as its consequence the "strengthening" of society, restricting the exceptionally expanded excessive and expensive state, paralyzed by its own weight, does not lead in the least to the weakening of society.

The success of the process of degovernmentalization, in the course of the economic, political and legal reforms earmarked by the party, will largely depend on whether it will be comprehensive, i.e., whether it will begin to develop simultaneously in several directions, above all toward eliminating the economic foundations for the existence of the superstate. This implies steps such as substantially restricting departmental ownership (for example by expanding the financial-economic opportunities and rights of soviets, local above all); developing the cooperative and mixed forms of ownership; assigning proprietors to the actually "nobody's" public property (including long-term leases) and so on.

Obviously, a great deal will depend on the way the destruction of the economic foundations of the superstate is supported by the destruction of its political base. Usually, it is the bureaucracy which is considered to be such a base and that the key to the democratization of society is seen in reducing the apparatus. However, debureaucratization and destatification are processes which, although interrelated, are nonetheless different. Debureaucratization is, strictly speaking, depriving the

bureaucrat of his "private property," which, as defined by Marx, is the state (see K. Marx and F. Engels, op. cit., vol 1, p 272), and removing the latter from the power of the apparatus, among others by reducing the army of officials. However, in itself debureaucratization does not predetermine or, to be more accurate, by no means determines in all areas the future destinies of the governmental machinery, removed from the apparatus. A great deal depends on who will take over its previous functions, whether such functions will be retained in their previous volume or will be restricted, and so on.

It is already clear that an all-embracing "total" state which would try to regulate virtually all aspects of social life from, as Lenin said, "tin-plating washbasins to artistic creativity," is not only difficult to manage and expensive but simply inefficient and even counterproductive. As to the areas of social life in which the regulatory role played by the state is truly necessary, which include the production, here the problem is for such regulation not to develop, as is most frequently the case, into petty supervision and excessive control over functioning of enterprises, organizations and private citizens. The experience of the first years of perestroika convincingly proves that without expanding the range of their true freedom and without giving them true autonomy (regulated by the law and morality and, materially supported) it would be difficult to expect a great deal from the planned reforms.

Finally, another method is that of transferring some of the functions of the state to nongovernmental structures, public organizations above all.

As the experience of previous reforms indicates, no appeals "to work and think in a new way" would yield any whatsoever significant results without reducing the extent and range of state activities. However, this process of restricting and reassigning functions could develop in two different ways: either as strictly superstructural, or else as a process which develops simultaneously both from above, by the state, and from below, by enterprises, citizens associations and other mass organizations which not simply applaud the party and the state but suggest alternate mechanisms for regulating social processes, born of the initiative of the masses and embodying their specific experience and, possibly, in some areas even differing from the recommendations of the state. The second path, naturally, is fraught with major contradictions and even conflicts and great "inconveniences" to the "command." However, the failed experience of superstructural reforms of the 1960s and recent practices speak precisely in favor of it.

The most important part of the strategy of destatification, however, is the restructuring of the activities of soviets, as stipulated at the 19th Party Conference. We have already seen two interrelated and interdependent trends in the solution of this problem. The first is upgrading the professional standards and the efficient legal, including procedural, control over their activities.

The second is the democratization of the soviets both on the level of establishing real control over their activities by rank-and-file citizens, as well as on the level of changing their personnel structure.

We are very familiar with the expression that any cook should learn how to manage the state. This appeared in connection with Lenin's article "Will the Bolsheviks Retain the Power of the State?" in which we find the following sentence: "We know that no common laborer or cook can now take over the management of the state.... But we... demand an immediate break with the prejudice that **managing** the state, and performing ordinary daily management work is given only to the rich or to officials coming from rich families. We demand that **training** in state management be given to the conscious workers and soldiers and that this be undertaken immediately, i.e., that all working people, all poor people begin to be immediately **involved** in such training" (op. cit., vol 34, p 315).

Today, under the conditions of more complex social relations and the professionalizing of administrative processes, it may seem silly to allow a "cook" to control the power of the state. Furthermore, experience of participation in the work of soviets on different levels by some production workers, frequently people who are deserving and intelligent but who, as a rule, have had no real influence on solving governmental problems but have merely "stamped" together with the other deputies unanimous decisions, also seems to confirm the skeptical attitude toward such an idea.

Nonetheless, if we speak not of the letter but of the spirit of Lenin's statement and the expression it created, it becomes a question of nothing other than a democratic popular alternative to the omnipotence of the bureaucratic machinery. Naturally, it is not a question of replacing the professional manager with a nonprofessional "cook." It is a matter, above all, of granting access to the authorities to rank-and-file citizens who are prepared truly to defend the interests of the people and, meeting in soviet sessions, would be able practically to influence (by participating in discussions, deputy questions, voting, and so on) the formulation and making of decisions.

Obviously, it is precisely through the creation of soviets, which would be a synthesis of statehood and self-management and of representative and direct democracy, and which would have strong feedback from the citizens (a problem which has largely remained unsolved) that the high road to the "semistate" which is so urgently needed by our society passes.

Something else is obvious as well. However much the soviets may be improved, the efficiency of their activities as a mechanism for people's rule will largely depend on whether they will be "backed" from below by a

powerful and dynamic infrastructure of public organizations, operating on the basis of the principle of self-management and direct democracy. In this connection, quite topical, in our view, is the question of giving the existing mass organizations a truly social status, relieving them from the paralyzing petty supervision of the apparatus and converting them into full partners of the state in solving the problems which society must solve. For example, those same trade unions, having truly become a "school of management," as Lenin saw them and, at the same time, acting as the true defenders of and spokesmen for the interests of the working people (ready, if necessary, to enter into a dispute with governmental departments and even take them to court) could, obviously, become a constructive "counterbalance" to the state, helping to keep it within certain limits.

Let us note in this connection that under the conditions of the historically developed one-party system in the Soviet Union and, therefore, the absence of a legal political opposition, the question arises of the need for the existence within society of a certain critical force. This would be a legal and "loyal," but nonetheless critical force which, guided by the same common socialist objectives and humanistic principles, could truly help promptly to detect and resolve the problems arising in the country. A developed system of public organizations could become such a force.

Obviously, however, the decisive step in giving such organizations a new status, consistent with the requirements of the present, is the systematic separation of the functions of the state and the party, the debureaucratization of its apparatus, a demarcation which would help the party to perform its functions as the political vanguard of society, a vanguard which, despite its authority, would not find itself outside the law, as should be the case in a state of law.

The logical extension of the course of emancipation of the mass social organizations is the extensive development of the political and social activities of the popular masses. The spring of perestroika was noted by the appearance—for the first time in many years!—of dozens and hundreds of spontaneously organized political clubs, associations, people's fronts and other voluntary associations. They express the political energy of the masses, which had accumulated over the long years of Stalinism and stagnation, the desire to speak out and hear others speak and to help the party and the state in implementing the initiated projects. These organizations have no political experience and have no place from which to draw it. They could err and do and, sometimes, clash with the state authorities. What is important today is not to exaggerate but also, naturally, not to ignore their errors and shortcomings, and not to "swaddle" them with prohibitions or frighten them or, in a word, not to eliminate these shoots of people's self-management, and not to promote mistrust in the minds and hearts of the

young people who are their broadest base. In the future, under favorable circumstances, they could play a very constructive role in the renovation of Soviet socialism.

A danger from another side is possible today. It is caused by the efforts of forces which have nothing in common with perestroika and its tasks but who use glasnost and the development of democracy for destructive and frequently provocative purposes. In this case they hope that the leadership will "lose control," will "collapse," and adopt a "firm hand" policy which would undermine perestroika. Therefore, as the political reform develops, the assertion of conscious discipline and awareness of responsibility by all people involved in the democratic process become very important.

In addition to an economic and political, we also note an ideological-cultural trend of degovernmentalization. It is a question of molding political awareness and political standards free from the deification of the state or fear of the state, rejecting the view that the individual is an easily replaceable "little wheel" or "cog" in the sociostate system. Without attempting to anticipate the overall image of this standard we could, however, assume that an adequate task in the conversion to a democratic and socialist society will be to rely on the independent search by the citizens of political decisions, pluralism, competitiveness and tolerance, respect for the individual and his convictions, equality of all in the eyes of the law, and the power of the law in society.

The following question may arise: Could the course of destatification conflict with the solution of vital problems to our society, such as upgrading the efficiency in the activities of courts and the prosecution and other state institutions? Could this course conflict with the tasks of establishing a socialist state of law?

In our view, there are no conflicts here. Furthermore, the creation of a state of law is, in the present historical circumstances, a necessary step in the destatification of Soviet society, for it is aimed at eliminating the total permissiveness in the behavior of the state leviathan, restricting the power of the apparat with its "law by telephone," and upgrading the efficiency with which the state functions in the various areas and within the limits which, for the time being, must remain under state control. This means, in the final account, broadening the range of freedoms of the citizens. However, the purpose of degovernmentalization itself is to emancipate the individual so that he can apply his social potential.

The political reform, earmarked in the resolutions of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference, will provide a tangible impetus to our social progress along this road. The recently passed laws on elections and on amendments and supplements to the Constitution of the USSR will play an essential role in the development of the process of destatification. However, as the experience of previous decades proves, not all good laws and resolutions passed in our country are implemented. It is easy to

assume that the process of destatification as well will depend on whether the necessary conditions, consistent with the resolutions and the laws, will be established in the center and the local areas, whether new steps will be taken in the immediate future toward democratization and whether in the course of this progress some guidelines may be violated and we may lose track of the common objective, as has sometimes happened in the past.

The success or failure of the course of destatification will influence not only internal Soviet life but also its image as seen by the world public. Today the reputation of the country is based to a tremendous extent on the quality of life of its citizens, the justice and humaneness of its order and respect for the dignity and rights of the individual. Naturally, it is also based on what it can offer to the global community, the objectives of its foreign policy course and its behavior in the international arena.

History is giving us a new opportunity to prove in practice that socialism, humanism and democracy are compatible. The way to solving this problem was indicated by Lenin: the gradual and, at the same time, undeviating substitution of the power of the bureaucratic state by the power of the self-governing people.

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#### **International Roundtable: Contradictions and Motive Forces in Socialist Society**

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[Text] Today, when our country is in a process of renovation, the social scientists face in a new fashion the problem of contradictions and motive forces under the conditions of socialism. What hinders the self-progress of developing socialism? What are the obstruction mechanisms? What are the reasons for manifestations of a slavish, feudal, bourgeois, private-ownership and nationalistic mentality and habits in people? Where do those things come from in our country, in the 8th decade of building socialism? Today such problems demand a serious theoretical interpretation. All of them are facets of a more general, a basic problem, a problem of dialectical contradictoriness in the development of socialism.

The roundtable sponsored by *KOMMUNIST*, the journal of the CPSU Central Committee, *EINHEIT*, the journal of the SED Central Committee, *NOVO VREME*, the journal of the BCP Central Committee, and *TAR-SADALMI SZEMLE*, the journal of the MSZMP, was held last November at the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences. The following participated in the creative comradely discussion: **Jorg Vorholtzer**, deputy editor-in-chief of *EINHEIT*; **Erich Haan**, academician, director of the Institute of Marxist-Leninist Philosophy, SED Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences; **Alfred Kosing**, academician, head of sector,



SED Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences; **Todor Yordanov**, deputy responsible editor of *NOVO VREME*; **Zlatko Stoyanov**, member of the editorial board of the same journal; **Rosa Varro**, editor, *TARSAD-ALMI SZEMLE*; **P. Fedoseyev**, academician, *KOMMUNIST* editor; **R. Yanovskiy**, USSR Academy of Sciences corresponding member, rector of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences; **I. Antonovich**, prorector of the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences; **E. Arab-Ogly**, *KOMMUNIST* editor; **B. Bessonov**, head of the department of philosophy, CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences; **A. Zharnikov**, scientific secretary, department of scientific communism, CPSU Central Committee Institute of Marxism-Leninism; **G. Ikonnikova**, professor, department of philosophy, CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences; **S. Kolesnikov**, *KOMMUNIST* deputy editor-in-chief; **V. Mezhuiev**, chief scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Philosophy; **Zh. Toshchenko**, head of the department of ideological work, CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences; **V. Khalipov**, head of the department of scientific communism, CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences; **G. Cherneyko**, *KOMMUNIST* department editor; **Yu. Shcherbakov**, professor, CPSU Central Committee Institute of Social Sciences; and **V. Yadov**, director of the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Sociology.

The present survey of the roundtable materials was prepared for publication by V. Golobokov, V. Klovov and V. Kremnev.

### Roots of Vitality and Source of Development

All participants, noting the theoretical relevance and practical significance of the topic, discussed contradictions as an objective reality and a source of development of socialism. The problem of contradictions is present in all living phenomena. Only something that is dead can be noncontradictory. The existence of contradictions proves the viability of society, and not only that it has certain shortcomings which must be removed. It was essentially this concept that was adopted as the common basis in the discussion.

Several speakers noted that this fact, which today astounds no one, reflects a basic turn in the thinking of social scientists. Such a turn is closely related to the pressing need for theory with the help of which to surmount simplistic concepts of socialism and its history and future, and to gaining a deeper understanding of the very nature of the new social system. Any object develops by virtue of contradictions within its nature, and rejecting theory in the study of a dialectical contradiction is equivalent to rejecting the need to penetrate into the core of the matter.

But how did it happen that the acceptance of contradictions within socialism could come about only after lengthy discussions? What prevented this truth, which is most obvious today, from truly becoming obvious? The

lessons of such discussions and on the way they took place, were described by **P. Fedoseyev**, **A. Kosing**, **R. Yanovskiy** and other participants in the roundtable.

According to Fedoseyev, the progress of science, social science especially, was hindered by command-bureaucratic management methods, administrative pressure and intimidation. And although discussions may have been started from time to time, even on the abstract level, they were suppressed under pressure soon afterwards. Scientific truths are not always convenient politically and ideologically, **Z. Stoyanov** agreed. How else can we explain the fact that, despite the striking number of monographs, articles and speeches on contradictions within socialist society, their content have left something better to be desired and, in this case, whatever efforts may have been made to refute the familiar dialectical law, quantity never turned into quality. And whereas in recent years a new qualitative study of the contradictions within real socialism has nonetheless developed, it could hardly be ascribed only as a result of a previous accumulated theoretical background. More than anything else, it is a qualitative shift triggered by new views, and by the new thinking, which is gathering strength under the conditions of perestroika.

There is also gnosiological difficulty in the study of the dialectical nature of socialist society, as was mentioned in the course of the debate. To determine the inner source of development of the subject means to penetrate into its essence and, in this case, to engage in rather lengthy research, going from the surface of phenomena to the core in the development of socialism and, finally, to understand the historical limitations of the studied object itself. The core is contradictory. In addition to everything else, this also means that we are dealing not with some kind of absolute values or something that is suprahistorical and supratemporal. We are dealing with a phenomenon which has its own space and limits. Nothing in this world has an absolute value. When we try to apply this concept to our society, we must openly say that we thus raise the question of the historical limitations of socialism, for socialism cannot undertake to solve all historical problems. It is only by looking into the historical limits of socialism itself that we can determine its contradictions.

Another reason which we must not forget is the sociopsychological. Our people, our nation, **V. Mezhuiev** noted, was frightened by the word "contradiction." Unfortunately, such is our history: behind contradictions we always suspect blood. There was the Stalinist theory of the aggravation of class contradictions under socialism. We are familiar with its consequences. To this day, however, we have preferred to speak of anything else, such as differences, moral and political unity and a monolithic nature, but not of contradictions.

Obviously, prejudices against contradictions—the idea was voiced in the course of the discussions—remain also because the mechanism of their resolution has neither

been established nor created. It is the mechanism through which they function, for the aggravation of contradictions indicates the need to find new solutions, which is something frightening, for which we are not ready and without which things are more peaceful. That which is more peaceful today, however, tomorrow turns into a major disruption, bordering on catastrophe.

But whereas all speakers agreed, one way or another, with the fact that the concepts of socialism as a noncontradictory social system are in the past, a great number of original views were expressed concerning the understanding of the nature and role of contradictions within socialist society.

Above all, the question was raised of differences between internal contradictions, inherent in socialism by virtue of its nature, and external contradictions, which appear by virtue of circumstances influencing a society from the outside.

Many of the roundtable participants spoke of the need to distinguish between contradictions, on the one hand, and difficulties, subjective errors and various types of shortcomings, on the other. Thus, **A. Kosing** pointed out that in the GDR, 15 years ago there was a struggle for a proper understanding of contradictions and for learning how to distinguish them from errors, difficulties and shortcomings. However, the ability to separate one from the other did not cover the entire problem, **P. Fedoseyev** said. One must also see the interconnection between them. As a source of development or, as Hegel said, contradictions, which are the root of all vitality, inevitably create problems as they aggravate. That necessitates their solution. If this is not done at the right time, conflict situations arise and crisis or pre-crisis conditions appear. Obviously, we must proceed not from the fact that each shortcoming is a social contradiction but from the fact that contradictions, if ignored, turn into problems and, under certain circumstances, turn into most difficult complications and most dangerous situations in a great variety of areas of social activity.

This viewpoint was supported by **R. Varro**: if contradictions are concealed or set aside, they accumulate and become an obstruction to anything that is new and progressive. However, this is not strictly because they were not identified on time. The reason is found in the very structure of the society and in the interests of specific social groups, as well as in the mechanism which operates in the society and which either obstructs or contributes to the recognition and identification of contradictions and to their proper resolution. It is precisely because the structure prevents its own identification that in the majority of cases crisis situations arise.

In the course of the debates the problem of the source and motive forces of development of society was discussed. There are those who believe that the contradictions themselves are the motive forces; others believe that they are the forces and factors which resolve the

contradictions. The latter view was supported by the German scientists and by some Soviet researchers. Thus, **J. Vorholtzer** assumes that the further development of the motive forces of socialism helps to resolve contradictions. In the GDR this means serving the interests of the working class and all working people by promoting unity within the party's economic and social policy.

Motive forces of a new type appear under socialism, based on public ownership of the tools and means of production and under the conditions of a planned economy and the enhanced role of the integral nature of the social system, **R. Yanovskiy** said. This faces researchers with the task of studying the dialectics of proportionality, planning and consistency in the dynamics of the different social areas. In this case the progressive force of contradictions does not develop by itself. Conversely, its energy (as an objective source of development) is released and is increasingly attained through the purposeful activities of the people, which are a subjective factor, and through the development of the initiative and creativity of the masses.

#### Contradictions, Antagonisms, Conflicts

The problem of antagonistic and nonantagonistic contradictions was raised at the roundtable discussion in relation to topics, such as the variability of social development, pattern or randomness of socialist deformations, the appearance of the administrative-command system, and the cult of personality and the tragedies which resulted from it.

On the basis of theoretical assumptions, socialism is the first social system in the history of mankind in which there are no irreconcilable class interests and, consequently, no objective foundations for antagonism. However, there have been many events in the history of real socialism which clearly carried within themselves the features of antagonistic contradictions. How did this happen?

A number of unclear aspects, according to **E. Arab-Ogly**, are caused by the fact that the two levels on which the problem of contradictions under socialism are considered—the logic of history and of specific historical development—are frequently confused with each other. The contradictions which the logic of history presumes are frequently replaced by contradictions existing in real life and vice versa, whereas these levels do not always coincide.

What are the reasons for the disparities between them? Above all, the fact that the logic of history presumes the conscious development of socialism on the basis of the scientific management of society and the scientific anticipation of the results of this development. However, when subjectivism, arbitrariness and violations of subjective laws are allowed to occur, naturally the logic of history is violated. We therefore come across the fact

that in the history of socialism there have been antagonisms, there have been armed clashes between the PRC and the Socialist Republic of Vietnam, the fact that the cult of personality was not an isolated and local event and, finally, the fact that a number of socialist countries have experienced situations of crises and precrisis conditions. All of them are the consequences of a specific policy and of violations of the logic of history.

There is no need for us to promote as the logic of history all specific phenomena and processes which occur in real life and to consider them mandatory as well as mandatorily inherent in socialism. It is equally impossible, however, to reject them on the grounds that logically they should not exist.

We must not sharply differentiate between ideal socialism. **R Varro**, emphasized, the ideals of socialism and its logic, and the actually existing socialist society. Let us look at life soberly. We must not deny responsibility for the negative phenomena, for the repressions of the past. We must understand, we must become aware of the reasons for such phenomena found in our society. It would be difficult to claim that the repressions (such as Bukharin's trial in the USSR or the Rajk trial in Hungary) are not part of socialism, and that only successes can be attributed to socialism.

Yes, in the course of practical developments, socialism created many problems of a tragic nature. However, nor does this mean that they are inevitable companions of socialism or that there were no historical reasons for them, for such tragic phenomena appeared on the grounds of socialism, whether in Asia or in Eastern Europe. There is no pure theoretical socialism, somewhere way above and far from us; there is real socialism under the conditions of which all of us live, a socialism which carries within it both positive and negative features.

All in all, **V. Mezhuiev** supported the same type of quite strict and uncompromising position. We are afraid of acting as dialecticians to the end, he said, by ascribing the negative to contradictions and the positive only to unity and harmony. We must recall that when it is a question of dialectical contradictions, we bear in mind contradictions which are directly related to the very essence of the subject or else which proceed from it. Today we have begun to describe as socialism, in general, all that we encounter in life. In real life, however, there are a great many things which could hardly be classified as socialism, such as that same cult of personality or a Beriya-style behavior, crime and embezzlement of public funds. All of this stems not from socialism but from the fact that socialism has not been entirely built and it has not as yet become a universal system. No social system can immediately remake and subordinate to itself whatever has existed previously. Under socialism as well not everything becomes socialist. We must acknowledge that 70 years proved to be too short a time

to achieve this. Many of the deformations which took place in our history can be largely explained by the power and strength of the type of past which we inherited.

Speaking of those same social phenomena, **V. Khalipov** suggested that they be classified into strictly socialist, nonsocialist and even antisocialist which, unfortunately, could become more numerous during certain periods. Under the conditions of the new society there still exist violations of the law and crime. However, there are no socialist violations and crimes.

Or else, let us take the command-administrative system under socialism. Is it socialist in its nature? Whatever the case, the administrative system is acceptable and there is nothing bad in it. Society needs it. Yet the distortions and pressure methods, according to **V. Khalipov**, are deviations.

**B. Bessonov** also supported the idea that under socialism as a social system there are no internal socioeconomic and other prerequisites which necessarily trigger antagonistic contradictions and social conflicts. However, there are reasons, such as the incomplete maturity of socialism and its deformation as a result of a wrong political line and leadership errors. Under socialism there are no antagonisms based on socioclass grounds. However, there are antagonisms based on individual or group grounds, which appear as a result of the basic differences in the interests of individual citizens or groups, on the one hand, and the interests of the entire society, on the other. They are manifested in phenomena such as black marketeering, bribery, parasitism and crime.

In this connection, **G. Ikonnikova** suggested a classification of phenomena of socialist deformation as those which are characterized by antagonistic contradictions, and which require a revolutionary restructuring of relations, and those which are related to nonantagonistic contradictions and can be eliminated through reform, coordination of different interests, and with the help of glasnost, strengthening the legal foundations, and the overall democratization of society.

To **A. Kosing**, the decisive question is that in a socialist society antagonisms are no longer a determining motive force, for they lack any kind of substantive foundation. Naturally, this has essential practical consequences. Even conflicting interests under socialism are based on a socioeconomic commonality. This always allows us to find a compromise and a coincidence which make it possible to convert different interests into a conflicting live unity aimed at achieving unified social objectives. According to Marx and Lenin antagonisms are based, in the final account, on the hostility of class relations and the existence of exploitation and private ownership. All socialist contradictions assume an antagonistic nature if they appear on the grounds of such relations. One could go on arguing about antagonisms forever. From the



viewpoint of long-term social development, however, and the viewpoint of identifying the motive forces of socialism, this is a peripheral problem.

A contradiction between socioeconomic processes and culture is possible. V. Yadov metaphorically spoke of the contradiction between paternal (progressive) and maternal (conservative) principles. Socioeconomic processes are much more flexible and variable than culture. A knowledgeable social policy should take this into consideration, so that there will be neither haste nor lagging.

Promoting in the sociocultural environment of systems of social organization and management mechanisms which, within a given culture, trigger rejection and opposition, is one of the sources of stress in relations among socialist countries and among different ethnic groups within a given country. Such stresses could create serious problems of a political nature.

Could socioeconomic and sociocultural contradictions lead to antagonism? Hardly, if we consider as a source of antagonism the interests of the different classes. However, if we mean by antagonism a broader category, which includes the contradiction among the interests of large social communities, such as nations, peoples and states, at that point contradictions among them could also assume an antagonistic nature.

R. Varro described as criteria for antagonistic contradictions the exploitation relation (the class nature), the insoluble nature of a given contradiction within a given system and, naturally, its aggravation. She pointed out that an aggravated nonantagonistic contradiction could be just as harmful to socialist society and to the individual as an antagonism caused by exploitation.

Essentially, she raised the question of distinguishing between antagonisms and other forms of pressing situations, such as clashes, conflicts, crises, and so on, for if a nonantagonistic contradiction becomes aggravated and leads to consequences which are equally severe as those of antagonisms and, sometimes, even superior to them, naturally, how are they different from each other? Furthermore, an antagonistic contradiction is not always manifested as a sharp conflict (such as class antagonism between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie).

Most speakers came to the conclusion that it is not the aggravation or hostility among struggling forces that distinguish an antagonism from a conflict. The latter is indeed only a form of manifestation of contradictions, even though nonantagonistic. Antagonisms are a certain variety of contradictions related to the irreconcilable nature of basic interests of major social groups-classes. However, although agreeing with such an interpretation of conflicts and antagonisms, many roundtable participants (A. Kosing, G. Ikonnikova, E. Haan, B. Bessonov and others) noted that this problem needs further work.

As the discussion progressed, socialist society was increasingly presented as a social system which has both contradictions and sharp social conflicts.

#### **Old and New Contradictions in Economics and Management**

Whatever form of social life may be discussed, one way or another its clarification depends on understanding the place and role of this phenomenon within the single social entity which is contradictory down to its very essence. In other words, any aspect of socialism as an integral system is determined, in the final account, by its **basic contradiction**. Therefore, the question of the basic contradiction drew the particular attention of the speakers. It was discussed by T. Yordanov, A. Kosing, P. Fedoseyev, J. Vorholtzer, I. Antonovich and others. Antonovich formulated as basic the contradiction between production forces and socialist production relations.

Unlike the approach which was popular in the recent past, the participants of the roundtable attempted in their consideration of the problem, to identify the dialectics of production forces and production relations, to begin with, precisely as dialectics, i.e., not only from the viewpoint of the consistency of one aspect with another and their coincidence, but also from the viewpoint of their dynamics, interchange and conflicting unity and, secondly, not abstractly but in connection with the realities of life. Whereas in the past discussions were frequently focused on determining what was **considered** as the basic contradiction, today they are focused on **what is in fact such a contradiction**.

For a number of years in the past, P. Fedoseyev said, I personally wrote about the consistency between socialist production relations and the nature of production forces in Soviet society. Actually, was there not such consistency and even a total consistency at a certain time? At the time of the Great October Revolution, was there not a radical revolutionary elimination of obsolete production relations and did we not establish a consistency between new production relations and the nature of production forces? How can we explain in that case that socialism, as a new social system, despite the tremendous losses resulting from the cult of personality and the mass repressions, and despite the incalculable casualties and destructions of wartime and the growth of stagnation phenomena, was able to display unusual viability and become a powerful force in universal history? This can be hardly explained by Stalin's "firm order," as some defenders of conservatism and supporters of administrative-bureaucratic management methods imagine. In fact, it was precisely socialist production relations, the elimination of exploitation of man by man and of unemployment and social and national oppression, despite all economic and political distortions, that were powerful boosters of production forces.

Gradually, however, production relations began to fall behind the needs of the further development of the economy and, combined with different distortions and command-administrative management methods, led to stagnation phenomena. The leadership of the country, the party and the state failed to take prompt measures to prevent the negative phenomena, to make the necessary changes in production relations and methods of management and to provide scope for the creative initiative of the masses and a new powerful impetus for socioeconomic development. The advantages of socialism, such as socialization and economic planning, were brought to a point of extreme centralization, which led to statism in all areas of social life, command-bureaucratic management methods, alienation of means of production from the producer and tremendous concentration of power in the hands of managements or even single individuals.

That which was previously known as the study of contradictions meant, all too long, in fact, the more or less mechanical efforts to make social reality fit the orthodox formula of the law of unity and struggle of opposites, I. Antonovich emphasized. This does not mean that the law was poor or that we did not like the orthodox nature of its formulations. Conversely, what makes this law great is that it is immutable for all times. All that change are the means as well as the effect of the law. In the past, however, this law was applied dogmatically. Initially, contradictions between production forces and production relations were mandatorily formulated; subsequently, the sum of this contradiction was reduced to mandatory consistency and, subsequently, the entire dialectics of the social process was reduced to standardized systems.

The evolution of public ownership was also viewed quite schematically. Because of insufficiently generated social wealth, distribution relations were strictly administrative. This created special priorities and particularly favorable conditions for the development of nothing but a single form of social ownership—state ownership—which initially subordinated and then actually absorbed all other types of social ownership. Under the unbearable burden of social needs, state ownership itself broke down and degenerated into departmental ownership which is today the focal point of socioeconomic restructuring.

The dialectical consistency between socialist production relations and production forces in the GDR will be achieved with the help of intensive expanded reproduction, J. Vorholtzer noted. This calls for a more efficient combination of science with production and for achieving profound structural changes in the national economy and improving the planning and management system. As practical experience has indicated, the combines became the type of organizational form for the dynamic development of the national economy in which central governmental planning and management are based on the broad democratic participation of the working people.

Whereas most speakers discussed primarily the dialectics of production forces and production relations, T. Yordanov emphasized the contradiction within production relations themselves. In his view, the existing mechanism for the functioning and economic realization of social ownership triggers elements of alienation from it, alienation from labor and from the authorities. The basis of such alienation is the break of relations between the individual working person and state ownership. This conclusion is part of the new party concept for the further building of socialism in Bulgaria. Socialist property should no longer be anonymous, nobody's.

The various forms of self-management of the socialist economy are means of surmounting the different forms of alienation from ownership and of labor from the authorities, and for enhancing the subjective factor in the renovation of socialism. In the Soviet Union and the other socialist countries, including Bulgaria, a search is under way for efficient solutions to this problem.

Socialist leasing can become the basic and most widespread form of ownership and property management. The state transfers the right of economic management to the lessee, which may be a labor collective or a private individual, against payment and for a certain period of time. Another form used in the service industry and at small industrial enterprises is that of cooperatives. This presumes the open-end ownership of the means of production by the collective-owner. Nonetheless, state ownership is retained in the most important industrial sectors, in transportation, communications, etc.

The socialist type of contradictions is related to the fact that socialism cannot build the economy without the intervention of the state, V. Mezhyuev believes. However we may be reforming management, it cannot be entirely free from the state although we have inscribed on our banners the "withering away of the state." This is a contradiction which must be studied.

Nor can socialism develop outside commodity-monetary relations. Money, commodities and market are necessary instruments of economic development. Socialism cannot do without them. It will develop and support them. However, a contradiction exists here between public ownership and the need for state intervention, between public ownership and the need for a market system. These are real contradictions which encompass both the advantages and the limitations of socialism.

How can we see to it that the market economic mechanism can systematically develop and for the market to be linked to planning and, therefore, to lead to the appearance of new motive forces in the economy? In answering this question, A. Kosing said that in published works the approach is rather metaphysical: there is planning but no market; there is market but no planning. Yes, this is a contradiction. If such a contradiction is believed to be a booster, our task is to establish how to use it best in our practices, so that the advantages of planning may also be

related to economic incentives for growth, intensification, fast utilization of the achievements of scientific and technical progress, upgrading labor productivity and production quality and ensuring the very flexible adaptation to existing requirements. This cannot be achieved only on the basis of centralized planning. Such objectives can be attained only through the interconnection between the plan and the market.

According to I. Antonovich, social contradictions become aggravated when the balance is disturbed between the course of ideas and the course of things, between thought and reality. Actually, our ideas are always ahead of the course of things. The imbalance and the consequent aggravation of contradictions appear when "immature" reality tries to catch up with the idea which has outstripped it with the help of administrative-arbitrary regulatory measures. Nothing good comes as a result. This is the harsh lesson which was taught to us by the period of stagnation. The so-called scientific management of society also followed the path of the coercive urging of reality to fit a preset and quite frequently biased concept.

Scientific management is nothing other than the systematic study of objective reality and the existence of respective indicators of social progress at a specific time, nothing more and nothing else. What matters is not a speculative model, which people pursued in the past, but an objectively tested scientific foundation, the existence of which would make it impossible for the decision-making authorities to avoid or ignore it.

#### **Contradictions of Interests Are Also Contradictions of Life Itself**

The objective contradictions in socialist society are manifested through the activities of the people, who are governed by their own interests. The specific forms of such activities in all areas of social life, the contradictory nature of such forms and the types of interaction among the interests of different social groups, classes, nations and ethnic groups, strata and individuals became topics of lively debates.

Socialism will prove its social efficiency only after it has solved an entire array of problems which are now facing mankind in an entirely new, a progressive way. This includes the question of social justice and problems in the area of national relations, social security and, finally, the organization of the political life of society. The solution of each one of them is related to the development and elimination of a number of contradictions.

An indication of the way all such problems are being solved by the new social system is the new approach, the new thinking based on the priority of the universal over the class factor.

Marx provided an efficient formulation of the correlation between class interests and the need for overall social development: the time has come for the working class to start moving toward a new organization of sociopolitical systems "in its own interests and in the interests of mankind" (K. Marx and F. Engels, "Soch." [Works], vol 17, p 554). In other words, in promoting its own liberation, the working class creates conditions and possibilities for progress to all mankind. In the roundtable this was pointed out by P. Fedoseyev, E. Haan and other participants. The proper understanding of the prime significance of universal human problems, combined with a class approach to problems of the theory and practice of social development and international relations, is an essential accomplishment of the new and essentially dialectical way of thinking, which is of vital importance in the contemporary complex, contradictory and interdependent world.

Social equality is an example of the conflicting processes of social life. The supreme objective of socialist development, P. Fedoseyev pointed out, is achieving total social equality. However, as Lenin emphasized, this can be achieved only through the distribution of material and cultural goods based on the results of the labor of the individual working person. This means factual inequality, for with different results of labor and different types of families, "per capita" income will be different. This is one of the dialectical contradictions of socialism: progress toward full equality is taking place and can take place by accepting a relative inequality in wages for different labor results.

Under socialism the struggle between its inherent egalitarian trend and the social possibilities which limit it is permanent, claimed I. Antonovich. Deviations between such trends and the equidistant force are a standard of our development. Today we are emphasizing the personal interest and triggering an entire range of social inequalities. The reaction to this mandatorily includes the obstruction of a natural historical egalitarianism.

Today the task of the study of contradictions in the realm of national relations has become particularly relevant. The reasons for their aggravation was mentioned in the roundtable as well. The speakers pointed out either scorn for traditions and culture, particularly the sociopsychological aspects of the culture of one or another ethnic group (V. Yadov), or the disproportion between national and international processes. Yet another viewpoint existed, according to which said reasons were merely a manifestation of a more profound contradiction. Actually, the prime reason for the current tension in national relations, claimed A. Zharnikov, is the collapse of the command-administrative system, which grew out of the total stratification of the entire social life. The solution to this situation could be only one: democratization. However, democratization must have a specific content and real instruments for its implementation in the area of national relations. Its content could hardly be a federation of independent



countries, which is something occasionally suggested in the heat of numerous debates. The entire experience in global development indicates the unviable nature of such federations, which is determined, perhaps, by objective trends toward the internationalization of economic life. In the case of our country, the fact that a federal system would be unrealistic is also related to the multinational nature of the republics themselves.

The only real content in the process of democratization of national relations could be the true restoration of the Leninist principle of self-determination. In turn, this principle must be given a material content. This role could be assumed by republic cost accounting, which would exclude bureaucratic administration from the center and unjustified economic interference. On the other hand, limiting the principle of self-determination exclusively to Union republics would be insufficient. Obviously, it must be applied within each one of them as well. Under the conditions of national equality and the multinational structure of each republic, such a formulation of the question becomes legitimate.

In considering the international aspect of this topic, G. Cherneyko noted that, from the very beginning of the existence of socialism as a world system a tendency appeared not only toward developing a unity among socialist states and ruling parties but also toward giving priority to national interests which by no means coincided with those of other countries. However, this dialectical contradiction did not find a prompt and efficient solution and in frequent cases turned from a factor of development turned into one of obstruction. Nor was full use made even of coinciding interests which are more numerous among socialist compared to nonsocialist countries, based on their identical nature and collectivistic economy as well as single ideological-theoretical foundation—Marxism-Leninism. Such uniformity creates an objective opportunity for harmonizing interests on an international scale, but only an opportunity. The other, the international aspect of the contradiction is not the sum of coinciding national state interests or something which is above or outside national interests. Without national interests there could be no international interests achieved by coordinating individual interests. Such coordination is a way to strengthen the international nature of the socialist community.

Important problems were discussed also in the area of the sociopolitical and spiritual life of contemporary socialism.

That a bureaucratic stratum exists and that the contradiction between it and the remaining segment of society is one of the grave social contradictions of socialism is confirmed by the entire experience of perestroika. It is a question not of the qualitative structure of this stratum but of the position it holds in the hierarchical structure of society. According to Z. Stoyanov, it does not include anyone engaged in managerial activities but only those who put their personal interest above the social and to

whom the only behavioral motivation is official position, material well-being and career. What is the mechanism for the solution of this contradiction? It consists of the development of socialist democracy, implementation of the idea of self-management, reform of the political system and, naturally, glasnost.

Could it be that the excessive organization of political life was one of the reasons for the dominating position of command-administrative methods and the bureaucracy? If under socialism there are contradictions, which may not be based on class, V. Mezhuiev believes, but which are nonetheless contradictions among people and differences of interests based on the division of labor, i.e., differences in the social status of individuals. Under such circumstances is political struggle possible? Or else is it, nonetheless, despite all kinds of disagreements, a society of like-minded people who immediately, on the very first summon, would vote "for" what is asked and would agree to everything? But if a political struggle is possible, what forms and methods will it use?

One of the troubles of the period of stagnation was the fact that we greatly narrowed our understanding of politics in which two contradictions within society find their final manifestation. We confused the official with the politician. Not even self-management can replace the politician. Socialism needs professional politicians, professional political activities and a rich political life so that the solution of contradictions become less painful than it has been in the past.

Contradictions exist within the communist party itself, in its relations with society and individual strata and groups of working people, classes, etc. Here as well the contradiction is dialectical, as Yu. Shcherbakov said. Under a socialist system the communist party is the spokesman of the true and very profound interests of the working class and all working people. In practice, however, certain differences and contradictions exist between some aspects of party policy and the interests of specific social groups, strata and classes. Finding the optimal correlation between democracy and centralism and between the possible strength of party ranks under specific circumstances and quality indicators in the level of the political consciousness of party members and their activeness and initiative helps to achieve the closest possible interaction between the party and the toiling masses.

The objective contradictions in the activities of the Marxist-Leninist party are a reflection of contradictions within society and of the profound processes within the party itself, between the level of political and ideological-theoretical awareness of the party members and the toiling masses and, finally, contradictions between the tendency of the apparatus to play a self-sufficient role and the profound democratization of internal party life.

Socialist ideology must be considered an inseparable component of the motive forces of social development, E. Haan noted. The older socialism becomes the less it can live only with hopes for the future, particularly if it is a question of mass awareness, the more so since this future—the objective of socialism—is frequently defined by simply rejecting that which exists under capitalism. With the development of the socialist society the need for a positive development of its objectives and for a constant sober analysis of the existing situation increases, so that we may see how and to what extent such objectives are being implemented and what type of contradictions appear in this connection, and by virtue of what kind of reasons.

The significance of socialist ideology increases also as interests are shaped, which is the main motive force of society. According to E. Haan, the dynamics of development of interests and their social reproduction and the settling of contradictions between them cannot be an ideologically neutral process the experience of the GDR convincingly proves.

The important role of ideology is also dictated by contemporary production forces. Under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution great opportunities appear in the choice of various decisions which have tremendous social consequences. This makes the collective development of social criteria for such decision-making necessary. Here as well we cannot do without ideology, for the formulation of the social strategic objectives and the orientation of the working people toward achieving them is, precisely, its main task.

In the past, efforts to conceal contradictions to the detriment of democracy led to manipulations of social awareness and mistrust in and even alienation from socialist values. Today, Zh. Toshchenko believes, this negative trend is being surmounted. Social awareness is being awakened, although this process is not without problems. Sociological studies have indicated that no more than 9 percent of those surveyed said no to perestroika in the country, whereas 91 percent believe that perestroika is taking place. However, when it came to accessing the situation in the own labor collective, 40 percent answered "no." In other words, people see more the happening of perestroika in the country rather than within their own collective. Or else let us consider the following situation: 80 to 90 percent of those surveyed spoke out against bureaucratism and greed. In the individual labor collectives, however, only 15 to 16 percent of those 80 percent show themselves irreconcilably opposed toward actual bureaucrats and grubbers. Therefore we, as fighters, do not tolerate negative phenomena in general but, in particular, turn out to be conciliationists. This is largely related to the common mistrust caused by changes in the past which, as a rule, were proclaimed but were not carried out to the end, but were abandoned midway. This feature of the awareness, which comes from the period of stagnation, must be

taken into consideration. Most people learn from practical experience. Such people must be given real support by us, social scientists. Our task is to make social awareness a constructive force of development.

Naturally, in the course of the discussions only a small part of the contradictions could be mentioned and described, for it is only the roundtable of life itself that could encompass all of them. Furthermore, the participants in this meeting were not supposed to list some kind of "mandatory array" of contradictions. What was important was to single out among them those which have either assumed great importance today or else play a major role under the conditions of socialism as a whole.

In the period of perestroika and renovation of socialism, the dialectics of the old and the new and the struggle between them are among the key problems.

The confrontation between the old and the new does not take place painlessly. Sometimes it is accompanied by a sharp clash of positions, and one of the most important lessons in the first years of perestroika is to see all this and realistically to assess the situation, without leaning one way or another or falling into ruts.

This methodological approach, which the party has adopted and is developing further, accurately characterizes the complex dialectics of the struggle between the old and the new in the developing socialist society.

Naturally, it is important to understand that the knowledge of phenomena remains incomplete until it has been brought to the point of determining the inner contradictory nature of phenomena and its role in the single social entity. However, we must absolutely not stop at noting existing contradictions or even studying them. We must resolve these contradictions in practice.

All fraternal parties and all socialist countries are participating ever more actively in the live process of building the purposeful socialism of which Lenin spoke. This is the target of the process of perestroika, the process of renovation taking place in our society. This will require the joint efforts of specialists in the social sciences—philosophers, economists, historians, and legal experts—and the joint efforts of all of us, the personnel of theoretical journals of fraternal parties.

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### Solving the Women's Issue

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[Text] The world community, including organizations such as UNESCO and the ILO, consider the status of women as one of the global problems of mankind.

Our century is characterized by radical changes in the status of women, determined by the increasingly full and true recognition of the principle of their equality with men. However, achieving practical equality is a difficult and conflicting social process in our country as well. In the 1930s the "women's issue" experienced the lot of many other most important social problems. It was proclaimed "solved" and, perhaps, closed to discussion on a level different from the rhetoric of the "greatest accomplishments." In the 1960s, theoretical and practical studies of this topic were renewed. At that time, however, they rarely led to some kind of real results. Meanwhile, a number of negative phenomena had developed in the area of women's employment. Demographic problems were pressing. In the course of perestroika a number of new problems come to light, related, in particular, to the implementation of the economic reform. The main one among them is the following: Will women become the social group which will be the first to be affected by the processes of manpower layoffs? What guarantees exist in this area? Are they needed? In general, how is the social protection of women ensured?

The essence of the Marxist understanding of the "women's issue" is well-known: equal legal and equal actual social status of men and women; extensive and full participation in social production; changes in the way of life; finally, pursuing a corresponding purposeful and active policy in its specific organizational aspects. It is hardly necessary to prove that several generations of Soviet women are already living under conditions in which such theoretical foundations are no longer consistent with their practical embodiment in an entire array of parameters. Today we must clarify whether this concept is fully applicable in solving the problems which face us or do we need certain refinements or, perhaps, the formulation of new principles and new social guidelines?

### Viewpoints and Approaches

We believe that in the approach itself to the "women's issue" (and, naturally, hence the suggested solutions) we could single out four basic areas. We would describe the first as "patriarchal." Quantitatively, it is supported by

the largest number of authors. Particularly numerous among them are writers and journalists who write on so-called "women's" and "moral" topics. Most frequently, this trend is depicted indirectly, based on general considerations and assessment of characters, social processes and predictions. The nature of the concept representing it is the following: the world (in the sense of society) is based on certain natural foundations. Their destruction is extremely dangerous, for sooner or later this leads to the destruction of society itself and it is precisely the division of functions between men and women that is such a natural foundation. Nature itself has assigned to woman the main objective in her life as the mother, the keeper of the home. The home is the world of women. Men must be the procurers, the social leaders. They must provide the liaison between the small community, the family, and the big one—society at large. In terms of our history, the "patriarchal" awareness tends to link all negative processes to the fact that the orientation of women toward work in public production, as the main area of activities, destroyed the maternal instinct and led to a severe decline in mores and in the foundations of the family. Children, old people and husbands remain without women's concern and caresses, as a result of which the children grow up neglected despite living parents, old people are helplessly sent to the countryside and men become feminized and subordinate....

The supporters of this trend suggest, in order to improve society, that the women's working day be shortened, that housework and motherhood be granted the status of socially necessary productive labor, with corresponding payment and to make it part of the overall length of service; women should be given an additional free paid day per week in order to perform their household chores; they must be granted longer leave to care for small children, and mothers raising three or more children should be freed from the need to work in public production and be given corresponding social guarantees, and so on. It is considered necessary to put an end to propaganda via the mass information media of the ideal of the emancipated woman, as being destructive to the family and society and, conversely, pay greater attention to a healthy way of life, well-being, and happy families in which relations are built on the natural functions of men and women. Demands are being formulated decisively to apply steps, such as denying to people parental rights and instituting criminal prosecution for prostitution, and the creation of a special service in charge of watching over moral behavior. Immediate corresponding legislative changes are demanded.

As the letters sent to the Committee of Soviet Women and to newspapers and journals indicate, many women as well tend to gravitate in that direction, women who are truly suppressed by their "double burden," and who have chosen to work in public production above all because of economic necessity. However, judging by the results of sociological studies, the percentage of women



who would agree **not to work at all**, even if their material well-being is total, remains small and is further declining as their educational potential grows.

The second trend is represented mainly by specialists whose main topic of research is the process of economic intensification and the role which the human factor plays in it (we shall describe this trend as "**economic**"). In this case the women's problems appear as a reflection of economic problems. They are viewed as applied problems and treated correspondingly: women are a specific subjective production factor. Their labor efficiency is low because of frequent interruptions in their work, lower skills, and so on, for which reason the level of their employment in public production should be reduced. The most systematic supporters of this trend believe that it is only by eliminating undereffective manpower (and, therefore, female above all) high economic efficiency can be achieved. In order to facilitate such a "withdrawal" from public production by women, it is suggested that women be given a number of additional labor benefits: reduced labor day, increased paid leave (included in labor seniority) for caring for newly born children, etc.

The approach to the women's issue which characterizes the third trend—the "**demographic**"—is characterized above all by the viewpoint of the reproduction of the new generation. In analyzing the process of a declining birth-rate in the economically most developed parts of the country, demographers claim that, in the final account, this could lead to a depopulation unless special steps are taken in the area of demographic policy. In as much as statistics proves that the level of the birthrate is, as a rule, inversely proportional to the level of female employment in public production, the demographers deem necessary that women be given the virtually same benefits: longer paid leave to care for children, shorter work day, and so on.

The fourth trend, finally, which we shall describe as "**egalitarian**" (from the french word "egalite," which means equality). The supporters of this trend (which includes us) do not tend to consider the strictly "female" aspect of moral, economic or demographic problems. Conversely, moral, economic and demographic phenomena are considered as aspects of the status of women in society, as their social status. We proceed from the fact that the so-called natural division of labor between men and women is of a social nature (S. Firestone: "Nature made women different from men and society made them different from people"). The process of changes in the old type of division of functions is a process of destruction of the old social order and not a subversion of social foundations in general. The new egalitarian type of relations between sexes, which is replacing the "patriarchal," is based not on relations of domination and subordination, given by tradition and promoted to the rank of a "natural" law, but on relations of individual reciprocally complementing features in society and the family, which could be achieved only within the objective and subjective "area of free choice." It is the

social—material and spiritual—environment in which all a priori (class, starting opportunities, sex, age, political, and so on) concepts of the personality have been eliminated, i.e., an environment in which the personality is proportional to itself, to its own scale and not to any predetermined scale.

The supporters of the "egalitarian" trend believe that the negative phenomena in our life—the weakening of family relations, the lowered quantitative and qualitative indicators of the new generation, the problem of the elderly left without care, drug addiction and alcoholism among women, prostitution, the "feminization" of men and "masculinization" of women are not the result of the fact that society has destroyed its inviolable foundations but, conversely, are all confirmations of the transitional nature of our time from a patriarchal type of reciprocal relations to an egalitarian one. The old laws **no longer** operate during this period or else they operate weakly and in a contradictory manner, while the new interpersonal relations do not operate **as yet**. Therefore, the solution is to provide the greatest possible scope for the new relations rather than to destroy them.

This approach presumes, correspondingly, new means of "treatment" of social diseases and its own interpretation of the lessons in solving the women's problem in our country, and its own attitude toward developing the principle of sexual equality. Let us discuss in greater detail such problems (naturally, on the basis of our own views).

### Facing Reality

Naturally, in discussing the egalitarian approach, we do not shut our eyes to reality. Reality is the following: women, who account for one-half of the people employed in the national economy, are "concentrated" in a number of feminized sectors, where the wage level is 25-30 percent below the average. Women continue to engage in hard physical labor: for more than 4 million of them working conditions do not meet the standards and rules of labor safety. The jobs they hold are, as a rule, "horizontal," i.e., without a future in the sense of growth; the "vertical" jobs usually go to men. The percentage of women in science—among candidates of sciences, doctors and academicians—is declining although the educational level of women is quite high: they account for 60 percent of the total number of specialists with higher and secondary specialized training.

We have one of the highest levels of female employment in the world: about 90 percent of active-age women hold jobs or go to school. However, there is also a great deformation of employment, which has its reasons: despite a virtually identical level of education with that of men, on an average—both as workers and employees—women are worse trained on the professional and skill levels. The gap in the level of skills in an entire array of sectors ranges between two and three grades. Studies

have indicated that after getting married, two-thirds of working women do not improve their skills. They continue to work using their initially acquired knowledge, although this takes place under the conditions of the scientific and technical revolution, which requires a repeated and even continuous updating of abilities and skills. This is also a result of shortcomings in the organization of vocational training, in the skill improvement system, difficulties in daily life and shortage of children's institutions. The lack of proper coordination between general education, professional training and labor activities also affects primarily women. Whereas this situation was considered with alarm in the past, today, as we pointed out, it cannot fail to become aggravated and thus to aggravate the "women's issue."

Today full cost accounting and self-financing are being established on a comprehensive basis. Naturally, the enterprises develop an objective economic interest in recruiting and keeping the type of manpower which is the most stable, and which adapts itself well to faster production parameters and progressive changes. Under these circumstances, prerequisites are created for the appearance of a double sectorial model of employment: the first sector is stable, with good opportunities for growth, a creative type of work and, respectively, higher wages; the second is with a "fluctuating" employment, which requires essentially performing skills, a relatively low degree of loss caused by interruptions in the work, limited opportunities for vertical professional mobility and lower wages. Therefore, conversion to self-financing in its "pure aspect" objectively contributes to reducing the use of female labor (like that of workers belonging to other "marginal" groups, such as young people, employed pensioners, people reaching pre-pensioning age, people with diminished health, the disabled) precisely in the second employment sector. One can anticipate that women will lose jobs above all in connection with updating production facilities, reduction in personnel, and so on. This applies not only to women workers but also women with higher training, for such a differentiated approach is already encountered by women university graduates. The stereotype of considering women unreliable workers will be extended to all women. Understandably (although, it is true, not everyone realizes this) such integration of female labor in the production intensification process is not socially justified under a socialist system.

What are the possible solutions to this problem? As we know, the state implements its policy through administrative and economic forms of influence. Naturally, through a variety of respective orders and instructions, the enterprises can be instructed to employ a certain percentage (quota) of women workers or be instructed to lay off no more than 50 percent of the women it employs, let us say. Such orders could be effective but only as "first aid." In the long-term, however, as we know, administrative instruments quickly lose their efficiency. An example is found in the familiar 1979 resolution which remains inapplicable in practical terms, which

mandated that women with children under 8 be given the opportunity to undergo retraining and to upgrade their skills on a full-time basis but with full pay. It is important, therefore, to develop a mechanism which would be consistent with the reform, i.e., which would influence enterprises economically. We believe that society should create for the enterprises the type of economic conditions in which the sex factor or the existence of children in a family would not be a priori negative or positive. In our view, this can be achieved by using the mechanism of a rate of withholdings from gross profits; the share of the profit which is left at the disposal of the enterprises should proportionally grow depending on the increased "children load" on the collective" (which means the correlation between the number of children of enterprise workers and the overall size of the personnel). In order to use more efficiently and purposefully such funds, they could be deposited into a "children's fund" (or, let us say, a "family fund") of the enterprise. The specific parameters of such withholdings could be determined in the course of the experiments aimed at perfecting the economic mechanism. The collective itself would determine how to use its "children's fund." Such funds could be used as compensations for the additional burden carried by those who work "for two," when one of the spouses is caring for a sick child; this could include special bonuses to educators and nurses employed at the plant's kindergarten, taking care of the "healthy" children; additional funds could be used for building children's preschool institutions, purchasing "family" travel vouchers, etc. The "children's load" could also include children who attend the kindergarten of one enterprise while the parents work at another (we believe this to be an important addition, for today there already are numerous cases in which enterprises operating on a cost accounting basis do not accept "outside" children from "their own" nurseries and kindergartens). Such a step would encourage the building of preschool institutions financed out of noncentralized investments.

Another important feature is the following: the radical economic reform stipulates the extensive use of the cooperative form of organization of production and individual labor activity. Cooperatives may become an area of employment which would absorb the surplus manpower, including women who are being laid-off by state enterprises, the management system, and so on. Obviously, however, this also requires certain organizational steps, such as drafting special programs for retraining precisely women in accordance with the needs and requests of the cooperatives and the creation of small women's collectives, whose members would combine managerial with performing functions.

Of late the question of night work for women has become aggravated. Unfortunately, more frequently than men women work in three-shift systems, and the night shift is also, unfortunately, primarily that of women (women employed in night shifts exceed the number of men by a factor of 2 or 3 and, in some sectors, 6). Obviously, the trade union committees have decided not to interfere in

this matter. Yet the Committee of Soviet Women has been literally flooded with letters from women to whom night shift destroys their entire way of life and prevents normal family life. Women are particularly irritated by the conversion to multiple shifts where this is not needed to meet the true requirements for upgrading production efficiency and frequently harms efficiency, and where such a system is applied only in obedience to some order. The situation which has developed in the textile industry is particularly difficult. However, as the studies of the All-Union Central Scientific Research Labor Safety Institute (Ivanovo) has indicated, with suitable organization of the work, in this case night shift can be avoided and the work can be done with the existing equipment (a considerable percentage of which predates the revolution) without any lowering of output. This would relieve the people from extreme psychophysical overstress caused by night work.

Worldwide practical experience shows disparities in the attitude toward banning nighttime labor (incidentally, such labor was banned in our country in October 1917 but reintroduced once again in April 1925 "with a view to preserving the women's proletariat"). In particular, the view was expressed that in the period of implementing economic reforms, such a step hinders the equal status of women on the labor market. Furthermore, there also are areas of employment in which nighttime work is not particularly heavy (such as hotels, and so on) and, should salaries be raised, could even be attractive. In a number of climate zones nighttime labor is less tiring than daytime work. We believe that all such factors must be taken into consideration in order to reach a truly expedient solution concerning night work, which would be useful to working women.

Finally, one of the most important problems is that of wages. The Soviet Constitution proclaims the principle of equal wages for equal labor, regardless of sex. However, the actual disparity in the average male and female wages, as studies have indicated, can be expressed with the ratio of 3:2. If we were to classify industrial sectors on the basis of their average wage levels, the following trend appears: the higher becomes the percentage of women employed in a given sector the lower is the wage level. Let us immediately stipulate here that labor conditions in the "feminized sectors" are by no means better and are even frequently worse than in sectors where male labor predominates, with the same difficulty of the work. We believe that including in the corresponding article of the Constitution the formula recommended by the ILO of "equal pay for equal labor of equal quality" would provide grounds for revising the wage rates and salaries in "female labor" sectors and skills. This would not be a manifestation of "social welfare" but a necessary prerequisite for the elimination of the disproportions in this area.

However, disparities in wages, based on the area of employment itself, do not exceed 15 percent (according to studies). The balance is the result of the unequal

opportunities for a labor career. In comparing differences in the earnings of men and women we find the following: whereas nearly one-third of women earn under 100 rubles, this applies to only 2 percent of men; if we take the overall number of low-salaried people, nine-tenths of them are women (characteristically, with the passing of time absolute figures of earnings may change but the ratios remain the same).

The low standard of wages in the "female sectors" (which, naturally, includes sectors in the nonproduction area, such as education, health care, culture, etc.), could be considered another reason for their feminization. However, frequently the concentration of women in this "traditional" area tends to be explained not in terms of economic reasons but the justification that such work is like an extension of household chores or is based on them. It is believed that because of their double load women prefer to choose the type of employment which reduces to a minimum any risk of experiencing future difficulties related to giving birth to children, etc. In our view, however, the accuracy of this view is refuted by the very fact that the "array" of typical professions practiced by men and women in different countries frequently varies. Thus, in the United States the profession of physician is one of the highest paid and women who practice it are rather few (13 percent of all physicians). In our country the opposite is true: 69 percent of all physicians are women.

We are prepared to acknowledge the existence of a biased attitude toward a professional career for women, and when people speak of equality they rarely take into consideration the need to increase the participation of women in the decision-making process (let us note that only 7 percent of women with higher or secondary specialized training hold management positions, compared to 48 percent for the men). It is believed that, as a whole, women are less oriented toward professional success, that they do not have such a need or, furthermore, that it is not inherent in them. It is thus that a stereotype takes shape which makes virtually no distinction among individual qualities and capabilities. Yet, naturally, the awareness among women themselves is quite disparate. Unquestionably, this determines the differences in orientations and behavior in society. Yet here achievements are expected of men only. If a woman manages to achieve professional success, it is usually believed that she was "lucky" (frequently this is unrelated to her capabilities). Both failures and successes are gauged in terms of traditional women's roles. Frequently women are accused of forgetting their "direct obligations." There are those who tend to emphasize that a labor career is incompatible with femininity (but is femininity compatible with moving railroad ties or laying asphalt?)

Women frequently find themselves in a double situation: they would like to "remain women" but, at the same time, to "rise in their career." As a rule, in reality a woman has to choose one or the other (it is common



knowledge that women limit their professional activity in favor of family obligations, whereas men limit their family obligations in favor of their jobs). The choice is less voluntary than determined by social conditions. Sometimes women, even those oriented toward a "career," must abandon their plans, for in some circumstances professional activities would make their lives more difficult. Considering the existing disbelief in women's managerial capabilities, their own underestimating of possibilities intensifies. Lack of confidence in their forces develops. That is perhaps why many of them prefer to turn their efforts toward achieving success in areas which are considered part of traditional women's roles. In some cases they must even conceal their aspirations and capabilities in order to adapt to the stipulations of the existing stereotype and customary views on the structure of social relations, the role and functions of men and women and social subordinations. This leads to constant nervous stress and conflicts in the family. Nervous disturbances, dissatisfaction with their status and the impossibility of self-realization as persons are the price which women pay. The loss of human and economic resources is the price paid by society.

#### On Equal Opportunities

Contemporary researchers frequently quote Lenin to the effect that sexual equality does not mean equalizing women with men in terms of the difficulty of labor, the extent of its stress, and so on, assuming in this case that we have gone a long way precisely in terms of this "improper" equality-equalization. They therefore conclude that it is "necessary to take more fully into consideration the specific nature of female labor." As a rule, what is meant by specific nature is that same "purpose of women established by nature itself...."

If we speak of the egalitarian interpretation of the Marxist understanding of the principle of equality, it means not that society must try to eliminate all social disparities between men and women (an approach precisely typical of the rhetoric of early socialist utopias). Conversely, it is an emphasis of the need for a systematic and active effort to provide equal social opportunities for development; it is a question not of "averaging" the person and converting him into some kind of one-dimensional sexless being but of **lifting the social barriers which prevent the manifestation of the person as a personality.** One such barrier is the sex stereotype which simplifies and averages the individual down to the level of the implementation of his "natural specifics," as men or as women. Therefore, this presumes progress toward a more developed, a more complex society based on equal opportunities for the manifestation of the personality, which is quite consistent with the present emphasis on the development of socialism by increasing variety and the humanistic orientation toward the specific individual.

Any society considers a specific conceptual system in terms of its own needs and the extent to which this adaptation is adequate greatly depends on the extent of

development of the society itself. The specific conditions for making socialist changes in our country were related to the partial and, sometimes, erroneous understanding and implementation of the Marxist-Leninist principles governing the solution of the "women's issue." The main emphasis was on the greatest possible involvement of women in public production and it was precisely the quantitative indicator that began to be considered as the main criterion in determining the success of its solution. Components of the classical concept, such as converting the household economy into a sector of social labor, developing new relations between the sexes, and a new type of distribution of labor within the household remained virtually ignored. In this connection, the phenomenon of the "double burden" was bound to appear. This is a phenomenon which in all countries undergoing the stage of industrial development leads to discrediting the emancipation of women. All of this not only failed to eliminate the "patriarchal" relations in our country but, in a certain sense, even **intensified** them, leaving to the woman the old range of "her" obligations in a family but reproducing it on the level of **society as a whole.** Naturally, if we truly wish to achieve social equality the "women's issue" must be resolved in full.

Practical experience indicates, however, that even where significant successes have been achieved in the development of trade, public catering and services, i.e., in the socialization of household labor, in themselves such achievements are not sufficient to eliminate the attitude toward women as "second-rate workers." We believe that both in theory and in practical activities the most important aspect remains intact: we must not emancipate women **exclusively.** Emancipation is, as a minimum, a two-sided process. Both men and women must have the areas from which they were removed open to them: public production in the case of women, and home and family, for the men. The implementation of a consistent policy of this kind and the shaping of a corresponding public opinion are, in our view, the necessary steps in resolving the "women's issue." Such steps must be taken as of now.

Converting from complaints concerning the insufficient participation of men in household chores and in the education of children to the creation of real material facilities for men to participate in such functions is of essential importance. The "single function," which has developed and become instilled in social awareness, leads to major losses to society and to the personality of men, for the area of their activities in the family has been reduced to the role of "procurer." A man, even if he would like to increase his contribution to the family area, and even if this comes closer to his personal inclinations, is unable to accomplish this, as a rule, for society does not grant him such right: he cannot use additional leave for taking care of a child should this become necessary, and so on. Yet nature has assigned to the woman the single function of giving birth, whereas care and upbringing of the children are parental functions. Men find themselves in an even more unequal situation when a

marriage is dissolved, although the Constitution calls for equality between men and women in all areas of activities, for in 99 out of 100 cases after a divorce children are left to the mother, regardless of specific conditions. Even after the divorce all that is actually demanded of the man (or, frequently, also asked for), is material support. Frequently men become simply alienated from the raising of and spiritual contacts with the child, thus becoming ex-fathers.

The parental function belongs equally to men and women. It is important to proceed on this basis in formulating demographic policy. All the benefits which society can grant (unless they are related to the physiological features of men and women) should be aimed at the **family as a whole**. Some of them, possibly, could be formulated precisely for the fathers (in particular paid leave while the wife and the child are in the maternity home). Incidentally, "paternal" benefits are granted in a number of countries throughout the world, such as Denmark, Sweden, Greece, the FRG, Finland and Brazil (in Bulgaria this includes grandmothers and grandfathers). As May Britt Teorin, Swedish member of parliament, has pointed out, the universally acknowledged achievements of Sweden in involving women in higher managerial and political activities are explained also by the social support given to parenthood, not only to women but to men as well.

Naturally, without denying the specific features, we speak of protecting the personality of women and men from the traditional perception of their role, codified in cultural and, partially, legal norms. The "**specifics of necessity**" (let us give it that name) would be replaced by the "**specifics of freedom**," which presumes full opportunity for involving the individual in worthy areas of activities on the basis of a free choice. Labor relations and the juridical standards which regulate them should contribute to the establishment of such new specifics, so that they may develop **thanks to** and not **despite** them.

In order legislatively to support such an approach it is important, in our view, to add to Article 35 of the USSR Constitution a section which would guarantee not only to women but also to men the possibility of combining the functions of parent and production worker. We believe that a special commission should also review labor legislation and the Marriage and Family Code. It is important to identify and delete legal rules which lead to direct or indirect discrimination against women in labor and men in the area of the family. Special governmental steps must be taken to guarantee the rights of men and women in connection with the economic, demographic and social policy which is being implemented.

The implementation of such principles and approaches would make it possible, in our view, to solve a number of "women's" problems which have accumulated and to prevent the appearance of other negative phenomena.

Naturally, we have tried to present here a viewpoint which we share and support. As we pointed out, other approaches exist as well. We recognize that today we lack an overall concept for the solution of the "women's issue," which would combine in a nonconflicting fashion its new and old aspects—economic, demographic, legal, social and national. In this connection, we deem it timely and necessary to raise the question of intensifying the interdisciplinary nature of studies on this set of problems and concentrating within a single scientific center (for the time being, such studies are extremely scattered). It may be expedient to discuss "social feminology" as a scientific subject whose specific content would be the study of the status of women and "applied feminology," which would study the "women's aspect" which is invariably present within the other social sciences—economics, demography, ethics, psychology, etc.

The formulation of a single and integral concept is a most important task and a necessary structural part of the policy of perestroika.

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#### Letters To the Editors

18020010g Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 4, Mar 89 (signed to press 22 Feb 89) pp 66-76

[Text] V. Kharcheva, **doctor of philosophical sciences, department head at the scientific research center of the Komsomol Central Committee Higher Komsomol School: Youth and Labor**

What do we know about the young, about the tendencies and feelings of those who are at the start of their labor career? Understandably, by supporting them, the mature generation ensures for itself a tranquil old age. It is in its interest to help every young person to find within the social and professional structure of society the place in which he would feel most confident and would realize his capabilities and vocation to the fullest extent. A man in his right place is always a good worker. What is the nature of the real practice, and to what extent is social policy toward the young consistent with the tasks of economic perestroika and the interests of the new generation?

The new forms of organization of labor demand higher professional knowledge and different qualities in terms of the social standards of the individual compared to those toward which, willy-nilly, our system of education and training was oriented over a long period of time. Initiative, competence, and moral reliability become prerequisites for success in labor and, therefore, in life. To what extent are such qualities found in the working youth?

I believe that for the time being we do not have sufficiently complete answers to such questions or an overall concept of the self-awareness, hopes and fears of working

youth. However, even that which sociologists have already determined allows us to judge of the extent to which such problems are serious. The studies conducted by the Higher Komsomol School indicated, in particular, that by the age of 25, 36 percent of young people are satisfied with their life as a whole; the figure rises to 38 percent by the age of 30 (for people past 50 this indicator is substantially higher: about 60 percent). What stands behind these figures: youth maximalism, greater demands concerning production and living standards or material difficulties? In all likelihood, all three. For example, the average wage per young family member is almost half compared to people belonging to older age groups. The dissatisfaction of young people with their work in the production area may be due to different reasons. However, there also is a common ground: in this case the development of the personality remains a problem to be solved by the individual and is of little interest to anyone else.

The young person would like a job in which he can not only "earn well," but also which is interesting, where he can apply his moral and intellectual potential. Creativity plays an important role in the structure of the value orientations of the new generation. This is noticeable, let us say, when we consider the development of scientific and technical clubs. However, at work no more than 5.7 percent of young people are involved in invention and rationalization work. The low prestige of a number of skills related to material production is due not to a dislike of work as such but to the negative attitude toward labor conditions, and the primitive forms of labor organization. As long as social policy is oriented primarily toward upgrading the results of human labor at specific jobs, rather than structural changes in production, it would be unlikely to expect a change in this trend.

Faith in perestroika is quite high among the young generation. It considers reforms as the only real means of solving its problems. However, we must also protect the interests of young people in the economic and production areas. The development of the mechanisms for such protection and a flexible and an efficient system for employment and retraining becomes all the more important considering that changes in the structure of employment on the scale of the country are becoming a practical task. According to the specialists, the hidden manpower surplus in the country's national economy amounts today to 13-19 million people. Meanwhile, about 700,000 jobs which require high production skills remain vacant. If we were to increase the shift coefficient by no more than 1.7, the number of such jobs would increase by a factor of almost 6. Therefore, protecting the interests of those who are entering working age demands the solution no longer of tactical (improving individual aspects of training and education, professional training, and so on), but of strategic problems.

The approach to the utilization of the labor potential of young people, which was established during the period of extensive economic development, can be defined as

nothing but thoughtless waste. Despite constant claims to the opposite, claims which are frequently of a ritual nature, actually young people were considered on the basis of pragmatic-consumerist positions (positions of an immediate pragmatic nature), as an accessible and always available source of unskilled manpower, used in compensating disproportions in socioeconomic development. The outlay principle in the organization of the production process triggers a constant shortage of cadres above all where, as it were, there is a surplus of them. With every passing year the flow of young migrants who leave their villages and towns and, frequently, their families, to acquire a skill and find a job increased. The customary way of life and mechanisms of social control were disrupted and the nature of intercourse among people changed. The new immediate surroundings frequently proved adverse in terms of moral standards and value orientations. It is no accident that the highest percentage of crime in the cities is precisely among young people who have gone there to work or study.

This problem could have been made less serious by locating vocational technical schools and branches of technical colleges in the small towns and rayon centers, so that the young people could master a skill without leaving home. However, the strategy of waste and the "construction projects of the century," which were completed essentially by young people, rather contributed to the fact that the processes of job finding remained uncontrolled. To this day, in many areas, particularly in Central Asia, between 30 and 50 percent of young people enter the national economy without any vocational training whatsoever. Furthermore, even among those who have such training a large number are unable to find jobs precisely in their own field rather than simply take any job. All of this has influenced in a most negative way the self-awareness of the young generation.

Social tension is being constantly reproduced and so is the clearly obsolete and, above all, rigid structure of skills which are taught in vocational-technical schools. Normal competitiveness among young workers and the possibility for everyone to display his individual capabilities assume distorted aspects if, as professions disappear, there is a systematic reproduction of a surplus of graduates, while a grave shortage exists in filling jobs requiring new skills.

For the time being, this disproportion is high: according to 1987 data, for example, nearly one out of three workers lacked the opportunity to make full use of his skills; meanwhile, 196,000 people held jobs requiring training higher than the one they had. Surveys indicated that in both cases a feeling of moral and psychological discomfort develops in people: some experience a constant dissatisfaction with their work and a gradual loss of interest in professional growth; others develop a complex of social inferiority, lack of confidence in themselves and fear of failing, which is worsened by frequent clashes with their fellow workers and managements. A number of sociological studies have shown that such problems



affect between 40 and 60 percent of working youth. Is there any guarantee that in converting to cost accounting and collective forms of labor organization such problems will not become aggravated further?

As a study conducted by the Central Press indicated, equalization and arbitrary wage reductions, on the grounds that "this worker is too young," are still a reality. Another problem has been added to this: in collective wage forms, the distribution of earnings within the brigade is based, as a rule, on job rating, although all the members of the brigade are performing work of equal difficulty. The higher grades are those of workers with greater longevity, and whatever labor contribution the young may have made, they come out the losers. Even if the entire brigade wishes to upgrade the "status" of a young person, years must pass before the opening presents itself.

Usually, there is a lack of inclination to entrust young workers with new equipment. It is true that, according to a number of surveys, the older comrades are also not interested in handling new equipment because of fear of loss of earnings. The habit of earning not according to one's labor but one's grade remains strong. Adding to this the fact that brigade wage forms are applied on a purely arbitrary way, the social microclimate at the enterprise begins to worsen. In such cases it becomes difficult for the young worker to avoid developing a reputation of loafer, laggard, of *ignoramus*. Hence, the specific evaluation of the brigade contracting method is the following: young workers support it (between 29.7 and 37.5 percent of those surveyed in 1988); however, most of them would prefer to work in strictly youth collectives, where there would be no grounds for conflicts between members of different generations. Such a system, however, can clearly not be adopted as the main one.

The optimal solution of the worsening problem of working youth is seen in something else: obviously, we can no longer postpone the formulation of a uniform nationwide system for the redistribution of manpower (as a rule, local initiatives in finding jobs for those who were unable to compete professionally within their collectives are ineffective), and implementing a reform in vocational-technical training and retraining, and drafting special legislation to protect the interests of the young. Unquestionably, these would be useful and necessary steps. Nonetheless, so far no full light has been shed on any of these areas.

It would be hardly right to rely in this case exclusively on the development of administrative (national and regional) structures, and even on initiative and enterprise. We must use economic methods in controlling social processes. In particular, the possibility of establishing a procedure for paying for labor resources,

according to which both the brigade and the enterprise as a whole would find it to its advantage to recruit young people and to invest in their professional growth, looks tempting.

Taking into consideration the complexity and scale of perestroika in the national economy, it would be hardly justified for the development and implementation of an efficient, flexible and comprehensive job policy (for young people above all) to be exclusively the prerogative of the State Committee for Labor and Social Problems. The committee drafts corresponding suggestions. However, so far they are not being submitted to public consideration. We believe however that in this case we need the joint efforts of all interested organizations and an open, businesslike and constructive discussion in the press.

The same could be said about drafting youth legislation. Analogues of this may be found in many countries throughout the world. I believe, however, that in our country there are no more than a few specialists familiar with how precisely to solve the problems of the young generation and the extent to which the legal regulation of such problems is efficient and, finally, the nature of the tasks and objectives of youth policy. The secondary role which is assigned to this entire array of problems in our theory and practice has led to the fact that public opinion considers them as nonexistent. If a draft law on youth is submitted for discussion, I fear that few are those who would be able to evaluate the suggested steps or to substantiate their own viewpoints competently. However, such a viewpoint must be formulated, at which point the role played by the mass information media, particularly the youth press, becomes very important.

It is obvious that youth policy should not be reduced to taking "emergency" tactical measures and reducing the most stressed contradictions and conflicts in the social and production areas. It is important, in my view, for the state authorities and public organizations and the scientists in a great variety of areas to realize its main strategic objective: not the passive adaptation but the active, the organic integration of the new generations within the social structure and the labor collectives.

**N. Nesterov, worker, technical department, Morozovsk-selmash Plant, Rostov Oblast: Respect for the Law**

Today a great deal is being said and written about the state of law and, as a rule, prime importance is ascribed to the formulation and passing of respective laws. Unquestionably, drafting laws with the broad participation of the masses is both necessary and useful. This is the first step. However, it is after it that begins the hard and long procedure of developing in all members of society without exception the habit of observing the laws which have been passed. History has given us very little time to accomplish this, far less than bourgeois was needed by bourgeois society. I believe that in this case the mass information media must play an active and

purposeful role both in the dissemination of legal knowledge as well as in objectively interpreting the work of our law enforcement authorities and soviets of people's deputies.

In principle no one objects to such an interpretation of the problem. This does not mean, however, that I am trying to break an open door. Despite the unity of views, changes along this way are virtually nonexistent.

The first in the series of laws stipulated in the legal reform were "On the State Enterprise (Association)" and "On the Cooperative in the USSR." The drafts of these laws were extensively discussed and approved by the public. What prevents their strict implementation? Why is it that the newspapers are full of innumerable cases of violations of such laws? The general answer to these questions is familiar: the existing administrative-command management system opposes their effect. Naturally, this is the right answer, why are our law enforcement authorities not criticized for their failure to make the people observe the laws? The prosecutor's offices have not indicted a single violator of these laws!

This applies to an even greater extent to the Law on the Cooperative in the USSR. We hear a great deal of complaints voiced by heads of kolkhozes and agricultural associations, including some which are famous throughout the country, to the effect that the personnel of the agroprom, party and soviet authorities and banking and financial officials interfere in their work. But then the law protects the kolkhozes from such interference! Why not remind such people, if necessary, that interference in kolkhoz activities (and of activities of cooperatives) is against the law and that the kolkhoz has the right to appeal the actions of an official in court?

"Common sense" is the excuse for the crying legal passiveness of heads of agricultural cooperatives: if one were to take to court managers of a rayon or oblast (not to mention republic) one would not receive funds for equipment, spare parts, or financial "contributions;" conversely, there would be petty annoyances and visits by all kinds of commissions and need for explanations. Who would risk this, the more so since there are no "instructions" about turning to the courts with complaints against illegal actions committed by superiors. Generally speaking, such tactics are entirely explainable and, let us be frank and remember practical social experience, justified. But then who should point out the immorality of such tactics?

The question I have asked was "why was the Law on the Cooperative in the USSR passed if no one is willing to apply it?" I addressed this question to editors and to our highest state authorities. My question was re-addressed to officials on the rayon level. These are quite noticeable results of perestroika, right?

**S. Goncharuk, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, Lyubertsy: The Scientific Council**

We are currently preparing for the elections, the candidacies of the future deputies, including nationally and world-famous scientists, are being discussed. These are people who submit programs important to society, concerning their governmental activities (should they be elected). I support such candidates.

Nonetheless, I ask the following: Why is it that in our country, where foreign and domestic policy is based on science, most noted scientists and academicians can influence it only if, in addition to their titles, they must have the trust of the voters? For otherwise the authorities which formulate such policy would not resort to the services and advice of such people. Published works on problems of ecology and capital construction indicate that many construction projects have not been subjected to scientific expertise at the planning stage. It seems to me that the scientific potential which is available to our society is, in this case, used by no means sufficiently and that the bureaucratic system is satisfied "to do its own thinking."

KOMMUNIST has published letters to the editors in support of the suggestion of setting up under the control of superior authorities scientific councils consisting of the most outstanding scientists, who would discuss at the proper time all problems of importance to the state and society and would issue recommendations; every scientist would deem it his duty to participate in such councils and to express his opinion. I believe that this suggestion should be implemented in the interest of the cause and in for the sake of our common interests.

**S. Chesnokov, senior scientific associate, USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of Economics and Forecasting of Scientific and Technical Progress: On the System of Social Statistics**

As yet perestroika is insufficiently passing through the glass doors of departments which perform centralized national economic management functions. The reasons for this involve politics, economic and personnel, and are being extensively discussed. I would like to draw attention to instrumental, information-technological reasons, if you wish and, in this connection, discuss problems of social statistics.

Democratization and glasnost have been supported politically and codified legislatively. For the time being, the press, radio and television are the main instruments of perestroika. Clearly, this is sufficient in carrying out political reforms. I believe that it is not, in terms of organizing a stable social life on a democratic basis, within the framework of a large state.

A well organized system of social statistics, accessible to all citizens, which would allow them to correlate their problems with the state of affairs throughout the country, is necessary in terms of our future life, as we conceive of it. In my view, the best option would be for such a system to assume the aspect of social and economic monitoring.

Our state statistical system developed in order to solve problems of accountability and control. Now, with perestroika under way, these tasks have changed without, naturally, losing their significance. Fortunately, demand for "ideological support" with the help of statistical manipulations, is disappearing.

The main charges leveled at social statistics were roughly the following: The figures were classified, inadequate and inaccurate.

Let us assume that everything is made public. Not "30, 50 or 60 percent," but everything stored in the vaults of the former Central Statistical Administration. Will this solve the problem? I do not think so, for few data have been gathered concerning the health of the population, infant and adult mortality, drug addiction, availability of food products, medical services, and so on. An idea of the gravity of such problems has already been provided by the press, the radio and television. A political effect has been generated, but what about an administrative one? If we look at it as in the past, when the main thing was to be able to say that "here is the problem, and here is where we must concentrate the efforts," statistics made it possible to sound the alarm on the basis of figures. Today many abscesses in our life have been opened, and the alarm has been sounded. What now?

Now we need a description of the connections among social, regional and economic indicators, which would enable us to identify the mechanisms of interconnection among the different manifestations in the life of the people belonging to various population groups and strata. It is precisely such data that could enable us to make accurate and specific decisions concerning economic and social problems on the level of governmental departments and institutions.

How to solve this problem? I believe that there is only one radical solution: not to increase the rigidly pre-planned "forms," but to adopt an essentially different technology for their formulation of a kind such that that anyone who uses statistical figures could efficiently obtain precisely the information he needs for the solution of a given problem. Currently the right to make statistical tables has been monopolized by a department or small groups of experts and technical specialists. Obviously, this right must become democratic.

A simple doubled, tripled or even hundredfold increase in initial data will not meet the needs of science and management or provide the country with a reliable system of statistical information and set social policy and centralized economic management on a strong information base, whatever shape it may acquire as a result of the economic reform. The reorganization of the access of people to strategic information as well would not suffice. We need a technological chain of transformations on all levels, on which the production of statistical information would be based.

It is at that point that the State Committee for Statistics could continue to specialize in the area for which it was established: in statistical accountability and control. In connection with the new requirements, it could also deal with some social statistics, based on a specific set of indicators (above all those about which total accountability is desirable or else accountability based on particularly extensive selections). Monitoring should be based on the facilities of the VTsIOM or the various research centers and should provide the type of social statistics which require efficient selective data gathering. This would include some long-term statistics. We need, above all, current social statistics with a steadily changing structure of indicators, a structure which must be based on the short-term and medium-term management and science requirements. For example, there is no need to project statistics of poisoning from moonshine or toxic chemicals for the next 100 years. However, such statistical projections could be planned and made, for the next 10 years, by the monitoring system. The same could be said about data reflecting the implementation of the new legislative initiatives. A number of such examples may be cited.

Above all, however, we must change our view on the way statistics is viewed by the public, the general and the scientific, the specialists and the members of the apparatus.

**Ye. Yumatov, doctor of medical sciences, professor, First Moscow Medical Institute imeni I.M. Sechenov: Scholarship: Suggested Experiment**

My long experience in educational work in a medical VUZ indicates that in the course of a semester a significant percentage of the students remain virtually idle. Few students succeed in their colloquium on the first try. Violations of the regulation on the study and examinations in academic materials have almost become standard. One would start the colloquium 1 month later than scheduled or at the very end of the semester, and one could take it several times over, to no one's amazement. The rush begins immediately before the session and during the period of examinations. Most students are unaccustomed to working regularly during the semester. The reasons are familiar: "I shall catch up when the session comes around." Hence a great deal of emotions and feelings during the session which, incidentally, are not only unpleasant but also harmful.

Several times each semester the dean's office officially gathers information on lagging students. However, no effective steps are taken toward them. As a result, the conscientious teacher must pay with his time for the disorganization and irresponsibility of such students. In my view, the time has come to create conditions for active and regular work during the semester, so that neither tests nor examinations will create unnecessary nervous stress. The problem is how to do this. Appeals in this case are ineffective. Specific and real incentive is needed. The students must become personally interested in doing regular work throughout the semester.



One possibility could be to review the procedure for awarding scholarships which presently, with a satisfactory performance at the preceding session, are given like an advance for the entire semester. A paradoxical situation has developed: if you have passed your test you could remain virtually idle throughout the next semester. Naturally, there have been cases in which in the course of the semester the dean's office would deny a student his scholarship. As a rule, however, this is would be unrelated to the student's current grades.

Obviously, it is not the examination but current grades that must be the decisive factor in granting the scholarship. In that case, in the course of the semester on several occasions the dean's office would collect information on current grades, on the basis of which the question of continuing or granting a scholarship would be reviewed. If a student wants a scholarship let him study during the semester without falling behind. In that case it will be both easier to pass the test and the teachers will spend less time in useless repeated testing of the laggards.

Naturally, decisions must be made objectively, taking into consideration the opinion of the departments and the student group. In general, the function of granting and allocating scholarships could be transferred to the student collective itself, while the dean's office would simply monitor grades. In my view, it would be worth trying, albeit as an experiment, to introduce such a form of economic incentive for conscientious work by the students, consistent with the spirit of our time. Students with whom I have discussed my suggestion have been interested. I would like to know the views of my colleagues.

#### Excerpts From Letters

**Ye. Zakharova, party member since 1956, Kramatorsk:**

Recently the press has published a number of critical articles, including some about party members who have compromised themselves. This is as it should be. It seems to me, however, that it is no less important today to speak also of the true communists, whose number in our country is much greater.

**N. Gorbach, candidate of philosophical sciences, Lvov:**

In connection with the preparations for the CPSU Central Committee Plenum on improving relations among nationalities, I submit the following suggestion: All preparatory materials related to organizations within the USSR be printed separately. In my view, they should be closely studied not only by scientists, party workers and the ideological aktiv but by students as well. Such documents are an invaluable source in formulating standards of contacts among nationalities and in acquiring the moral purity of the Leninist principles of proletarian internationalism.

**N. Klenov, propagandist, Belgorod:**

I address the following question to the editors of this theoretical organ of our party: Why in the entire variety of verbal and printed materials carried by the mass information media one does not see or hear the personnel of the ideological service of party committees, including the Central Committee? Why do they poorly participate in the molding of public opinion and a contemporary world outlook?

**F. Shugayev, candidate of economic sciences, Novosibirsk:**

Competitions in which anyone, including cooperatives of scientific workers, who would like to participate, would be a good method for upgrading competitiveness in science, efficiency and results of scientific research and experimental design projects. To this effect, the broad circle of specialists from "nonspecialized" scientific research institutes, VUZs and other organizations, as well as those engaged in independent work on inventions, should be kept well informed of the needs of departments, enterprises and regions, concerning the solution of various scientific and technical problems. The USSR Academy of Sciences and the State Committee for Science and Technology could publish special bulletins, available to anyone, indicating specific topics and areas of research.

**I. Borisovskiy, Kremenchug:**

I am retired and, like many others, would like to stay in a resort, assuming that I am in good health, and precisely in places which are advised in terms of my state of health. However, I have to wait several years before I can obtain a travel voucher. When my turn comes, I am issued a voucher for available places, regardless of my wishes. It is considered that objections are out of place, for the voucher is issued free of charge (actually, as I understand it, this is a relative concept, for everyone pays for it but not everyone benefits). I would prefer to contribute to the cost of the voucher (I still have some savings from my work), providing that I am given what I need. Is this excessive?

#### Responses to Our Publications

**I. Yudin, doctor of economic sciences, professor at the Military-Political Academy imeni V.I. Lenin:**

In his economic survey (KOMMUNIST No 2, 1989), Ye.T. Gaydar raised the question of "information support" of the development and problems of the conversion of the defense industry sector. Today one can make a comparison between several dozen countries through the world and the medieval knights who were so heavily weighed down by armaments and ammunition that their economical movements were slowed down. On an average, it takes two workers in the defense industry

and the military-economic infrastructure to support one serviceman. The cost of weapons and equipment is dozens or even hundreds of times higher than it was in World War II.

The Armed Forces account for a significant expenditure of social resources. This is a forced step. By reducing the size of the Armed Forces, to a certain extent we also reduce the economic outlays on defense. At the present time 20.2 billion rubles from the state budget are appropriated for defense. These funds are used for combat training, maintenance, housing and cultural services to the personnel. As the study of the structure of outlays for the country's defense during the Great Patriotic War, and the military expenditures of the United States and other countries indicates, this accounts for approximately 29-33 percent of the overall military expenditures. Armaments, ordnance, a significant percentage of defense NIOKR are included in other budget items. Furthermore, the Armed Forces use their own funds earned from the production activities of the troops and the Navy. It would be hardly possible for anyone today to provide a reasonably accurate figure of overall defense expenditures: we do not have a comprehensive method for evaluating the amount of such outlays and the inefficient practice of accounting in the troops (based on physical accountability only), distortions in military finances and the overall lack of system in price-setting in the country make this problem even more difficult.

I believe that the time has come to estimate the overall social cost of the Armed Forces (I am afraid that this would be more than the personnel of the financial authorities of the USSR Ministry of Defense would be able to handle. The joint efforts of specialists are needed). This would help us to restructure some of the production capacities of the defense industry, including entire enterprises, which would engage in the production of high-grade civilian goods. Already now the defense complex is providing a great deal of items for peaceful use (technological lines for the light and food industries, means of production for the agroprom, electronic equipment, household appliances, consumer goods, etc.). Noticeable results will be obtained also from the use for civilian purposes of some of the military equipment and auxiliary facilities, assemblies and individual parts (tank engines, some airplane equipment, and equipment for so-called double purpose, such as motor vehicles, tractors, automotive cranes, bulldozers, trailers, portable electric power plants, river crossing facilities, communications equipment and household appliances). All of this will efficiently contribute to the implementation of our economic and social programs.

**G. Korostelev, head of the department of philosophy, Sverdlovsk State Pedagogical Institute, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor, and B. Pavlov, head of the sociology of labor sector, Institute of Economics, USSR Academy of Sciences Ural Department, doctor of philosophical sciences, professor:**

Please consider this letter an answer to the article by R. Ryvkina published in your journal (KOMMUNIST No 14, 1988). We do not absolutely agree with all the ideas expressed in the article but we thoroughly welcome its main content and spirit: the need firmly to upgrade the role of sociology in our social life.

We would like to draw attention to the sociological training of the future members of our intelligentsia. In the course of the current restructuring in the teaching of philosophy in higher educational institutions (particularly the basic course—Marxist-Leninist philosophy), using a variety of pretexts, sociological problems have been reduced to a minimum. This can be seen by simply looking at the new recently published philosophy textbooks. There has been a drastic reduction in the time allocated for the study of philosophy (in pedagogical institutes it has been already reduced to 74 hours, i.e., shorter than the course of philosophy in technical VUZs!). Here as well it is above all sociological knowledge that suffers.

We believe that we should not reduce but increase sociological training of future teachers, engineers, economists, and so on. The Sverdlovsk State Pedagogical Institute is experimenting in offering a number of sociology courses: general theoretical, youth sociology, sociology of the family, and student familiarity with the method and techniques of sociological research. The Sverdlovsk National Economic Institute and the Ural Polytechnical Institute are offering a special course on Labor Sociology. Leading sociologists from the Institute of Economics of the USSR Academy of Sciences Ural Department have been hired to teach the course. We believe that in solving the question of the structure used in the teaching of social sciences in VUZs it is important to not simply preserve but to specifically **develop** the teaching of sociology. Sociological training is not the latest due to fashion but a need dictated by the tasks of perestroika.

#### Correspondence With Readers

##### On the Development of Marxism and on the Morality of the People

To the editors of KOMMUNIST, theoretical and political journal of the CPSU Central Committee

Copy: LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA editors

Copy: Board of the USSR Writers' Union

Dear Comrades:

KOMMUNIST (No 17 1988) carried an editorial comment which criticizes some statements made at the on-site session of the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union. In particular, the editors do not share two views expressed by me at that session: 1. The fact that in our country for the past 65 years Marxism

has not been developing and that leading social scientists, economists above all, have been unable to engage in this kind of creative work by virtue of the features of their former activities; 2. The fact that during the period of the cult of personality and stagnation, the broadest possible strata of our people fell into a state of profound spiritual and moral neglect.

In principle, differences in assessing the situation in the country and the condition of theory are natural, providing that a press organ which broad social circles take as representing the views of the party's leadership does not abuse its position and does not try, as was the case in the old stagnation times, to shout down views it finds unsuitable. In order to block the restoration of polemic methods condemned by the party, it would be expedient, in my view, to initiate in *KOMMUNIST* an honest, frank and open discussion on the problems mentioned in said editorial comment.

To begin with, I suggest that *KOMMUNIST* print my two following questions, and its editorial answers to them:

**First question:** Name (if possible giving the names of the authors) the major discoveries with which Soviet social scientists, economists above all, have enriched Marxism-Leninism in the period from V.I. Lenin's last works to the start of the present perestroika, and describe the results which were obtained from the application of such theoretical innovations in the practice of building socialism. In other words, how could it happen that with the existence of an entire army of social scientists engaged in developing Marxism we led the country to a pre-crisis condition? How can we be confident that those same theoreticians, who led the social sciences into an impasse would be able to head its perestroika and even, as they did in the past, act as "competent" consultants to the party and state leadership?

**Second question:** Name (also, if possible, giving the names of their authors) the spiritual and moral values which were developed by Soviet social scientists, superior to universal human moral absolutes, which were rejected in their time as unnecessary ideological trash and manifestations of abstract bourgeois humanism. If such values exist, why is it that the previous text of the CPSU Program included such a primitive moral code for the builders of communism (which was an extremely simplified transposition of ancient universal human rules of morality), whereas in the new draft it was necessary to abandon even this surrogate of a combination of standards of communist morality? If there is no spiritual and moral return to savagery (which is noted with increasing concern by the most noted men of Soviet culture and, if necessary, I could quote dozens of testimonies on this account), why is it that 71 years after the revolution our country has one of the highest crime rates in the world and that organized crime has appeared and the distorted deviations from the norms of social life which were so boldly mentioned in M.S. Gorbachev's

report at the January 1987 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, became possible? Why is it that boorishness threatens to become a feature of our national character? Why is it that in terms of the levels of education and health care and, frequently, technology (not to mention ecology) we have not only fallen behind the advanced capitalist countries but even also many developing countries? Why are we poisoning ourselves with food which contains the type of noxious chemicals inconceivable in any civilized country? Why are we farming in such a way that we are ruining one area of the country after another, gradually turning them into places unsuitable for human habitation (the example of the Aral is the most obvious, but the Caspian and other areas are becoming similar to it), i.e., why do we behave like irresponsible savages? Why is it that the average life span in our country is much shorter than in other developed countries, both capitalist and socialist? Why is it that drunkenness and alcoholism have reached the level of national catastrophes in our country? Why is it that a significant percentage of young people have already become lost to culture?

Since I am already writing you, allow me to ask yet another question which is not directly related to the debate I suggest. *KOMMUNIST* spoke out against Minvodkhoz construction projects, such as the Volga-Chogray and Volga-Don-2 canals. Meanwhile, the Volga-Don-2 Canal is being built at full speed, so that "next year water should already flow along it" (*SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA*, 10 December 1988). With the commissioning of these canals the transfer of the waters from the northern rivers to the south, which was stopped by government decree, will become inevitable. This will lead to the swamping of the north and the salinization of the chernozems of the south or, in other words, to turning our country into a perennial purchaser of food abroad. If even the criticism voiced in the journal of the CPSU Central Committee was ignored and had no effect, what are those mysterious and omnipotent forces which allow this inhuman and pernicious project to be carried out despite the clearly expressed will of the people and the government's resolution? Would it not be better for the journal to focus its efforts on leading to a successful end the struggle for saving the country instead of seeking and inflating isolated errors in statements by writers who care for the future of their homeland?

Being interested only in the salvation and blossoming of my native country (considering my advanced age I personally seek nothing for myself), I would be happy to be proven wrong in the debate which I suggest.

I hope that the proposed debate will be successful.

[Signed] M. Antonov



**Response from KOMMUNIST Editors:**

Dear Mikhail Fedorovich:

Clearly, it would be too much of a conceit on our part to try to initiate the "honest, frank and open discussion" you suggest. It is not we but our party which has already initiated such a discussion, which has been taking place throughout the country, since April 1985. It becomes the more useful, the more thorough its participants avoid the satisfaction of personal ambitions and biases and the more they seek the truth only. The harm to the public interest, to the cause of perestroika and to glasnost caused by efforts to turn the debate on the vital problems of the life of the people into an instrument for settling accounts and for the triumph of group interests was pointed out last January at the meeting with the men of science and culture. The appeal for consolidation, which was heard at the meeting, was aimed not at closing the discussion but at protecting it from unhealthy accretions, thus allowing it to develop even more confidently.

Taking this into consideration, we would be unwilling to answer your questions in the tone suggested in your letter. Our journal has published a number of materials on the questions you raise, speaking out above all against dogmatism, improper comments in science and in favor of the formulation of contemporary scientific concepts on basic problems of social development. In an effort to preserve the healthy and calm atmosphere of the discussion, we would prefer to ask you to avoid a discussion of problems in the manner you have suggested. Unfortunately, you hastened to make public the facts in the letters we received and the content of the questions asked of KOMMUNIST (LITERATURNAYA ROSSIYA No 52, 1988); subsequently, you repeated your claim about the lack of development of Marxism after Lenin (SOTSIALISTICHESKAYA INDUSTRIYA, 2 February 1989; NASH SOVREMENNİK No 2, 1989). Under those circumstances, our silence would puzzle our readers.

The full answer to your first question in full would require not a letter in this journal but a set of several volumes. Even the shortest possible enumeration of the achievements in the science of economics alone should include the study of the problems of building socialism under the conditions of a mixed economy, planned control of the market economy, planned restructuring of the economy of an underdeveloped country, the long-term laws governing economic development, the creation of a balanced method of planning and other achievements of the Soviet economists of the 1920s and 1930s. In the same spirit we should also mention works on the centralized management of the wartime economy and the postwar rebuilding of the 1940s, the economic debates of the 1960s, and the establishment of the cost accounting planning system. The scientific achievements of the period of perestroika are well-known: the reinterpretation of the concept of socialist socialization, the

development of the problems of the socialist market, and the formulation of an integral concept of economic management based on full enterprise cost accounting.

You are interested "above all in the economists." However, the great deal of work which has been done after Lenin can be seen by turning to the other social sciences as well. Let us merely note the contemporary development of global problems, something which simply did not exist by the turn of the century, and the comprehensive study of the problems of man. Let us particularly note the turning point in the development of the social sciences—the 20th CPSU Congress—which marked the beginning of the formulation of new views on socialism and on our entire domestic and international development. In this connection, we can only be puzzled by the fact that you provide in your letter an equally negative assessment to the entire period of development after Lenin. This ignores not only the period until the end of the 1920s, when collective party leadership still existed, but also after the 20th and 22nd congresses, and the time of perestroika.

Science records bring up the names of the greatest economists of the bolshevik generation, Lenin's fellow workers (Bukharin, Dzerzhinskiy, Krzhizhanovskiy, Sokolnikov, Rudzutak, Mezhlauk, Mantev), Marxist-oriented scientists who were not bolsheviks (Kafengauz, Groman, Bazarov) and the old nonparty scientists, who did not consider themselves Marxists but who made a real contribution to Soviet science (Kondratyev, Chayanov, Yurovskiy, Chelintsev and Makarov), the generation of scientists who belong entirely to the Soviet period (Novozhilov, Kantorovich, Lemchinov) and hundreds of others.

The history of science is familiar with a number of cases in which scientific groups were ignored; sometimes, the bearers of such knowledge were destroyed, people ranging from Giordano Bruno to Nikolay Vavilov. This is particularly close to the topic of our discussion: suffice it to recall that the philosopher Academician Luppel and the biologist Academician Vavilov found themselves in the same cell in the Saratov jail. Let us also recall the fact that the noted economist V.S. Nemchinov, as head of the Timiryazev Academy, spoke out, at the sadly notorious August 1948 VASKHNIL Session in defense of the chromosome theory of heredity, aware of the fact that this could have cost him not only his career but also his life. Most of the economists we listed above died tragically and not one of them avoided having his ideas suppressed and ignored. To this day, however, it has occurred to no one to hold liable for scorning science not those who persecuted science but the scientists themselves, who were among the first victims of the cult of personality and the period of stagnation.

Your second question of "the neglect of the people" is equally puzzling. This is not because we are any less aware than you are of the difficulties of our economy, ecology and culture. These difficulties are common knowledge and our journal discusses them no less than other publications. In particular, if we speak of the problems you enumerate in terms precisely of our journal, you may have read of late also about the difficulties in health care, the immoderate use of chemicals, the problem of the Aral and many other problems and

difficulties. It seems to us, however, that one must choose one's words particularly carefully when one speaks of the people, of the large number of people, of growing children, of those who work honestly, who continue to build and restructure our huge country, our common home. Political journalists in Russia were referred to as "people's defenders." We do not remember, however, the names of "accusers of the people."...

Finally, as to your third question. As was reported in the press, the plan for the Volga-Chogray Canal was rejected by the state experts; the argument as to the Volga-Don-2 Canal is continuing. The forces which you described as "mysterious and omnipotent" are, in fact, not omnipotent although, unquestionably, they are quite strong. Let us add that, naturally, they are not mysterious. These forces are group interests, interests of departments and of individual social groups, clans and some collectives. No one has promised us that the struggle against them in the course of perestroika would be easy and would yield instant results. However, it would be an obvious case of stretching a point to claim that the struggle for perestroika is yielding no results. This struggle would prove out futile only if one set of group interests is replaced by another. We are in favor of group interests to be countered by the interests of society.

You claim that the journal is "abusing its position," and tries to "suppress unsuitable views," and you threaten people with a return "to the methods of polemics condemned by the party." This is a serious accusation and one can only regret that you fail to support it with a single fact. Let us try to fill this gap.

We should point out, above all, that our journal avoids anything which could even remotely remind of the times when writers were instructed how to write. We have not changed even a single word in any literary polemics, although in the course of such clashes many objectionable statements have been made. Of late, however, with increasing frequency we listen to debates in which literature is simply forgotten. The people discuss politics which, in itself, is the inalienable right of every Soviet person. However, this is our right too. Why is it that your opinion is simply your own, whereas our opinion is a "shout" and an "abuse?"

Our commentary entitled "Old Myths and New Fears" does not contain a single word on literary matters. It discusses only that which our journal must always deal with: the socialist choice made by our people, the gains of the October Revolution and the destinies of Marxism. We reread this commentary once again. The harshest evaluation of our comments at the session of the secretariat of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union which may be found in the commentary and the strongest adjective used is "strange." Is this comparable to the endless variety of words used at the session, which could not even be included in the official report for ethical considerations? Furthermore, we deliberately did not name a single name, emphasizing that we are opposing

not individuals but views which we found erroneous. Is this shouting? Did we engage in political labeling or raise accusations? Did we demand any organizational conclusions to be drawn or that people be removed from their positions for expressing views different from ours? If such methods have been used of late, they have not been used by our journal and, let us add, by no means have they been used by ideological bodies.

Social debates are under way and will be pursued on problems of the social sciences and morality. Such discussions were given a powerful impetus at the 19th Party Conference and, unquestionably, will continue to develop with party support. Our journal intends to continue to participate in them, as it has in the past, above all by providing a constructive development of problems, many of which have accumulated. However, as we think of the fate of perestroika we cannot remain silent about what concerns us in some statements. We are concerned, above all, by the inflamed passions, addressed not to the mind but to emotions and when accurate facts are replaced by one-sided impressions. We are concerned by replacing the condemnation of the cult of personality and stagnation with a condemnation of the entire way of socialism, when people speak of the catastrophe allegedly experienced by our society from 1917 to the present. We are concerned with intolerance shown for different viewpoints.

Fortunately, all of this is manifested only in a small part of the speeches and in public discussions. At the plenum of the board of the RSFSR Writers' Union where, as reported, you made public your letter to KOMMUNIST, there were a number of speeches which make us hope that the appeals for consolidation are meeting with support. Let us recall them:

**G. Goryshin:** "I find strange the claims of some people or groups or entire clans to having a final say, and to being the final repositories of the truth."

**A. Turkov:** "In my view, we must eliminate the desire to cause a scandal, to pick at something, to press a sensitive point."

**I. Vasilyev:** "When we hear a pointed debate and arguments among our writers here, in the capital, and compare this with the situation as it is reflected in the provinces, honestly speaking, I would rather keep silent. The people have their own concerns and all of our arguments do not excite either the kolkhoz member or the worker. This is an internecine quarrel. It may influence the destinies of literature but today it does not help us to move ahead."

*The editors of KOMMUNIST agree with the sober nature of these views.*

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### **Democratic Alternative and Antimonopoly Strategy**

18020010h Moscow *KOMMUNIST* in Russian No 4, Mar 89 (signed to press 22 Feb 89) pp 77-82

[Letter by Willi Gerns, member of the presidium of the board of the German Communist Party, and Robert Steigerwald, member of the board of the German Communist Party and editor of the journal *MARXISTISCHE BLÄTTER*]

[Text] Great interest is shown abroad in the debates conducted in *KOMMUNIST*, as confirmed, in particular, by the letter which follows.

Dear comrades: Issue No 14 of your journal for 1988 carries the article by Yu. Krasin "The Workers Movement in Search of a Democratic Alternative," which was subsequently reprinted in the FRG (in the journal *BLÄTTER FÜR DEUTSCHE UND INTERNATIONALE POLITIK*). The article discusses problems of the democratic alternative of the labor movement in the developed capitalist countries. It thus directly pertains to the conditions of the struggle waged by the German Communist Party. This encourages us to make our statement in this connection, the more so since we are of a different opinion on a number of fundamental aspects.

#### **Points of Agreement**

Let us begin with what we agree about. Like Yu. Krasin, we proceed from the fact that the new stage in the scientific and technical revolution (NTR) faces the labor movement with many new questions which call for new answers. We agree with his conclusion that, on the basis of their positions, today the neoconservative forces proved to be better prepared for such processes. We explain this with the fact that the decisive criteria in their case are, in the final account, exceptional international competitiveness and profit. Meanwhile, the labor movement is facing the following questions: How is the dialectical correlation between progress and the conditions for achieving it developing from the viewpoint of the new standard of the material and spiritual production forces? What is the situation with the social consequences of the contemporary NTR? The question of the acceptability of scientific and technical progress and its management in a protective social and ecological regimen is formulated in an entirely new fashion. It is a question, therefore, of many-tiered and complex problems, which make it difficult for the labor movement to answer the new challenges.

We agree with Yu. Krasin also in that the struggle for reforms under capitalism assumes, under such circumstances, even greater importance and a new meaning and that the focal point in it is the problems of democratization and participation in management and decision-making. Furthermore, extremely important in the present reform policy are the alternatives in solving or reducing the gravity of global problems. We also agree

with him in that, considering the vast internationalization of social life, the international interaction within the labor movement and the formulation of alternatives on that level should play an exceptional role. However, so far this has by no means been the case.

#### **Differences of Opinions**

##### **a. On the question of antimonopoly democracy:**

Yu. Krasin proceeds from the fact that the concept of antimonopoly democracy does not "work" and should be replaced. We disagree. Such a far-reaching claim affects the programmatic concepts of many communist parties in the developed capitalist countries, including ours, and makes it incumbent upon us to speak out in greater detail on this problem. But is this alone proof that it is inoperative, furthermore under the circumstances which we would like to establish? The concept of a united people's front as well was not implemented, in the final account, until Hitlerite fascism was routed by the Soviet Army. Nonetheless, Krasin would probably have to agree with us that this was the correct strategy.

Furthermore, the impression we have developed, naturally at this point we can speak only on behalf of the German Communist Party, is that Yu. Krasin takes insufficiently into consideration the specific meaning of our concept of antimonopoly democracy and its further development, as it occurred in the past. Our party has never considered antimonopoly democracy a law but only an opportunity which could develop under the predictable conditions of the class struggle, on the road to socialism. We did not limit ourselves to such a guideline. As early as 1978, under the social democratic government, when the initial symptoms of a "turn to the right" appeared against the background of the new stage in the NTR, we formulated the concept of a turn toward democratic and social progress. In this connection, our party's program emphasizes that by defending the gains achieved in the past we can counter the aspirations of monopoly capital to pull itself out of the crisis by using a reactionary method. The successes achieved in the struggle for expanding social and democratic rights and for strengthening the peace improve the situation and conditions of the struggle waged by the working people. We consider encouraging participation in management and converting key economic sectors to public ownership, under democratic control, major prerequisites for limiting the power of the monopolies and ensuring the growth of the economic and political influence of the working people.

We proceed from the fact that the unity of action within the working class strengthens in the course of the struggle for a turn to democratic and social progress, and that broad democratic alliances will appear. This may lead to substantial changes in the internal correlation of forces in favor of the working class and the other democratic forces. Real prerequisites may appear for the working



people to find within themselves the strength to achieve radical antimonopoly changes and, in the course of the class struggle, finally open a path to socialism.

In a number of documents our party has described the nature of the turn toward democratic and social progress as a process of progressive reforms. From the very beginning, this concept was conceived as an alternative reform on the basis of capitalism. The GCP is engaged in the further development of such an orientation in the draft "The German Federal Republic Marching Toward the Year 2000—GCP Suggestions on an Alternate Reform for the 1990s, Oriented Toward Peace and Democracy," based on contemporary conditions and the new conclusions. It is a question, above all, of encompassing the qualitatively new aspects of the policy of reform, related to the new scale of the global problems. Specifically, it is a question of the following: How to adapt the Federal Republic to a long-term peaceful future? How to reorganize the system of production forces itself under capitalism, so that it may meet ecological requirements? What requirements concerning the democratization of society should and could be carried out under these circumstances, and so on?

We proceed from the fact that we are dealing today with various types of reforms. First, these are the usual, the "traditional" reforms aimed at improving the living and struggling conditions of the working people. Second, there are antimonopoly structural reforms, including participation in management, control of investments, and nationalization under democratic control. Third, these are reforms aimed at solving or easing the gravity of global problems.

The more differentiated array of reform problems also requires a more differentiated approach to the policy of alliances in the implementation of the reforms. Ordinary, not to mention antimonopoly, reforms must be carried out in the course of the class and antimonopoly struggle against all big capital. This does not apply to the third type of reforms. As to reforms aimed at solving global problems, in this case we try to promote broad alliances, including, whenever possible, with monopoly capital. However, these reforms as well must be carried out under the conditions which prevail in the FRG, dominated by monopoly capital, and in the struggle against specific forces, such as the military-industrial complex, the concerns which destroy the environment and the big banks which are among the main exploiters of third world nations. Such reforms, therefore, are of an objective antimonopoly nature.

As to structural antimonopoly reforms, numerous indications exist that with their help we could approach the surmounting of the system more closely than through the use of the older customary reforms. However, there are equal grounds to assume that the opposition put up by monopoly capital to such reforms will be particularly strong. It would be difficult to imagine that their implementation would be consistent and continuous. That is

precisely why we deem both possible and necessary for the struggle for a turn to democratic and social progress to lead to the establishment of an antimonopoly democracy.

By antimonopoly democracy we mean a period of radical change in the course of which the working class and the other democratic forces will enjoy such great political power and parliamentary influence as to be able to set up a coalition government which would represent their joint interests. Taking into consideration historical experience, and on the basis of the democratic mandate given by the people, such a government would free the army, the police, the judiciary, the administrative apparatus and the mass information media from the influence of neo-Nazi and militaristic forces and put an end to using state agencies against the people and the constitutional government. In the course of such a development an antimonopoly democratic state power would be developed, supported by the working class and the other democratic forces.

In relying on extraparlimentary actions by the working class and the other democratic forces, under the conditions of an antimonopoly democracy, profound political and economic changes could be achieved through progressive legislation. The possibility would arise of broadening the participation of the working class and its trade unions and the other antimonopoly forces in management, including democratic control over production and capital investments in big enterprises. In this manner, as well as through the gradual conversion of the big concerns into public property, it would become possible to restrict even further and, in the final account, eliminate the economic power of monopoly capital.

In our concept of antimonopoly democracy, reform and revolution become interchangeable. The path of this process goes through radical antimonopoly reforms which lead to revolutionary change. As a result of this process we shall be dealing not with a reformed monopoly but a qualitatively new, antimonopoly and, subsequently, socialist ownership of the decisive means of production; not with a reformed monopoly-capitalist state but with an antimonopoly and, subsequently, a socialist state.

This is not a concept of the gradual growth of capitalism into socialism. We cannot avoid the impression that Yu. Krasin is not entirely free from such a concept when he speaks, in connection with a democratic alternative, of a future "long march" toward socialism, going through the comprehensive development of the democratic forces of the functioning of capitalism, with the faith that "socialism will become the result of this path, through the gradual development of the self-managing organization of the working people, and a strong power infrastructure of a socialist type."

From our viewpoint, equally erroneous are his statements to the effect that "the highly developed mechanism of economic self-control," the creation of which has become an "imperative requirement of perestroika," in the developed capitalist countries "appears in its fundamental features.... within latter monopoly capital." It is precisely this process, he also says, that makes it possible to advance toward socialism by following the democratic alternative.

Let us ignore the fact that the concept of "highly developed mechanism for economic self-regulation" seems to us to be quite controversial in the characterization of the processes which are taking place in the Soviet Union in the course of perestroika, for if we understand this accurately, perestroika should not mean the elimination of a socialist planned economy. Let us also set aside the fact that this concept is not suitable in the case of state-monopoly capitalism with governmental interference in the economic process. The question which arises is the following: Why aspire to socialism if all of this is possible under capitalism as well? If we understand accurately the economic mechanism which is developing in the course of perestroika, it would include far-reaching self-management by producers, including the election of enterprise managers, far-reaching rights of labor collectives in handling enterprise profits, and so on. Is this possible under capitalism? We believe such a concept to be an illusion.

#### **b. On changes in the working class:**

Yu. Krasin justifiably notes that the difficulties experienced by the labor movement increase as a result of the profound structural changes within the working class, triggered by the scientific and technical revolution. However, we cannot agree with his conclusions in this connection.

The GCP has dealt with the problem of changes in the structure and way of life of the working class since the end of the 1960s. We pointed out such changes at a time when many fraternal parties had still not become rid of concepts that the working class includes only factory workers engaged in physical labor. We rejected such concepts without falling into the other error, such as the dissolving of the working class within "hired labor." Our approach to the contemporary working class was already reflected in the theses of the 1971 Dusseldorf Congress. It was further developed in the 1978 Program, the theses of our 1986 Congress and, finally, the materials of the 8th Plenum of the GCP Board of 1987. In this case we do not ignore the fact that the level of our practical party work is still not consistent to any extent with the concepts and conclusions contained in these documents.

We have developed the impression that Krasin goes further than we do by removing the line which separates the working class from the "hired labor," particularly

that of the middle classes. If this is the primary orientation toward the new groups of the working class or it is the middle classes who come closer to the working class through their hired labor, we consider this approach to be faulty.

To us, as in the past, the "nucleus of the working class" consists of the "blue and white collar workers employed in big enterprises engaged in material production (industry, the power industry, construction, transportation and communications). This is explained by the key role which these sectors play in the economy. Such sectors include, above all by virtue of the quantitative concentration of the working class, the high degree of its organization in trade unions, and major combat experience, the main power centers of the labor movement."

We do not reject this evaluation although, naturally, we see that in connection with changes in economic structures in the course of the scientific and technical revolution, the closing down of enterprises and the reduced number of workers, there has been a substantial decrease in the quantitative indicators of people employed in material production as a whole and, particularly, in traditional sectors such as mining, steel smelting and ship building. Naturally, we are also aware of the qualitative changes which occur as a result of the NTR within the nucleus of the working class. Groups of blue and white collar workers and production sectors directly related to the most advanced technology are acquiring a growing significance. However, their readiness to participate in class battles will depend to a substantial extent on the degree to which it will be possible to instill in the ranks of these new groups the awareness and combat traditions inherent in traditional industrial labor.

At the same time, we emphasize that the labor collectives in big enterprises in trade, banking and insurance, and in the area of private and state services, largely consisting of white collar workers, assume a growing significance in the struggle waged by the working class. Both in this area as well as at large industrial enterprises the role of middle classes and intellectuals who work for a salary becomes greater.

The practice of the class struggle in our country indicates that the starting point and the fulcrum of all major strikes are, as in the past, the main groups of the working class. At the same time, the new groups of the working class or forces close to it are becoming involved in class battles, as is confirmed, in particular, by the strikes of bank employees, personnel of radio broadcasting companies, etc. In the course of such conflicts it becomes clear that the main problems affecting not only traditional industrial workers but also "production workers of a new type," and employees in the private and state service industries remain, as in the past, problems of wages, working time and jobs. At the same time, in the course of these conflicts blue and white collar workers come across problems of participation in management, democracy, and so on. Therefore, the "old" and "new"

values do not contradict each other but, conversely, become mutually complementary. The need to participate in management and have democracy does not arise in an airless space. It is based on the struggle waged for immediate interests. Similar to this are the reasons which motivate blue and white collar workers to participate in the struggle for peace and disarmament and for the solution of ecological and other global problems.

On this basis, we agree with Krasin when he emphasizes that "the aspiration for democratic freedoms and self-governing principles, social justice, increased interest in the development of individuals and forms of their self-assertion, ensuring conditions for social activeness and autonomous activities and a spiritual meaningfulness of life" assume growing significance and an increasingly important role in the programs and practical activities of the parties of the working class. The GCP ascribes a major role to such areas of interest, as confirmed by the theses of our Hamburg Congress and the draft "Federal Republic-2000." In the future they will be the subject of even greater attention (these documents will be discussed within the GCP before the extraordinary congress which is scheduled for no later than February 1990—editors).

We object to the familiar pitting of the new areas of interest against traditional ones or underestimating the latter. Although Krasin makes note of the new interests and values, "interpreted in a Marxist way and organically related to the traditional values of the labor movement," in our view his article pays insufficient attention to the significance of the traditional areas of interests. In any case, on the basis of our own experience, we cannot confirm the accuracy of his statement that in the case of the "new type" of production worker "conditions for ensuring a creative activity become much more important than wages."

#### c. On the question of alternatives:

Participation in management and democratization play a major role in Krasin's considerations of alternatives. In this, as we pointed out, we agree with him. We disagree with the author's statements to the effect that participation in management and democratization under capitalist conditions could lead to the creation of a "broad democratic system of social self-management." As long as the monopolies will exercise economic and political power, they would hardly be willing to surrender it to people's self-management. Had this been possible, why would we have needed socialism? We are convinced that under capitalist conditions it could be a question only of achieving elements of social self-management by limiting the power of the monopolies. "The broad democratic system of social self-management" can be achieved only under socialism.

Cooperatives, including "multinational consumer and production cooperatives," play an important role in Krasin's statements.

As we know, ideas on cooperatives have deep roots in the labor movement, for they reflect the basic aspiration of the workers for cohesion. However, it is no accident that the struggle for a labor cooperative, which blossomed under the conditions of early capitalism, has lost its significance under monopoly capitalism. It is obvious that the cooperative movement exists within the limits assigned to it by the monopolies, which tolerate its activities only where the monopolies cannot anticipate adequate profits. For that reason we believe that in a strategy the purpose of which is to change the existing system, the concept of the cooperative can play only a rather limited role.

This applies also to the author's views on the "democratic management of shareholding capital." The FRG includes a large number of small shareholders. Many of them belong to the working class employed at big enterprises. However, as petty stock owners, their influence on enterprise production and management is virtually nil. Conversely, the existence of petty stockholders under conditions in which the big banks have the right to vote on matters pertaining to bank deposits, even contributes to the concentration of power in the hands of financial capital. As to the idea that by establishing trade union funds the potential of the small shareholders could be combined and thus enable the trade unions to have a certain influence on the production and management of large enterprises, naturally, it is something worth discussing. This idea was formulated by the GCP as early as the start of the 1970s as an alternative to the conservative concept of "creating wealth owned by hired labor." Let us point out that we have always been aware of the great limitations of such an influence. We believe that in this area illusions are totally inappropriate.

The fact that in his concept of a democratic alternative the author ascribes such a major role to self-management, cooperatives, and so on, proves, we believe, that his views are a reflection of the internal political debate under way in the Soviet Union. This can be seen in his opposition to government obstructions and petty supervision of the economy. We believe that our country needs greater state control of the economy, not in the interest of the monopolies but of the working people. Taking into consideration the radical differences in conditions in a socialist Soviet Union and a capitalist FRG, we find of little use theoretical considerations which take such differences insufficiently into account.

Nor can we agree with Krasin when he rejects the idea of the nationalization of multinational monopolies, for "to begin with, it is inefficient; secondly, it is harmful for it would tear mechanically the living fabric of global economic relations and the intensifying cooperation among national economies." In addition to everything else, the question arises here of a global economy and of what is being torn within it and by whom. We believe, however, that we should not ache for the bosses of multinational monopolies. Our experience, conversely, proves that the



international monopolies, with their monstrous concentration of power, are obstructing progress on a national and international scale and that without any restrictions and, in the final account, without the elimination of their power, no true democratic progress, not to mention any progress toward socialism, would be possible. For that reason, we are convinced that the struggle against the multinational monopolies, on the national and international levels, should be a direct structural component of any democratic alternative.

As we pointed out, we agree with the author that the labor movement should take into consideration the international framework of democratic alternatives more than it has in the past. It is important to bear this in mind in connection with the creation of the so-called domestic European market by the year 1992.

The theses of our 8th Congress (1986) already noted that "with the increased role of multinational concerns, the international division of labor, the coordination of economic policy among imperialist countries and the transfer of an increasing number of traditional national-state functions to supranational institutions, the danger that successes in the struggle waged by the working class in one country will become exceptionally hindered by the international coordination of countersteps taken by monopoly capital becomes greater. Thus, even a progressive governmental policy could be neutralized through capital exports, refusal of loans and currency manipulations. It would become increasingly difficult, on the scale of a single country, to satisfy demands for a significant reduction in working time, and for the protection of industrial sectors and areas whose future existence is threatened. This would require a substantial strengthening of international cooperation and cohesion within the labor movement."

Yu. Krasin writes that, thanks to the strategy of surmounting capitalism and promoting democratic alternative reforms, the grounds for a number of differences which obstruct the labor movement will vanish. We agree with this statement in the sense that today the communist and social democratic labor movements are unquestionably coming closer to each other as a result of the substantial weakening of one of the reasons for their division: the different approaches to the question of imperialist war. Both movements share similar ideas on immediate targets: they favor the type of option in the development of capitalism oriented toward peace and democratic reforms. The struggle for reforms would be given long-term priority in the policies pursued by both labor movements.

Naturally, as the author points out, at the same time profound ideological differences will remain along with differences in the concepts of the distant objectives and prospects and the ways of achieving them. As in the past, the most important difference is that the social democrats limit themselves to reforms under capitalist conditions, hoping for a growth into socialism as a result of the

combination of reforms, whereas we, communists, as the firm fighters for the implementation of reforms, never lose track of the fact that our socialist objective cannot be achieved without the revolutionary reorganization of political relations and relations of ownership, regardless of the specific ways and means leading to such a change.

We agree with the author that a conversion to socialism under the conditions of latter monopoly capitalism will, in all likelihood, not take the shape of a "breakthrough" as was imagined in the past. Nonetheless, as we pointed out, we do not conceive of such a conversion merely as a continuing process, without any specific break. We believe that a number of indications exist to the effect that, in all likelihood, in the course of this process several consecutive breaks will be required, in the course of which the social energy released by such "breakthroughs" will spread immediately and explosively. One of the components of this process could be an antimonopoly coalition government, which would surmount the opposition of the monopoly bourgeoisie, relying on a parliamentary majority and extraparlimentary activities by the broadest possible popular masses, and engaged in the implementation of basic antimonopoly structural reforms or, in other words, an antimonopoly democracy.

Let us note, in conclusion, that although we do not share many of the basic concepts expressed in Yu. Krasin's article, we nonetheless consider the very fact of the formulation of such problems a positive challenge of our time. Taking into consideration the profound changes governing the conditions of our struggle in the developed capitalist countries, and the complex processes taking place within many communist parties, we must critically reinterpret our strategy and tactics without shunning unusual and even "heretically" sounding matters. If these problems may trigger objections, the result can only be positive. The way to become familiar with the new goes through the critical comparison among different viewpoints. Krasin has made his own contribution to this, the way we would like to make our own through our critical remarks on the subject of his article.

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### **Building Sensible Relations Together**

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[Article by Yaan Karlovich Rebane, member of the Estonian SSR Academy of Sciences]

[Text] The political and ideological consolidation of people, regardless of national origin, for the sake of joint activities in promoting perestroika, has become a major task of life in Soviet Estonia today.

The need for such consolidation was triggered by the substantial increase in inter-nationality tension, which intensified less in daily contacts than in the sociopolitical area. There are virtually no excesses or violations of law and order on the grounds of national conflicts in Estonia. However, social movements in support of perestroika seem to be divided along national features: Estonians predominate in the Estonian People's Front, while non-Estonian Russian-language speakers predominate in the International Movement.

What is the reason for this? The opponents of perestroika tend to blame democracy and glasnost: allegedly, the press has become uncontrolled and is fanning national passions. Indeed, excesses of this kind have also taken place. Under the conditions of pluralism of opinions, it would be hardly possible totally to eliminate statements with a nationalistic and chauvinistic slant. Unquestionably, a principled party struggle, using the instruments of that same glasnost, must be waged against these and other phenomena which are unacceptable in our country's ideological and political life.

A process of restoration of historical truth is currently taking place in our republic, related above all to the reevaluation of many events in the history of the Estonian people in the 1918-1940 period. Such events are being discussed in the press essentially by political journalists and only isolated historians have become involved in the debate. Occasionally, in the course of the discussions, we hear notes of unrestrained glorification of life in the bourgeois Estonian republic, while the events of 1939-1940, which brought about the restoration of the Soviet system in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, are characterized as the "Stalinist occupation" of their territories. We believe that it is high time for the leading historians in this country, under the conditions of glasnost, to formulate their principled viewpoint on such matters.

It is clear to any unprejudiced person that it is not in the least glasnost that is the prime reason for the aggravation of relations among ethnic groups. Glasnost contributed merely to the broad and open discussion of relations among ethnic groups in Estonia. Today significant number of the population realize that for a long time the republic's socioeconomic development took place regardless of national-ethnic consequences which were by no means positive in terms of the Estonian nation and, partially, the non-Estonians living here. In particular, there was an increasing number of enterprises, organizations, establishments and even areas in which the Estonian language was no longer the language of business and intercourse. As a result of the fact that Union departments unreasonably threw their weight around in the Estonian economy, and of thoughtless waste of Estonian natural resources, some parts of the republic were bound to sink into profound ecological crisis.

Under these circumstances, the overall objectives of perestroika assumed a national aspect in Estonia. It was necessary to see to it that perestroika in economics,

political and social relations, public education, culture, and so on, provide real guarantees for the normal national development of the Estonian nation and for the negative trends hindering such development to be eliminated.

The political activeness of the entire population in our republic significantly increased and the national self-awareness of the native ethnic group—the Estonians—tempestuously increased in 1988. There are grounds to speak today of the beginning of a new period in national awakening. All of these processes occurred under the slogans of perestroika and revolutionary renovation of socialist society. Exceptions were found only in isolated extremes which showed up in the course of this process.

The year 1988 also marked the beginning of the implementation of practical steps to protect the Estonian language and to restrict migration. Laws aimed at ensuring the republic's sovereignty (the Declaration on the Sovereignty of the Estonian SSR, the Law on Amending the Estonian SSR Constitution) were adopted at the November session of the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet. Clearly, this action was not the most suitable. Because of discrepancies between the Constitution of the USSR and some legal stipulations adopted by the Estonian SSR Supreme Soviet, the USSR Supreme Soviet Presidium declared these stipulations invalid. Nonetheless, it deemed expedient, in connection with the questions raised by Estonia, to formulate a system for state-legal mechanisms which would guarantee the political and socioeconomic interests of Union republics and would broaden and protect their sovereign rights within the USSR.

The steps aimed at protecting the interests of the Estonian nation and, above all, the Estonian language, as well as the errors which were made in their interpretation by the press, made parts of the nonethnic population watchful, particularly people who did not speak Estonian. Approximately two-thirds of the non-Estonians do not speak the Estonian language. Most of them live in the Russian-language areas of Estonia or work in Russian-language labor collectives of enterprises under Union jurisdiction. They have their own economic interests which do not always coincide with those of the republic. Such were the objective conditions for the shaping of departmental-egotistic concepts, according to which Estonia is considered, possibly even subconsciously, a simple extension of Russia. In order properly to understand the steps being currently taken, people who hold such views would obviously have to cross a certain psychological barrier.

The tasks of perestroika, in the case of Soviet Estonia, appear as a combination of three different interests: the common interests of the entire population in the republic; the interests of the native Estonian nation; and the interests of the non-Estonian population. The common interests of the entire population in the republic and joint interest in achieving the objectives of perestroika

and accelerating socioeconomic development on the basis of the new economic management conditions and republic cost accounting, solving the ecological crisis and the further democratization of social life are the objective grounds for the consolidation and sensible combination of the different national interests. However, such a sensible combination of national interests can be achieved only if non-Estonians show respect for the interests of the native ethnic group, and if Estonians respect the interests of the population belonging to other ethnic groups. It is precisely reciprocal respect that must become the foundation of all measures aimed at controlling national processes.

Not so long ago ideologues, followed by scientists who preferred to comment on rather than analyze events and processes in social life, considered national relations exclusively from the viewpoint of positive results. Such results indeed exist. The vast progress of previously backward nations, a conversion from nomad cattle breeding to a modern industrial-agrarian society, the appearance of a national working class and a national intelligentsia, the development of national cultures and the assertion in the public awareness of the ideas of equality, friendship and cooperation among ethnic groups, socialist internationalism and Soviet patriotism, as well as many other factors, were firmly established as accomplishments of Soviet national policy.

However, as was the case in other areas of social life as well, in the area of national relations development takes place through contradictions. For a long time second priority was given to the real contradictions in the solemn political statements which were made and in most works by Soviet scientists. Today it is generally recognized that the scientific study of national processes has fallen seriously behind the requirements of social practice.

As we mention the lag in the scientific interpretation of national processes, let us not forget that the CPSU has formulated quite clearly the programmatic objectives of national developments. On the one hand, they include the further blossoming of nations, national languages and cultures; on the other, the reciprocal rapprochement among nations on the basis of internationalism. However, the specific ways for the development of these two processes were insufficiently clarified. It was precisely because of such a lack of clarity that the international feature, as a concealed principle of activities, was frequently identified with the national-Russian principle (or the principles of other national majorities).

The same type of confusion was manifested in underestimating other national languages, the attempts appeared to proclaim the Russian language—the language of communications among ethnic groups—the “second native” tongue of the other nationalities, to replace the principle of mutual rapprochement among nations with that of their Russian-language “merger,” to reduce the significance of national cultures merely to the classification of

archaic-ethnographic exotic manifestations, and so on. Such concepts, naturally, did not contribute to strengthening the friendship among nations.

The outstanding role of the Russian nation in the history of the land of the soviets is unquestionable. Historically, the situation developed in such a way that the Russian language became the language of communications among ethnic groups in the USSR, performing important functions in the management of the country and the international exchange of information. However, none of this is a reason for confusing what is national-Russian with what is international.

It is useful to recall the way V.I. Lenin conceived of relations among ethnic groups in the Soviet Union.

We know that during the cult of personality, the national policy of the party was described as “Stalinist,” while Stalin himself was proclaimed the greatest and infallible authority on the national problem. The national policy which was implemented at that time was, actually, Stalinist. The principle of Marxist-Leninist national policy was acknowledged in words, on the one hand, and even, to a certain extent, was being implemented. On the other, however, there were grossest possible violations caused by violations of law and order, ignoring the legitimate rights of ethnic groups and nationalities and national republics and regions, and applying mass repressions against many peoples and ethnic groups. Although the repressive-Stalinist distortions of national policy were eliminated with the exposure of the cult of personality, the great-power trends which were inherent to the post-Leninist period in the history of Soviet society were preserved to one extent or another.

The Leninist understanding of the tasks of Soviet national building, including sharp criticism of the Stalinist concept of “autonomization,” was made public only 34 years later—in 1956—after the 20th CPSU Congress. However, it is only now, under the conditions of perestroika, i.e., again after an interval of more than 30 years, that we are beginning to understand the true meaning of the Leninist plan for structuring relations among ethnic groups in our country.

Let us take as an example the correlation between local nationalism and great-power chauvinism. As a rule, in the past attention was focused on the criticism of nationalism. Indeed, Lenin condemned the nationalism of small nations, for it subordinated the working class to “its own,” its “national” bourgeoisie. However, Lenin criticized great-power chauvinism just as sharply. Naturally, compared to 1922, under the Soviet system the situation in the country changed radically. The type of chauvinism of the Great Russians and “Russified Aliens,” which Lenin exposed so strongly, largely disappeared. The development of the nations and changes in the ideology and, above all, the settling in the social consciousness of the idea of equality among nations,



eliminated the grounds for open and unconcealed arrogance. Nonetheless, to this day such great-power trends can be triggered by those same sources which Lenin identified, and which are, above all, the unceremonious and omnipotent behavior of the central administrative-bureaucratic machinery and scorn for the legitimate rights of people.

Or else let us consider another problem which is also directly related to controlling contemporary national processes: the need to provide guarantees against inequality between big and small nations, an inequality which can actually develop within a single Union state. Lenin wrote that "we must apply the strictest possible rules concerning the use of the national language in republics of other nationalities which are members of our Union, and check such rules particularly thoroughly" (*Poln. Sobr. Soch.* [Complete Collected Works, vol 45, p 361]). Furthermore, internationalism "should consist not only of observing the formal equality among nations but also use an inequality which would as as compensation by oppressing nations, by big nations, for the inequality which actually develops in life" (*ibid.*, p 359).

I believe that the steps currently being taken in Estonia to protect the Estonian language contain an element of such "inequality," as mentioned by Lenin, for the Russian language has less need for such protection. However, the concepts of "small" and "big" are relative. The Estonian nation is small when it protects the prerequisites for its national development, on the scale of the entire country. However, it is "big" when it comes to the members of other ethnic groups living on its land, and whose interests must also be mandatorily respected.

For decades the supercentralized management system which now, through political and economic reforms, will be transformed into a real community of equal republics, was a major nutritive ground for erroneous concepts on the development of Soviet national and ethnic groups. Mental stereotypes which have been established must be eliminated in the course of this reorganization.

For example, to this day we have not eliminated the mental stereotype according to which the interests of any given Union department are considered in advance an expression of the interests of the entire state, as the national interests. According to this stereotype any local opposition to the aspirations of Union departments is qualified primarily as a manifestation of parochialism, national exclusivity, and so on. However, all we have to do is look at the current condition of nature and the way its resources are used, and we can easily see how frequently it is precisely these interests of Union departments that conflicted with the national interests and acted as bureaucratically alienated interests.

In order to limit departmental omnipotence, we must radically change the attitude toward local, republic and national interests. They should be considered, above all,

as an indicator which reveals with a high percentage of probability the unacceptability of alienated departmental interests. This is applicable not only to economics but also to public education, culture, health care, and so on.

According to another accepted mental stereotype, in planning socioeconomic steps their national-ethnic consequences were either ignored or considered unsubstantial (matters went so far that in planning and forecasting labor resources frequently the ethnic structure was totally ignored). Usually, the major feature in planning was an assessment of economic efficiency. It was only in the course of perestroika that we began to take properly into consideration the social and ecological aspects of planned national economic projects. Obviously, yet another step must be taken. The realm of national-ethnic processes must also have regulatory principles or certain basic prohibitions, as is now being done in the area of ecology. Possibly, such principles should be made into laws.

I have discussed some basic problems of national policy and mental stereotypes for the reason that the sensitive areas in relations among nationalities in Estonia are largely the result of the lack of a purposeful national policy. The spontaneous or semi-spontaneous development of national processes was entirely consistent with the assumption that national problems will be automatically solved by the "merger" among nations and that contradictions in relations among nationalities are based only on the insufficient awareness of the people and, therefore, can be eliminated through explanatory work. Meanwhile, the actual national development followed an entirely different course and led to undesirable results, the main among which were the steady decline in the percentage of Estonians in the republic's population and the significant polarization of the two ethnic contingents: Estonians and Russian-speaking non-Estonians.

The dynamics of the Estonian national structure in the postwar period indicates a steady decline in the percentage of the native population: from 92 percent on the eve of the war it dropped to 75 percent in 1959 and to 61 percent in 1988.

The present national composition of the population in the republic is the result of three basic causes: war casualties, intensive migration and low natural increase in the Estonian population.

During the war the Estonian population dropped to 850,000 i.e., by more than 200,000. Between 1945 and 1958 some 285,000 people came to Estonia, including one-third of the returning local population (demobilized, evacuated, illegally repressed, and others). Many Estonians who lived in other parts of the country also moved to the republic.

The current nonnational population of the industrial northeastern part of Estonia, which was wrecked and depopulated as a result of military operations, developed

during the period of postwar restoration. The restoration and further development of industry in that area were largely the work of the new residents—non-Estonian—who settled there.

Migration was the main factor in the changing national structure of the population of Soviet Estonia in subsequent years as well. Such migration, unjustified and unrelated to the development of new territories, as a result of which the RSFSR Nonchernozem, among others, became depopulated, while other already densely populated areas became overpopulated, has now become an obstacle to the development of the entire country. This applies to our republic as well.

Thanks to the migrations, 210,000 people settled in Estonia between 1959 and 1987, or an average of 7,500 people monthly. This is the balance of the migration; in fact, population dynamics were double that figure. It was precisely the cities that expanded as a result of migrations. Currently Estonians account for 51 percent of the republic's urban population (1,137,000) and for 86 percent of the rural population (443,000).

For decades the influx of ever new people was the result of chronic and largely fictitious manpower shortages, paralleling the extensive development of Estonian industry. In addition to drawing from the outside the truly necessary manpower, for decades some enterprises operated as a kind of emigration pump: steadily attracting from the outside people interested not in work at the given enterprise but, above all, in the opportunity to leave their previous locations and try their luck elsewhere. In many large cities throughout the country this situation is quite well known as the problem of "ceilings." In our republic, however, it acquired an additional national coloring. Whereas such enterprises (most of them under Union administration) have good resources for social development and construction capacities, some of the new arrivals, it turns out, have a privileged situation in terms of obtaining housing compared to the native population, which aggravates the friction between nationalities even further.

In addition to production needs, the relatively better living conditions in Estonia, compared with the areas from which outsiders come, have been a permanent reason for the positive balance in migration processes. Since to this day the hope to improve living conditions is a major incentive for moving to Estonia, it is very difficult to control migration.

The adverse effect of excessive migration affects the entire Estonian population, regardless of ethnic origin. The mechanical increase in population requires steps to control it. We believe that the most efficient are steps to restructure industry and close down sectors the existence of which is unjustified in Estonia either from the viewpoint of importing raw materials (such as metal-intensive industry) or that of marketing finished goods.

There is no fatal inevitability whatsoever by virtue of which Estonians must become a national minority in their own land. However, if the present processes continue, this should not be excluded. Switching the Estonian economy to new tracks and, on this basis, limiting unjustified migration, would counter this trend.

The national-ethnic consequences of migration processes would not have been all that painful had they not been paralleled by the division between two major linguistic-ethnic groups in Estonia. This division applies not only to the territorial location of the population but to labor collectives as well (for example, the collectives of the large Union industrial enterprises and those engaged in maritime and railroad transportation are Russian-speaking). The current housing policy contributes to adding to the cities new residential districts in which the Russian language population predominates. The separation is found also in the statistics of mixed marriages: as a result of them there is primarily a merger between Ukrainians, Belorussians and members of many other ethnic groups and Russians, on the one hand, and between Finns and Estonians, on the other.

Although the Western press continues to claim that the Estonian nation is becoming "Russified," reality indicates otherwise. The Estonian nation has a rich national life. Its language and culture are developing on their own foundations. Estonia has preserved higher education in its native language. If we take into consideration the number of Estonians, in terms of publications in the native language, Estonia is leading among Union republics. There is not even a hint that the Estonian nation is becoming diluted within the Russian. The trouble lies elsewhere: the constant shrinking of the space held by Estonian national life and Estonian language, as well as the fact that the "new" people—the postwar and as much as third generation residents of other ethnic groups—are insufficiently integrating themselves with Estonian life and within the system of Estonian language and culture.

The separation of the non-Estonian population is largely the result of social self-regulatory factors. Under the conditions of technical progress and urbanization the native language is the most important feature of national belonging. All other conditions being equal, the people prefer their own native national linguistic environment. This is a universal right. On the other hand, joint life and activities among people of different ethnic groups greatly contribute to getting closer to each other. On this basis, in Estonia as well efforts have been made to create as many mixed groups as possible in kindergartens, and to combine under the same roof classes teaching subjects in Estonian and Russian; propagandists tended to consider the national variety of a labor collective as an indication of internationalism, and so on. Such steps, if sensibly implemented, contain a kernel of rationality. However, it is radically wrong to impose all of this on people despite their wish and to ignore real possibilities. The point is that, due to the lack of a skilled educator, a mixed group in a kindergarten breaks down into two

separate language groups of children and that two schools teaching in different languages find themselves under the same roof. Furthermore, the efficiency of the work of a labor collective is hardly defined by the fact that a number of national labor traditions may be applied in it.

The main way leading to the mutual rapprochement among people of different nationalities runs not through their mechanical mixing but through a properly functioning educational, upbringing and cultural system. A number of shortcomings have accumulated in this area in Estonia. They are most visible in the present unsatisfactory linguistic situation. Currently we have no accurate data on the actual fluency in the Estonian and Russian languages. Sociological surveys lead to the conclusion that on a level sufficient for communicating, the Russian language has been mastered by about nine-tenths of all Estonians (at least 25 percent of Estonians are fluent in Russian); the Estonian language has been mastered by approximately one-third of the nonethnic population (10 percent are fluent in Estonian). Therefore, Estonians know the Russian language much better than non-Estonians are fluent in Estonian. Nonetheless, the majority of non-Estonians were educated in Estonian schools.

It is the public education system that should be blamed for this situation. The Russian-language secondary schools in Estonia are 10th-grade schools based on RSFSR curriculums (secondary school training in Estonian schools takes 11 years). In addition to these curriculums Estonian language was introduced in a total of some 600 classroom lessons (a total of 1,200 classroom lessons are assigned for teaching the Russian language in Estonian schools), in addition to lessons in Estonian history and geography (6-8 percent of the total number of hours taught in those subjects). In Russian schools Estonian literature is an optional subject. However all of this has been fitted within a 10-year secondary education training. Furthermore, the lack of skilled educators has been a permanent feature (it is only recently that the training of Estonian language teachers for Russian schools was undertaken); in a number of cases Estonian language was not taught at all. For that reason a significant percentage of Russian school graduates do not speak Estonian even on the elementary level. They do not know the history or geography of the republic in which they live.

As early as the beginning of 1988, taking into consideration this situation, the Estonian Communist Party Central Committee earmarked a number of steps the purpose of which, above all, was substantially to improve knowledge of Estonian by non-Estonians and of Russian by Estonians. At the end of last year the Estonian language was made the state language; in January 1989 a law was passed regulating the use of Estonian and other languages. The purpose of said steps is to improve

the overall linguistic situation and to protect the Estonian language. The suggestion of having two state languages—Estonian and Russian—in Estonia was rejected, for in that case the actual suppression of the Estonian language would acquire legal grounds. At the same time, the use of the Russian language as the language for Union-wide communications on the republic's territory is guaranteed by the law on the language. In practical life, these steps affect two extensive areas of activities: public education and a number of professions and jobs.

The study of a second language as a language for communicating and of a third, a foreign language, or else mathematics, history, and so on, takes place within the public education system. All that is needed is for Estonian language to be an ordinary subject in Russian schools. In my view, the study of the Estonian and Russian languages in the schools of our republic should not be "optional" at all, any more than the study of mathematics or history. Furthermore, taking into consideration the bitter experience of the past, it seems to me that Russian secondary schools in Estonia should have the same number of years as Estonian schools.

There are many positions the nature of which calls for fluency in the two languages. The knowledge of the two languages is needed by the personnel of the state and party apparatus, in trade, consumer services, health care, law enforcement, and so on, i.e., by anyone who manages or services people. Within a sensible period of time (naturally, this cannot be accomplished overnight), the knowledge of the two languages should become a mandatory qualification for a job. This requirement does not violate linguistic democracy in the least.

Today Estonia has begun to untangle the knots which were formed in the course of decades in matters of linguistics and other problems related to national relations. Naturally, one must be very cautious in formulating requirements concerning linguistic knowledge. Such requirements cannot be the same, for example, in Tallinn (where the ratio between Estonians and non-Estonians is 1:1) and Narva (where the ratio is 1:20). The specific nature of the area was taken into consideration in completing the draft law on the language, which must not be forgotten in the implementation of this law.

It is not at all a question of belittling the significance of the Russian language. For a long time attention was paid only to one aspect of the matter: mastering the Russian language by Estonians. Now its other side is being given priority as well: seeing to it that more non-Estonians become fluent in Estonian and integrated in Estonian life.

Knowledge of two languages or three or more is, above all, a question of culture and education. To boast of the inability to speak another language is to boast of illiteracy. That is why it would be quite sad if the justified concern of Estonians or Russians about the future of



their language, culture and nation were to degenerate into an effort to assert their own national superiority. Such a danger must be prevented.

At the present time training in the Estonian educational system is provided in two languages: Estonian and Russian. Our republic, however, is inhabited by members of many other nationalities other than Estonians and Russians. In the past the possibilities of Ukrainians, Belorussians, Finns, Jews, as well as Russians in places where they are not a compact national majority to practice their own culture were not properly formulated. Currently Estonia has taken the initial steps to organize such activities. To this effect, the members of the different ethnic groups are organizing all sorts of societies and native-son associations. Last autumn, a forum of the peoples was convened in Tallinn. Obviously, such activities in the area of national cultures must be regulated by law as well.

In my view, managing national processes and relations among nationalities has three aspects:

First is managing the profound socioeconomic processes. In planning economic, cultural, social and other steps we must take into consideration their national-ethnic consequences. Estonians must not become a national minority in their own land. Migration must be restricted. A prerequisite for such a restriction is the intensive development of all production sectors and upgrading labor productivity on the basis of mechanization and automation, increasing the share of Estonians engaged in industry and in the ocean-sailing and commercial fleets, and so on. In formulating plans for the development of the republic, we must avoid above all that which leads to the unjustified influx of new residents in the republic. Perestroika as a whole, the economic reform, the introduction of republic cost accounting, the radical change of relations between republic and Union departments, organizing closer contacts among republics and ensuring within the single Union the real sovereignty of Soviet Estonia as well as that of all other republics, play a major role in reaching this target.

The second aspect is a long-term plan for activities in the areas of public education and culture. Such activities must be reviewed, with a view to improving the interconnection between the two basic national-linguistic groups and, above all, with a view to integrating the non-Estonian population living in Estonia within varied Estonian life. Such integration and participation is a long-term process and, so far, inadmissibly little has been done to manage it. Knowledge of Estonian as the language for communication (on the basis of the principles we mentioned), a greater integration of residents from other nationalities within Estonian culture and in the life of the republic, and their active efforts in the area of their own national cultures must be encouraged. All of this must contribute to developing the type of permanent group of alien population who will consider Soviet Estonia not only a place where it lives but also as its

native land. Furthermore, we must systematically promote good knowledge of Russian by the Estonians, as a language of all-Union intercourse, and knowledge of the history and culture of the Russian and other peoples of the USSR. We must profoundly develop the feelings of Soviet patriotism and love for the common homeland by all Soviet peoples.

The third aspect, closely related to the second but nonetheless relatively autonomous, is internationalist upbringing and propaganda and raising the people in a spirit of equality and friendship among the peoples and of Soviet patriotism. In the past such work was most frequently formal, based on slogans, ignoring real contradictions. At the present time both the press and oral propaganda in Estonia pay great attention to reassessing the events of the past, which were frequently interpreted subjectively by official historical science, as well as the sensitive areas in international relations. It is unquestionable that in order to correct the situation shortcomings must be exposed. However we must not fall into the other extreme in concealing shortcomings (as was the case in the past) and concentrate only on exposures, ignoring our true achievements. Furthermore, information about events in Estonia must be adequate both for Estonians and non-Estonians, so that the justified protection of their national interests by the Estonian and Russian-language publications may not degenerate into pitting one ethnic group against another and ignoring the legitimate interests of either side. This is because in the main, the most important areas, the interests of the Estonian population, as well as those of all the peoples in the land of the soviets, regardless of ethnic origin, coincide. It is precisely this commonality of interests that is a foundation for consolidation and for joint constructive actions.

In the course of building a state of law all such aspects of activities must be given certain legal guarantees. In order to ensure the true sovereignty of a republic we believe that it would be expedient to conclude a Union treaty and include the necessary additions to the USSR Constitution which would guarantee national-cultural activities and the passing of respective republic laws which would promote true internationalism and the strict observance of laws guaranteeing human rights.

Perestroika in Estonia affects most directly relations among nationalities. Today, when the national problem is actively being discussed in the press, at meetings and in private discussions, it is particularly necessary to maintain an objective and balanced attitude. One-sidedness and excessive emotions must be avoided. We must comprehensively rely on the friendship among the peoples. It is only thus that we can raise to a new and higher level community life and cooperation among members of different ethnic groups in Soviet Estonia and jointly build sensible relations.

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**Incompetence; Pages From the 'Chernobyl Notebook'**

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[Article by Grigoriy Ustinovich Medvedev]

[Text] The "Chernobyl Notebook" was written by Grigoriy Ustinovich Medvedev in 1986. This work is the product of the intensive efforts of a document expert and political journalist, a thorough professional, familiar with virtually all fine points of nuclear technology, who is also an experienced writer and author of many stories and novels. Even more important, however, G. Medvedev personally knows many of the characters of his work not second-hand but through his own work.

He has dedicated nearly 3 decades to the nuclear power industry. The labor biography of this author includes the installation and tuning of nuclear systems on ocean-sailing vessels, operation of reactors at nuclear electric power plants, participation in designing and building some nuclear power plants, and work as an expert and member of inspection commissions.

The author, who believes that the nuclear power industry is an outstanding accomplishment of the human mind and one of the examples of "high technology," the mastery of which is considered by many people as the future of our civilization, convincingly proves through his own creative work that this level must be consistent with the high level organization of a society which has adopted such technology, and the level of its cultural standards and of its moral criteria in the life and activities of every individual who is, one way or another, involved with the latest technology and ensures its safe operation. Without such consistency the production process is fraught with the threat of monstrous casualties and accidents.

G. Medvedev is sharply opposed to departmentalism in solving problems which are not departmental in the least. He opposes unnecessary secrecy which restricts public control over the development of processes which support the life of society itself.

As reported by TASS, the "Critical Mass" social organization told the citizens of the United States that in 1987, as a result of various difficulties, no less than 430 emergency stops of nuclear reactors occurred at American nuclear power plants. The personnel were responsible for 492 violations of operational rules governing various types of equipment.

Does this mean that the U.S. nuclear power industry has fallen behind our own? No, it is rather an example of one of the mechanisms which help American society to reach the level of technological and other standards, the level of its own organization at which the nuclear power industry will not be an industrial element alien and hostile to man.

Following are some excerpts of the "Chernobyl Notebook," which deal with the topic of incompetence and irresponsibility it triggers. Unfortunately, we encounter such features in many areas of our life. The lessons of Chernobyl by no means apply to the power industry alone. The more profoundly we master them the more successfully we shall be advancing on the path of perestroika, the path of progress and renovation.

1

"The death of the Challenger crew and the accident at the Chernobyl AES increased the feelings of concern and harshly reminded us that people are only beginning to master the fantastically powerful forces which they themselves have brought to life, and are only now learning how to put in the service of progress," Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev said in his 18 August 1986 statement on Central Television.

Such a maximally sober assessment on the peaceful use of the atom was provided for the first time in 35 years of development of the nuclear power industry in the USSR. For many long years our scientists reported in the press and on the radio and television the exact opposite. The peaceful atom was presented as just about the panacea, the peak of true safety, ecological cleanliness and reliability. People were almost ecstatic when discussing the safety of nuclear electric power plants.

A.M. Petrosyants, the then chairman of the USSR State Committee for the Utilization of Nuclear Power, made a particular great contribution to promoting nuclear power plants.

It was precisely he who, at the 6 May 1986 press conference in Moscow, in commenting on the Chernobyl tragedy, said something which struck many people: "Science demands sacrifices." This must not be forgotten.

The time has come to say that the optimistic forecasts and assurances of scientists have never been shared by the personnel who run the nuclear electric power plants, i.e., those who have been handling the peaceful atoms directly and on a daily basis as part of their jobs and not from the comfortable quiet of offices and laboratories.

There were plenty of reasons for premonitions of concern: the capacities of the nuclear power industry had increased incredibly; their prestige had been inflated sky-high and the responsibility of the nuclear power workers, one could say, was declining. Furthermore, why should they feel some responsibility if, it was claimed, everything at nuclear power plants was so simple and safe.... It was roughly at that time that the cadre corps of operational workers at nuclear power plants began to change and that the scarcity of nuclear power workers worsened drastically. Whereas in the past it was mostly enthusiastic boosters of nuclear power who took jobs in

that industry, people who profoundly loved such work, now there was a rush of unsuitable people. In my view, it was not the money but the prestige that attracted the people most.

A situation in which accidents at nuclear power plants were concealed from the public had become the standard under P.S. Neporozhnyy, USSR Minister of Power Industry and Electrification. Breakdowns were concealed not only from the public and the government but also from the personnel of nuclear power plants throughout the country, which was particularly dangerous, for the lack of information on negative experience is always fraught with the danger of its duplication. A.I. Mayorets, who took over from Neporozhnyy, continued the tradition of concealment. Six months after assuming his duties, he signed an order which prohibited the publication in the press and on the radio and television information on adverse ecological influence on the servicing personnel and the population and the area surrounding power projects (the effect of electromagnetic fields, radiation, and atmospheric, water and soil pollution).

In April 1983 I wrote an article on the creeping nature of planning in the building of nuclear power plants and submitted it to one of the central newspapers. The article was rejected. Here, briefly, is what I wrote:

"What are the reasons for the unrealistic nature of planning in the nuclear-power construction sectors and projects, and for failures which have lasted for decades? There are three:

"1. The incompetence of the workers who plan the commissioning of power capacities and the management of the nuclear power construction sector.

"2. The unrealistic nature and, as a consequence, the creeping nature of planning, caused by incompetent assessments.

"3. The lack of readiness on the part of the machine building ministries to produce in the necessary quantity and suitable quality equipment for nuclear power plants...."

The fact that competence is directly related to both quality and realism of the plans and to the safety of nuclear power plants was more than obvious. Unfortunately, however, this is a fact of which we must be reminded again and again, for many leading positions in the nuclear industry sector were held, as we shall see, by unsuitable personnel.

Also amazing is the clearly manifested conformism of our public, which blindly trusted the academicians. Was this not the reason for which Chernobyl thunderously dropped from a clear sky and buried many of us?

Buried us but not all of us. Unfortunately, conformism and gullibility did not diminish. It is easier to believe something than to question it soberly. To begin with, it is less troublesome....

2

On 25 April 1986 preparations were under way at the Chernobyl AES to close the fourth power reactor for planned-preventive repairs.

In the course of closing down the reactor, in accordance with the program drafted by chief engineer N.M. Fomin, tests involving the disconnecting the reactor screens, in a mode of total de-energizing of the nuclear power plant's equipment, were planned. In order to generate electric power, the mechanical run-down energy of the rotor of the turbine generator was to be used (inertial rotation). Incidentally, such an experiment had been suggested to many nuclear power plants but, because of its risky nature, all of them had refused. The management of the Chernobyl AES accepted.

What does this experiment consist of, and why was it necessary?

The point is that if an AES is suddenly de-energizing, naturally, all mechanisms stop, including the pumps which move cooling water through the active zone of the nuclear reactor. As a result, fusion develops in the active zone, which is the equivalent of the maximally projected possible accident. The use of possible sources of electric power in such cases presumes an experiment involving the running of the turbogenerator rotor. For as long as the rotor of the generator turns, electric power is generated, which could and should be used in critical situations.

Similar tests, but with the reactor screens up, had been conducted in the past as well at the Chernobyl AES and at other nuclear power plants. Everything had been successful. I too had participated in such tests.

Usually, programs for such operations are formulated in advance, and coordinated with the general reactor designer, the general designer of the power plant, and Gosatomenergondzor. In such cases, the program mandatorily requires an emergency power supply while the experiment is being conducted, i.e., a de-energizing of the power plant during the tests is only simulated without, actually, taking place.

The program, which was approved by N.M. Fomin, the chief engineer of the Chernobyl AES, did not meet a single one of the necessary and well-known professional requirements.

In January 1986 V.P. Bryukhanov, AES director, submitted a test program for coordination with the general designer of Gidroyekt and to Gosatomenergondzor.



They did not answer. Neither the director of the Chernobyl AES or the Soyuzatomenergo Operational Association, were concerned, nor were Gidroyekt and Gosatomenergondzor.

At this point some far-reaching conclusions may be drawn: irresponsibility in all of these state institutions had reached such a point that they considered possible to remain silent or call for any penalties, although the general designer, the general customer (the Soyuzatomenergo VPO) and Gosatomenergondzor have such rights. Furthermore, it is their direct obligation. However, these organizations also have specific officials in charge. Who were they?

At Gidroyekt—the general designer of the Chernobyl AES—V.S. Konviz was in charge of the safety of nuclear power plants. He was an experienced designer of hydroengineering equipment and candidate of technical sciences. For many years (from 1972 to 1982) he headed the AES designing sector; in 1983 he was put in charge of AES safety. Konviz, who started designing nuclear power plants in the 1970s, lacked a thorough idea of the nature of nuclear reactors. He recruited essentially specialists in the designing of hydraulic power equipment. This makes everything clear. Such a person could not anticipate the possibility of a catastrophe which could be caused by such a program, or a breakdown of the reactor itself.

At Soyuzatomenergo, the association of the USSR Ministry of Power Industry and Electrification, which runs the AES and is actually responsible for all activities of the operational personnel, the manager was G.A. Veretennikov, a person who had never had anything to do with the running of AES. Between 1970 and 1982 he had been employed at the USSR Gosplan, where he planned procurements of equipment for nuclear power plants. On this point, one of the old officials of Soyuzatomenergo, Yu.A. Izmaylov, noted that "under Veretennikov, to find a nuclear power worker in a main administration familiar with reactors and nuclear physics became a virtual impossibility. Instead, bookkeeping and the procurement and planning departments became swollen with personnel...."

Shortly before Chernobyl, Ye.S. Ivanov, chief of the production department at Soyuzatomenergo, justified the increased breakdowns at nuclear power plants as follows: "Not one AES is observing all technological regulations. Nor is this possible. Operational practices are constantly introducing their own corrections...."

It was only the Chernobyl nuclear catastrophe that threw Veretennikov out of the party and of his position as chief of Soyuzatomenergo.

The personnel of Gosatomenergondzor were quite knowledgeable and experienced. They were headed by committee chairman Ye.V. Kulov, a nuclear physicist with vast practical experience in work with the nuclear

reactors of the Minsredmash. Strange though it might seem, Kulov as well ignored the draft program of Chernobyl tests. Why? The main task of the committee is specifically to supervise, on behalf of the state, the observance by all ministries, departments, enterprises, organizations, establishments and officials of the stipulated regulations, standards and instructions governing nuclear and technical safety in planning, building and operating nuclear power projects.

The committee also has the right to take suitable steps, including stopping the operation of nuclear power projects if safety rules and standards have been violated, if equipment failures have been detected, if the personnel is insufficiently competent, or in other cases which could threaten the proper operation of such projects....

I recall that at one of the conferences, in 1984, Ye.V. Kulov, who had been recently appointed chairman of Gosatomenergondzor, explained his functions to the nuclear power industry officials as follows: "Do not think that I shall be working for you. Metaphorically speaking, I am a militiaman. My job is to forbid, and to nullify your wrong actions." Unfortunately, in the Chernobyl case Ye.V. Kulov did not act like a "militiaman."

No one reacted to the improper program for the tests, as though there was a conspiracy. What was the matter? The matter was the established practice of keeping silent. If there is no openness, there are no lessons to learn. Therefore, no accident has occurred. Everything is safe, everything is reliable. However, it was not for nothing that Abutalib has said that whoever fires at the past with a pistol will be fired upon by the future with a cannon. I would rephrase this statement especially for the nuclear power workers as follows: the future will strike back with a reactor explosion. With a nuclear catastrophe.

The question, however, is why did the irresponsibility of Gosatomenergondzor, Gidroyekt and Soyuzatomenergo not concern Bryukhanov and chief engineer Fomin, respectively director and chief engineer of the Chernobyl AES? For one must not work according to an uncoordinated program. What kind of people, what kind of specialists were they? Let me say something about them.

I met Viktor Petrovich Bryukhanov in the winter of 1971, at the construction site of the AES at the Prityat settlement. I had arrived there straight from the Moscow clinic where I had been treated for radiation disease. I still felt poorly but I could walk and I had decided that I could hasten my recovery by working. I requested a discharge from the clinic took the train, and the next morning I was in Kiev. A 2-hour cab ride took me to Prityat.

At the Prityat settlement, that winter day was sunny and warm. Here this was frequently the case: although it was still winter, it smelled of spring. The cab stopped by an elongated hut which housed the office and the management of the construction project.

I went in. The floor bounced and screeched under my feet. I went into the director's office: a small room of 6 square meters. Bryukhanov stood up. He was a short dark-haired man, with a lined sun-burned face. He smiled embarrassedly and shook my hand. Subsequently, my first impression of a softness of character and the desire to be obliging were confirmed. However, I also found in him something else, the aspiration, caused by his lack of knowledge, to surround himself with personnel who were very experienced in practical affairs but not always ethical. At that time Bryukhanov was very young, he was 36. By training and experience, he had been a turbine operator. He had graduated from the Power Institute with excellent marks and assigned to the Slavyansk GRES (a coal-powered station) where he had shown his capability in the start-up of the generator. He would remain on the job for days on end. He worked efficiently and knowledgeably. In general, as I found out later, after working with him side-by-side for several years, he was a good engineer, competent and industrious. The trouble, however, was that he was not a nuclear power engineer. Nonetheless, the deputy minister of the Ukrainian Ministry of Power Industry, who was in charge of the Slavyansk GRES, had noticed Bryukhanov and made him Chernobyl director.

From the very first months (prior to Chernobyl, for many years I had been chief of shift at another AES), I had suggested to Bryukhanov that he staff the shops and services with people with long practical experience in nuclear power plants. As a rule, Bryukhanov would not refuse openly but then surreptitiously gave such jobs to personnel of thermoelectric power plants. It was his view that personnel well familiar with powerful turbine systems, distribution systems and power feed lines should man nuclear power plants. With great difficulty, going over Bryukhanov's head, and with the support of Glavatomenergo, I was able, at that time, to staff the reactor and special chemical shops with specialists. Bryukhanov appointed the turbine operators and the electricians. By the end of 1972 N.M. Fomin and T.G. Plokhii arrived at the Chernobyl AES. Bryukhanov suggested the former for the position of chief of the electric power shop and the latter for deputy chief of the turbine shop. Both of them were Bryukhanov's direct appointments. Fomin, who was an electric power worker by experience and training, was promoted to the Chernobyl station from the Zaporozhye GRES (fuel powered plant), prior to which he had worked in the Poltava Power Systems.

As deputy chief engineer in charge of operations, I had a talk with Fomin: a nuclear power plant is a radioactive and exceptionally complex enterprise. Had he thought seriously about it, before leaving the electric power shop at the Zaporozhye GRES behind? At that time he answered me that the AES is considered a prestigious and most advanced project. His quite pleasant and confident baritone would rise during times of stress. He had a square shaped angular body and shining dark eyes. In his work he was efficient, obedient, exigent and

impulsive. He was ambitious and rancorous. One felt that on the inside he was always wound like a spring, ready to uncoil.

Conversely, Taras Grigoryevich Plokhii was sluggish, thorough, a typically phlegmatic person, but meticulous, persistent and hard-working. A first impression about him may have been that he was wishy-washy but for his methodical and steady work. This impression was greatly reinforced by his closeness with Bryukhanov (they had worked together at the Slavyansk GRES); as a reflection of this friendship he appeared to have a more substantive and energetic personality.

Bryukhanov actively promoted Plokhii and Fomin as members of the management of the Chernobyl AES. Plokhii was in the lead: he was made deputy chief engineer in charge of operations and, subsequently, chief engineer. On Bryukhanov's suggestion, he had been made chief engineer at the Balakovskaya AES, a power plant with a water-water reactor, a project with which he was unfamiliar.

Meanwhile, at the Chernobyl AES Fomin quickly went advanced from his position as deputy chief engineer in charge of installation and operations, and replaced Plokhii as chief engineer. Let us note at this point that the USSR Minenergo did not support Fomin's candidacy but suggested for that job V.K. Bronnikov, an experienced reactor expert. However, Kiev did not agree to Bronnikov, considering him an ordinary technician. Fomin, it was claimed, was a strict and demanding manager and Kiev wanted him. Moscow yielded, and the matter was settled. The price of this concession is known.

At this point someone should have stopped, looked and remembered the Balakovo experience and intensified responsibility and watchfulness. But...

By the end of 1985 Fomin had an automobile accident and broke his spine. The result was a long period of paralysis and vanishing hopes. However, his powerful body was able to deal with the ailment, and Fomin returned to work on 25 March 1986, 1 month before the Chernobyl explosion. It was precisely then that I was in Prityat, inspecting the fifth power unit under construction. Progress was slow, held back by the lack of design documentation and technological equipment. I saw Fomin at the meeting which we had arranged especially about the fifth power turbine. He seemed quite weak. His entire appearance projected a kind of feeling of inhibition, showing the pain he had experienced. I shared my fears with Bryukhanov, who reassured me: "Nothing terrible, once on the job he will soon be up to standard...."

We continued our conversation. Bryukhanov complained that there were a number of leaks at the Chernobyl AES, the armature was not solid, there were leaks in the draining and air vents. The overall expenditure of

radioactive water was excessive, they were hardly able to treat it at the steaming systems. There was a great deal of radioactive dirt. He told me that he was quite tired and that he would like to find another job....

Let us now meet Anatoliy Stepanovich Dyatlov, deputy chief engineer in charge of operations of the second section of the Chernobyl AES.

A thin man, with gray hair, combed straight back, deep-set dull eyes, Dyatlov showed up at the nuclear power plant in the middle of 1973. Before that he had headed a physics laboratory at an enterprise in the Far East and had dealt with small nuclear power systems on board ships. He had never worked at a nuclear power plant. He was unfamiliar with the thermal systems at the plant and with uranium-graphite reactors. "How can you work?" I asked him. "This is new to you." "I shall learn," he said somehow tightly. "There are slide valves, pipelines... simpler than the physics of a nuclear reactor..." He seemed to have some difficulty in stringing out his words, separating them with long silences. He seemed to have a ponderous nature.

I told Bryukhanov that Dyatlov should not be appointed chief of the reactor shop. He would find it difficult to supervise the operational personnel not only because of his character (he obviously lacked the art of communication) but also because of his previous experience: he was a pure physicist and unfamiliar with nuclear technology. The next day the order arrived appointing Dyatlov deputy chief of the reactor shop. Bryukhanov had listened to my opinion and appointed Dyatlov to a lower job. However, his place of work—the reactor shop—was not changed. After I left Prityat, Bryukhanov promoted Dyatlov to reactor shop chief and, subsequently, deputy chief engineer in charge of operations of the second section of the nuclear power plant.

Was Dyatlov able to make an instantaneous and the only possible assessment of the situation at the start of the accident? I believe that he was not. Furthermore, he clearly lacked the properly developed necessary watchfulness and sense of danger, which are so greatly needed by someone who manages nuclear personnel. Instead, he showed a great deal of disrespect for such personnel and for technological regulations....

There is abundant proof that accident prevention training at the AES and the theoretical and practical training of the personnel were essentially carried out on the level of a primitive management algorithm. How had such slackness and criminal negligence developed? Who had programmed as part of our destiny the possibility of a nuclear catastrophe in the Belorussian-Ukrainian Polesye, and if so when? And why was it that it was precisely the uranium-graphite reactor that had been chosen for an installation 130 kilometers away from Kiev? Fifteen years ago this choice had been questioned by a number of people.

At one point, Bryukhanov and I had traveled by car to Kiev, summoned by the then minister of power industry of the Ukrainian SSR A.N. Makukhin. Makukhin was a thermoelectric power engineer by training and experience. On the way to Kiev, Bryukhanov said: "Would you object if we spend a couple of hours to give the minister and his deputies a lecture on the nuclear power industry and the structure of the nuclear reactor? Try to speak in a more popular style for them, like me, do not understand everything concerning nuclear power plants...."

Aleksey Naumovich Makukhin, Ukrainian SSR Minister of Power Industry, was quite domineering. He was also quite curt. I described the structure of the Chernobyl reactor, the nuclear power plant and the features of this type of AES. I recall that Makukhin asked: "In your view was a suitable reactor chosen or...? What I mean, after all Kiev is not far from it..." I answered that, in my view, not a uranium-graphite but a water-water reactor of the Novovoronezh type would have been more suitable for the Chernobyl AES. A two-circuit station is cleaner. There are less pipes and the waste is less radioactive. In a word, it is safer. "Are you familiar with the arguments of Academician Dollezhal? He is not totally opposed to building reactors in the European part of the country but some of his arguments are unclear..." "What can I tell you... Dollezhal is right, they should not be built." "Why did not Dollezhal support his views more firmly?" Makukhin sternly asked. "I do not know, Aleksey Naumovich," I said. "Obviously, someone had more clout than Academician Dollezhal." "What is the current waste of the Chernobyl Reactor?" the minister asked with some concern. "As much as 4,000 curies daily." "And that of the Novovoronezh?" "One hundred curies. A substantial difference." "But then academicians... Anatoliy Petrovich Aleksandrov praises this reactor as being the safest and most economical. You are exaggerating. Never mind, we shall develop it. The operational workers must organize matters in such a way that our first Ukrainian reactor will be cleaner and safer than the one in Novovoronezh!"

In 1982 A.N. Makukhin was transferred to the central apparatus of the USSR Minenergo as first deputy minister in charge of electric power plants and grids. On 14 August 1986, as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe, by decision of the Party Control Committee of the CPSU Central Committee, he was given a strict party reprimand for failure to take the necessary steps to upgrade the operational reliability of the Chernobyl AES.

Yet at that time, in 1972, the Chernobyl Reactor could have still been replaced by a water-water reactor and thus drastically reduce the likelihood of what happened in April 1986. In that case the say of the Ukrainian SSR minister of power industry would not have been final.

Here is another characteristic event. In December 1979, while I was already working in Moscow, I made an inspection tour of the Chernobyl AES. Vladimir Mikhailovich Tsybulko, then first secretary of the Kiev Oblast



CPSU Obkom, addressed the conference of nuclear power builders. His burned-up face (during the war he was a tank man and had caught fire inside a tank), had turned red. He looked straight ahead and spoke in the voice of a person unaccustomed to objections. However, there were fatherly intonations in his voice, intonations of concern and advice: "Look, comrades, what a beautiful city is Prityat, how pleasing to the eyes! You are saying four power turbines. And I would say, not enough! I would build here eight, 12, or even 20 nuclear power units!... And then what?! The city would have a hundred thousand population. It would not be a city but a legend.... You have a splendidly trained collective of nuclear power builders and installation workers. Instead of breaking new grounds, let us build here..."

During an intermission I mentioned that an excessive accumulation of nuclear active zones is highly fraught with unpleasant surprises, for it lowers the nuclear safety of the state in the case of a military conflict and an attack is launched on nuclear power plants or should a grave nuclear accident occur.... My retort was not noticed but Comrade Tsybulko's suggestion was adopted enthusiastically, like a directive. The building of the third section of the Chernobyl AES was undertaken soon afterwards, and so was the planning of the fourth....

3

After the reactor exploded, Kudryavtsev and Proskuryakov, young practitioners under the senior reactor control engineer, were on an assignment given to them by A. Akimov, the shift commander of the unit. They made their way through the wreckage, toward the 36th checkpoint, where the reactor hall was located. Above them, one could hear the crackling of the flames and the shouts of the fire fighters, magnified by the echo of the canyon created by the elevator block, coming from the roof of the machine hall and, somewhere on the side, apparently from the small reactor room.

"Is it burning there too?" the boys asked themselves.

On mark 36 everything was destroyed. Moving through piles of ruins and collapsed structures, the students reached the large hall of the ventilation center, which was separated from the reactor hall by the now collapsed monolithic wall. It was clear that the central hall had burst like a bubble, as a result of which the upper part had crumbled and the wall had caved in, with the armature sticking out radially. Here and there the concrete had crumbled and one could see the armature. The boys looked for a while, shaken up, finding it difficult to recognize the previously familiar premises.

Wearing no masks or protective clothing, they entered the reactor hall littered with burned wreckage. They saw the fire hose pouring water at the reactor. The water came out but there were no longer people. The firemen had retreated several minutes earlier, unconscious and at the end of their forces.

Proskuryakov and Kudryavtsev found themselves in the center of the catastrophe. But where was the reactor?

The round slab of the upper biological screen, with fragments sticking on all sides, made of fine stainless steel pipes, bent at an angle, was lying on top of the reactor shaft. The armature of the caved in walls was hanging, shapelessly, on all sides. This meant that the explosion had hit the slab which, once again, this time at an angle, had fallen on the reactor. Strong red and blue flames were coming out of the crater of the damaged reactor.

Taking good mental note of all that they had seen, Proskuryakov and Kudryavtsev spent no more than a minute near the reactor. This was enough for them to absorb a lethal dose of radiation (both died in terrible pain at the 6th Moscow Clinic).

They retraced their steps to the tenth benchmark with a feeling of deep depression and inner panic and entered the premises of the block management screen, where they reported the situation to Akimov and Dyatlov. Their faces and hands were brown (nuclear burns). Their skin under the clothing as well had taken the same color, as was established at the medical center.

"There is no central hall anymore," Proskuryakov said. "The explosion took away everything. There is open sky above. There is fire coming from the reactor...."

"You boys were mistaken," slowly said Dyatlov pausing between words. "Something must have been burning on the floor and you thought it was the reactor. Obviously the explosion of the detonating mixture in the emergency container demolished the roof. It is natural: a hundred and ten cubic meters is a great deal... not only the roof but the entire block could have blown up.... We must save the reactor. It is undamaged.... Water must be poured into the active zone."

It is thus that the legend was born: the reactor is undamaged, it is the emergency water container in the screening control system that exploded and water should be poured on the reactor.

At 2:30 a.m. AES director Bryukhanov arrived at the block management screen No 4. He looked gray, confused, almost out of control.

"What happened?" He managed to ask Akimov.

Akimov reported that a grave radiation accident had taken place but, in his view, the reactor had remained intact, and that the fire in the machine hall was in the process of being put out, that Major Telyatnikov's firemen were putting out the fire on the roof and that the second emergency supply pump was being prepared for work and would be activated soon.

"You are saying that it is a severe radiation accident but if the reactor is safe... what is the radiation now at the block?"

"The radiation meter is indicating 1,000 microroentgen per second...."

"Well, that is not too bad," Bryukhanov said, as though trying to reassure himself.

"That is what I think too," excitedly confirmed Akimov.

"Can I report to Moscow that the reactor is intact?"

"Yes, you can," Akimov answered confidently.

Bryukhanov went to his office and, at 3:00 a.m. called at his home Vladimir Vasilyevich Marin, head of the nuclear power industry sector of the CPSU Central Committee....

Meanwhile, Solovyev (not his name—author), civil defense chief at the nuclear power plant, arrived at the damaged block. He had a radiation meter the scale of which stopped at 250 roentgen. This was already something substantial. Walking along the deaerator shelf in the machine hall, to the caved-in area, he realized that the situation was extremely dangerous. In different parts of the block and the trash the needle on the scale was no longer registering.

Solovyev reported the situation to Bryukhanov.

"Your instrument is defective," Bryukhanov said. "There can be no such areas. Do you realize what this is? Either set your instrument right or throw it out...."

"The meter is accurate," Solovyev said.

Meanwhile, in the bunker Bryukhanov and Fomin were manning the telephones. Bryukhanov was in touch with Moscow while Fomin, with the block screen of the 4th Power Block Control.

The same information was being repeated dozens and hundreds of times to the Central Committee in Moscow, Minister Mayorets and Veretennikov, Soyuzatomenergo chief and, in Kiev, to Sklyarov, Ukrainian power industry minister and Revenko, obkom secretary: "The reactor is intact. We are pouring water on the system. The SUZ emergency container in the central hall has exploded. The explosion has lifted the roof. The radiation situation is within limits. One person is dead—Valeriy Khodemchuk. Vladimir Shashenko is in critical condition, with 100 percent burns."

"The radiation situation is within limits...." Just think. Naturally, he had instruments whose range of measurement did not exceed 1,000 microroentgen per second (or 3.6 roentgen per hour). But what was preventing Bryukhanov from having a sufficient number of instruments

with a greater measurement range? Why was it that the instruments were in the storage room while those used by the dosimetric personnel were inaccurate? Why did Bryukhanov ignore the report by Solovyev, the civil defense chief of the AES and fail to transmit to Moscow or Kiev his data on the radiation situation?

Naturally, this implied cowardice, fear of responsibility and, because of incompetence, disbelief in the possibility of such a terrible catastrophe. Yes, his mind refused to accept the situation. However, this only explains but does not justify his actions.

Moscow informed Bryukhanov that a governmental commission had been assembled, and that the first group of specialists would fly in from Moscow at 9:00 a.m.

"Hang in there! Keep cooling the reactor!"

Occasionally, Fomin would lose his composure. He would either fall into a state of stupor or plunge into feverish activities. His rich baritone voice was stressed to the limit. He pressured Akimov and Dyatlov, demanding that water be poured incessantly on the reactor, sending to the fourth block ever new replacements.

When Dyatlov was sent to the medical section, Fomin summoned Anatoliy Andreyevich Sitnikov, deputy chief engineer in charge of operations of the first section, and said: "You are an experienced physicist. Try to determine the condition of the reactor. You will act as outside observer, not as an interested liar. I beg of you. The best would be to climb on the roof of block 'C' and look down. How about it?..."

Sitnikov went to his death. He toured the entire reactor block and entered the central hall. There he realized that the reactor was destroyed. However, in order to see it personally, he went to the roof of block "C" (special chemical) from where he had a bird's eye view of the reactor. He saw a picture of incredible destruction.

He absorbed no less than 1.5 million roentgen. His central nervous system was exposed to radiation. At the Moscow Clinic a bone marrow transplant did not work and, despite all efforts, he died.

At 10 a.m. Sitnikov reported to Fomin and Bryukhanov that, in his view, the reactor was destroyed. The report submitted by Anatoliy Andreyevich Sitnikov annoyed them and was rejected. Water continued to be poured on the reactor.

**Testimony of Lyudmila Aleksandrovna Kharitonova**, senior engineer, production-executive department, construction administration, Chernobyl AES:

"On Saturday 26 April 1986, everyone was preparing for the celebration of May Day. The day was warm. It was spring. The flowers were blooming. My husband, chief of

sector in charge of ventilation, was planning to take the children to the dacha. Since the morning I had been hanging my washing out on the balcony.

"Most builders and assembly workers knew absolutely nothing of what was happening. We later heard something about an accident and fire at the fourth power block. But what precisely had taken place no one really knew.

"The children went to school, the small were playing on the street in sand piles or riding their bicycles. Not far from us on the street tasty donuts were being sold. I bought some. It was an ordinary day off.

"The construction workers went to work but returned soon afterwards, toward noon. My husband also went to work but came back soon afterwards. He said: 'There has been an accident. No one is allowed in. The station has been cordoned off....'

"We decided to go to the dacha but militiamen had set up road blocks and did not allow us to leave. We returned home. Strange though it may seem, we were still considering the accident as something that had nothing to do with our private lives, for there had been accidents in the past as well but they affected the station alone....

"They started washing the city after lunch. However, even this did not draw attention. This was an ordinary phenomenon on a hot summer day. Street washing trucks in summer are nothing unusual. It was an ordinary peaceful situation. I did note, incidentally, the white foam flowing along the gutters but paid no attention. I thought that this was because of strong water pressure.

"A group of the neighbor's children biked to the passageway (the bridge) from where the damaged block was clearly visible from the side of the Yanov Station. This, as we later found out, was the most radioactive place in the city, because the cloud with nuclear fallout had gathered over it. This, however, became clear subsequently. At that time, in the morning of 26 April, the children found it simply interesting to watch the fire.

"After lunch our children came back from school. They had been warned not to go on the street and to wash themselves at home. It was for the first time that we realized that something serious had happened.

"Different people found out about the accident at different times. By the evening of 26 April, however, virtually everyone knew. Nonetheless, everyone reacted calmly, for all stores, schools and establishments were open. Therefore, we thought, it was not all that dangerous.

"As the evening approached, we began to worry more. The concern had come who knows from where, perhaps from inside ourselves or from the air in which one could smell a strong metallic odor... I cannot even describe it precisely, but it was metallic...."

**Testimony of Gennadiy Nikolayevich Petrov, former chief, equipment section, Yuzhatomenergmontazh:**

"We woke up at 9:00 a.m. on 26 April. It was an ordinary day. There was sunshine and the sky was blue. I felt good, had come home to rest. I went out on the balcony to smoke a cigarette. The streets were already full of children.

"Toward noon the spirits were high. There was a sharpness in the air. It smelled of metal, of something sharp, and gave a sour taste in the mouth, as though one had touched a weak battery with one's tongue....

"At 11:00 a.m. our neighbor Mikhail Vasilyevich Metelev, an electrician, climbed on the roof to sun himself. Then, at one point, he went down to have a drink, saying that that day he was getting a real sunburn. He said that his skin felt hot all of a sudden. He said that the air was very stimulating. He invited me to join him but I refused. He said that he had no need for any sandy beach. Furthermore, he could see well the burning of the reactor against the background of the blue sky.

"Toward the evening the neighbor who had been sunbathing on the roof began to vomit violently and was taken to the medical center. Later, I believe, he was taken to Moscow or to Kiev. I do not know exactly where. However, this was considered an isolated case, for it was an ordinary summer day, it was sunny, the sky was blue, it was warm. So someone had fallen ill and the ambulance had come for him....

"All in all, it was an ordinary day."

**Testimony of L.A. Kharitonov:**

"As early as 26 April, in the second half of the day, some people, among them children in the schools, were warned not to leave home. Most of them paid no attention. Toward the evening it became clear that our concern was justified. People visited with each other and shared their fears. Many of them, the men in particular, brought alcohol. They were "deactivating themselves," for there was nothing else to do. Some women joined them. Most men and women felt cheerful. Prityat was quite lively, the people were active, as though preparing for some kind of huge carnival. Naturally, the May Day celebrations were approaching. However, the overexcitement of the people was striking."

Meanwhile, the members of the governmental commission were preparing for the flight at the Bykovo Airport, in Moscow. The commission included the following:



Yu.N. Shadrin, senior assistant to the prosecutor general; A.I. Mayorets, USSR Minister of Power Industry and Electrification; V.V. Marin, head of the nuclear power industry sector, CPSU Central Committee; A.N. Semenov, deputy minister of power industry; A.G. Meshkov, first deputy minister of medium machine building; M.S. Tsvirko, chief of Soyuzatomenergostroy; V.A. Shevelkin, deputy chief of Soyuzenergomontazh, L.P. Drach, B.Ye. Shcherbin's advisor; Ye.I. Vorobyev, USSR deputy minister of health; V.D. Turovskiy, representative of the USSR Ministry of Health, and others. In the cabin of the YAK-40, they sat next to each other on the red-upholstered seats. Marin shared his thoughts with the members of the commission:

"What pleased me most was that the nuclear reactor did not break down. Good man, this Dollezhal! Bryukhanov woke me up at 3:00 a.m., telling me that a terrible accident had happened but that the reactor was intact. They were pouring cooling water on it steadily."

"I think, Vladimir Vasilyevich," Mayorets joined in the conversation, "that we shall not stay long in Prityat."

Mayorets repeated this half an hour later in the AN-2 airplane on which the commission members flew from the Zhulyany Airport to Prityat. In Kiev they were joined by V.F. Sklyarov, Ukrainian SSR Minister of Power Industry. He retorted:

"It is my view that 2 days will not be enough...."

"Do not frighten us, Comrade Sklyarov. Our main task is to restore within the shortest possible time the destroyed block and connect it to the power grid."

Meanwhile, at approximately the same time B.Ye. Shcherbin, USSR deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, was flying from Barnaul to Moscow. From Moscow, the deputy chairman flew to Kiev from Vnukovo Airport. He arrived in Prityat toward 9:00 p.m.

By training and practical experience, Vladimir Vasilyevich Marin is an electric power plant construction engineer. He worked for many years at the construction trust in Voronezh and participated in the building of the Novovoronezh AES. In 1969 he was appointed by the CPSU Central Committee power industry instructor in the Heavy Industry and Power Industry Department. I came across him quite frequently at meetings of the collegiums of the Ministry of Power Industry, at party meetings, and at meetings on critical analysis of the work of nuclear power industry personnel employed at associations and main administrations. Marin actively participated in the work of the starting-up staffs of nuclear construction projects, knew personally the chiefs of construction administrations of all AES and, bypassing the USSR Minenergo, efficiently helped to provide the construction projects with equipment and material-technical and manpower resources.

Personally, I liked this big red-headed man with a thundering basso voice, very near-sighted, with glistening thick lenses, for his straight and clear way of thinking. He was an industrious and dynamic engineer who steadily worked to improve his skills. With all this, however, Marin was essentially a construction man, unfamiliar with the operations of a nuclear power plant. By the end of the 1970s, when I was department chief at the Soyuzatomenergo VPO, I saw him frequently at the Central Committee where, at that time, he was the only one in charge of the nuclear power industry. After our discussions, he usually allowed an aside, complaining of his work overload: "You have 10 men in your department while I have to take care by myself of the country's entire nuclear power industry...." He would ask: "Help me more efficiently, give me data, information...."

At the beginning of the 1980s, the Central Committee set up a nuclear power industry sector. It was headed by Marin and it was then, finally, that he was given assistants. One of them was G.A. Shasharin, an experienced nuclear power worker, who had spent many years running AES and who was to become later deputy minister of power industry in charge of nuclear power plant operations.

**Testimony by Vladimir Nikolayevich Shishkin**, deputy chief, Soyuzelektromontazh, USSR Minenergo, who attended the conference at the Prityat CPSU Gorkom, 26 April 1986:

Everyone gathered in the office of A.S. Gamanyuk, first gorkom secretary. The first speaker was G.A. Shasharin. He had already surmised that the reactor was destroyed. He had seen graphite on the soil and bits of fuel, but his mind refused to accept it. In any case, not immediately. The heart, the mind somehow required a smooth internal transition leading to the realization of this terrible, this truly catastrophic reality.

"A collective assessment is needed," Shasharin said. "The first block is de-energized. The transformers have been deactivated, to protect them from shorts. All cable half-floors have been flooded. In connection with the flooding of the distribution systems, the electricians at the marks with the minus sign were instructed to keep ready a 700-meter long power cable...."

"What kind of a plan is that?!" said Mayorets indignantly. "Why was the breaking of circuits not included in the plan?"

"Anatoliy Ivanovich, I am quoting a fact. Why is already another matter. In any case, cable is being located, water is being fed to the reactor, and pipelines are being cut off. Everything seems to indicate that there is high radioactivity everywhere around the fourth block."

"Anatoliy Ivanovich!" Shasharin thunderously interrupted Marin. "Gennadiy Aleksandrovich and I just visited the fourth block. The picture is terrible. It is

insane to even conceive of what has happened. There is a stench of burning and all around there is graphite. I even kicked a graphite block to make sure that that is what it was. Where did that graphite come from? How much graphite is there?!"

"Bryukhanov!" the minister turned to the AES director. "You reported that the radiation situation was normal. What is this graphite?"

"It is difficult even to conceive... The graphite we obtained for the fifth power unit under construction is intact, everything is in its place. I thought at first that it was that graphite but such is not the case. If such is the case release from the reactor is not excluded... partially. But then..."

"We are unable to measure the radioactivity precisely," Shasharin explained. "We believe that it is very high. There was a radiation instrument here but it was buried in the trash."

"This is scandalous! Why is the necessary equipment not available at the station?"

"The breakdown was unanticipated. The inconceivable has happened.... We asked Civil Defense and the chemical troops for help. It should arrive soon."

Most likely, all those responsible for the catastrophe wanted only one thing: to postpone the time of full admission. They wanted, as they had been accustomed to doing before Chernobyl, for the responsibility and the guilt imperceptibly to be spread among everyone, quietly. That was precisely why they dragged things out when every minute counted, when delays threatened the innocent population of the city with radiation, when the word "evacuation" was beginning to pound at the minds....

"Despite the difficult and even severe situation at the accident block, the situation in Prityat is normal and calm," Gamanyuk reported to Mayorets (at the time of the accident he was having tests done at the medical center but on the morning of 26 April he got out of his hospital bed and went to work). "There is no panic or disorder. This is an ordinary day off. Children are playing on the streets, there are sports competitions, the schools are open. Even marriages are being performed. Today there were 16 Komsomol-youth marriages. We are blocking misinterpretations and big talk. On the damaged block there have been casualties. Two operational workers—Valeriy Khodemchuk and Vladimir Shashenok—are dead. Twelve people are in the medical center in a critical situation. Another 40 people in less severe condition were hospitalized later. Casualties are continuing to arrive."

Gennadiy Vasilyevich Berdov, a tall, gray-haired, quiet MVD major general, deputy minister of internal affairs of the Ukrainian SSR, reached Prityat at 5:00 a.m. on 26 April. He was wearing his new recently sewed uniform.

"Anatoliy Ivanovich," General Berdov reported. "At 5:00 a.m. I visited the damaged power unit. Militia detachments have taken over from the fire fighters. They have blocked all access roads to the AES and the settlement, particularly the fishing spots of the cooling water reservoir." (Let us mention at this point that General Berdov, sensing the danger, had no idea of what it actually was, for which reason his militiamen were not issued dosimeters and individual means of protection, for which reason every single one of them received an excessive dose of radiation. Intuitively, however, they acted accurately by drastically limiting access to the presumed danger area—author). "An operative staff was set up and is in operation at the Prityat militia section. They are helped by personnel of the Polesye, Ivankovo and Chernobyl Rayon sections. More than a thousand MVD personnel arrived at the accident area by 7:00 a.m. The detachments of the transportation militia at the Yanov Railroad Station have been reinforced. Trains carrying most valuable equipment were at the station at the time of the explosion. Passenger trains and locomotive crews are coming in and the passengers are totally unaware of the situation. This is summer, the windows on the coaches are open, and the tracks are no more than 500 meters away from the damaged block. Train movements must be blocked." (Let us mention General Berdov once again. Of all those assembled, he was the first properly to assess the situation—author). "Standing on guard are not only sergeants and master sergeants but also militia colonels. I personally check the roadblocks at the danger zone. Not a single person has refused to carry out his service. Extensive work has been done at the automotive facilities in Kiev. Should it become necessary to evacuate the population, 1,100 buses are ready to go to Chernobyl and are standing by for the instructions of the governmental commission...."

"Why are you talking to me about evacuation? the minister exploded. "Is it panic that you want? As soon as we stop the reactor everything will end. The radiation will drop to normal. What is the situation with the reactor, Comrade Shasharin?"

"According to Fomin and Bryukhanov, the workers have suppressed it by activating the fifth-grade protective screening" (Shasharin was justified in saying that, for he had still not seen personally the destruction from a helicopter...—author).

"And where are the operators? Could they be summoned?" the minister insisted.

"They are at the medical center, Anatoliy Ivanovich.... Their condition is critical."

"I suggested evacuation early in the morning," dully said Bryukhanov. "I asked Moscow. I was told, however, that until Shcherbin came nothing should be done in that connection, and panic should be prevented."

"What is Civil Defense saying?"

Solovyev, that same civil defense chief of the AES who, in the first 2 hours following the explosion, using the only available radiation meter with a 250 roentgen scale, had determined the dangerous extent of radiation, rose (the reader knows of Bryukhanov's reaction. Let us add, however, that during the night Solovyev repeated the alarm for the benefit of the republic's Civil Defense, which is extremely praiseworthy—author).

"The needle jumped the scale past 250 roentgen in the area of the cave-in, the machine hall, the central hall and other places around the block and inside it. Urgent evacuation is needed, Anatoliy Ivanovich."

Turovskiy, the representative of the USSR Ministry of Health, stood up:

"Evacuation is necessary. What we have seen at the medical center... I am referring to the sick... they are in critical condition. According to initial assessments, the dose exceeds by 300 to 500 percent the lethal dose. A dispersion of radioactivity at a great distance from the center of the power block is unquestionable."

"And what if you are wrong?" Mayorets asked, holding back his displeasure. "Let us study the situation and make a decision."

**Testimony by G.N. Petrov**, former chief of the procurement department, Prityat Yuzhatomenergmontazh Administration:

"Precisely at 1400 hours, on 27 April, buses were sent to each approach. The people were warned once again on the radio to dress lightly, to take a minimum of things with them, and told that they would return in 3 days. At that very time I unwittingly thought: If people are allowed to take lots of things even a thousand buses will not suffice.

"Most people obeyed and did not even take spare cash. Generally speaking, we have good people: they joked, they cheered one another, they calmed down the children. They told them, we shall go visit grandma... we shall go to a movie festival and the circus.... The older children were pale, sad and silent. In addition to radiation, forced cheer and concern were hanging in the air. Everything, however, was done efficiently. Many people had come ahead of time and were crowding around, holding their children. They kept asking to go inside. The moment it was announced that they could get into the buses they left the doorways and immediately climbed in.

"They were taken to Ivankovo, (60 kilometers away from Prityat) and dispersed in the villages. They were not welcomed everywhere. One kulak did not let my family inside his huge brick house, but not because of the danger of radiation (which he did not understand and remained impervious to explanations), but because of meanness. He said he had not built this house for strangers to come in....

"Many people who came off the bus in Ivankovo, kept going, walking toward Kiev or every which way. A helicopter pilot I know told me later what he had seen from the air: huge crowds of lightly dressed men, women with children, and old people walking down the road and along the shoulders, in the direction of Kiev. Some of them had already reached the Irpni and Brovarov area. Cars kept dispersing the crowds while the people kept walking on and on...."

The population of villages and farms in the vicinity of the AES were evacuated as well. Anatoliy Ivanovich Zayats (Yuzhatomenergmontazh Trust chief engineer), assisted by a group of people, some of whom were hunters with their weapons, went from door to door, explaining to the people that they had to leave their homes. The state will compensate them in full for everything. Everything will be all right. The people, however, neither understood nor wanted to understand: "How come?... the sun is shining, everything is growing, there are flowers, gardens,?..."

Many residents, being told that the cattle should not be let to eat grass, chased their cows, sheep and goats to the roofs of their barns and kept them there to prevent them from grazing. They thought that this would not last long, a day or two, and then everything would go back to normal. Again and again we had to explain to them the situation. The cattle were shot, and the people were taken to safety....

4

On arrival in Chernobyl, I immediately went to see V.T. Kizima, chief of the construction administration of the Chernobyl AES.

Several people were coming out of Kizima's office. They were excited. Alone, Kizima was in the process of opening a can of mango. Bits of flint of the Petryanov gas mask hung on his cheeks.

"Greetings, Vasily Trofimovich!" "Well, greetings to the Muscovite!" he answered sadly. He nodded at the can: "Vitamins, the entire set. Helps against radiation." He drank thirstily, his Adam's apple bobbing.

The telephone rang. Kizima picked up the receiver.

"Yes! Kizima.... Yes Anatoliy Ivanovich.... It is the minister," he whispered to me covering the receiver with his hand. "Yes, yes, will do. Paper and pencil? I have



them. I am drawing a slanted line, 45 degrees.... Now vertical... yes... now horizontal... I have it.... It is a rectangular triangle. Is that all?" He kept listening for awhile and then put the receiver down. "You understand, I am now a clerk. Minister Mayorets is a senior clerk and Comrade Silayev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, is now chief of construction project. This is what the minister rang about. To give me a drawing by telephone. A triangle...." Kizima showed me the paper. "This is the dump near the block. He says to pour cement on it. It is as though I am a first grader and know nothing. I toured this pile on the 26th of April, in the morning. Then I went there several times. And it is only now that he is telling me... you see, he is asking me to draw a triangle. So I drew it and now what? Honestly speaking, I do not need them, neither ministers nor deputy chairmen. We have a construction site here, it is dangerous because of radiation but is nonetheless a construction project. I am chief of the construction project. I have enough scientific consultants, the military are to organize a command and maintain order. Naturally, there are the people. The people have scattered around. I mean by this the regular construction personnel and management. More than 3,000 people left without documents and passes. There is one dosimeter for 25 people, and even it is out of order. But even the one out of order is working as if by magic. The people trust this bit of iron and without it they will not expose themselves to radiation. You have a dosimeter.... Give it to me. I can send another 25 people with it."

"When I return from Prityat I will give it to you," I promised him....

During my trip to Prityat to see the destroyed power block, I saw soldiers and officers collecting fuel and graphite with their bare hands. They walked around with buckets and collected and poured into containers. Graphite had spread beyond the fence as well, and was near our car. I opened the door, put down the dosimeter, almost by the graphite block. Two thousand roentgen per hour. I closed the door. It smelled of ozone, burned materials, dust and something else, perhaps burned human flesh. After collecting a full bucket, slowly, it seemed to me, the soldiers walked to the metal containers where they emptied the content of the bucket. My dears, I thought, what a terrible crop you are harvesting.... The harvest of the past 20 years.... But where are those millions of rubles appropriated by the state for the development of robots and manipulators? Where? Did somebody steal the money? Did somebody waste it? The faces of soldiers and officers were dark brown: radiation burn. The meteorologists were promising heavy downpours and, in order for the radiation not to sink into the ground with the rain, people had come, instead of the robots of which there were none. Subsequently, informed of this, Academician Aleksandrov said indignantly: "At Chernobyl they are not sparing the people. All of this will fall on me..." However, he was not indignant when he built the RBMK Explosive Reactor in the Ukraine....

#### Testimony by V.G. Smagin, chief of shift, block No 4:

"In Moscow, in clinic No 6, on Shchukinskaya, the casualties were hospitalized first on the fourth and then on the sixth floor. The more severe cases, firemen and operational workers, were on the eighth. The firemen included Vashchuk, Ignatenko, Pravik, Kibenok, Titenok and Tishchura; the operators were Akimov, Toptunov, Perevozchenko, Brazhnik, Proskuryakov, Kudryavtsev, Perchuk, Vershinin, Kurguz, Novik, and others.

"They were put in separate sterile wards which were exposed to quartz light several times daily, according to schedule. The quartz lamps were directed toward the ceiling, so that the rays would not burn the people. The physiological solution which was injected into us at the Prityat Medical Center had had a good effect on many people. It had taken care of the poisoning triggered by the radiation. People who had absorbed doses of up to 400 rads felt best of all. The others were worse, they had severe pains in the parts of their skin which had been exposed to radiation and burned by the fire. The pain on the skin wore them out, killed them inside their bodies....

"Sasha Akimov spent the first 2 days, on 28 and 29 April, in our ward. The color of his skin was dark brown from the nuclear burn, and he was very depressed. He kept repeating over and over again that he did not understand why the stuff had exploded, for everything was perfect and until the screen had been activated, no single parameter had shown any deviation. 'This tortures me worse than the pain,' he told me on 29 April, the day he died....

"I visited Proskuryakov 2 days before his death. He was lying on a slanted bed. His mouth had become monstrously inflated. There was no left skin on his face. He was naked. His chest was covered with plaster. Lamps were burning over him. He kept asking for something to drink. I was carrying some mango juice. I asked him if he wanted that. He said he did, he did very much. He was fed up, he said, with mineral water. There was a borzhoma bottle on a table next to him. I filled it with the juice. I left the can with the juice and asked the nurse to give it to him. He had no relatives in Moscow. For some reason, no one else came to see him....

"Many of those who were already thought to be recovering died suddenly. It is thus that Anatoliy Sitnikov, deputy chief engineer in charge of operations of the first section, died suddenly, 35 days later. He had had two bone marrow transplants. However, his body rejected it because of incompatibility.

"Everyday those who were recovering would gather in the smoking room of the sixth clinic, and everyone was tortured by the same question: Why the explosion? They kept guessing...."

**Testimony of A.M. Khodakovskiy**, deputy general director of the Atomenergoremont Production Association:

"As instructed by the leadership of the USSR Minenergo, I was in charge of burying those who had died from radiation at Chernobyl. On 10 July 1986 28 people had been buried.

"Many of the corpses were highly radioactive. Neither I nor the personnel at the morgue were aware of this. We subsequently and accidentally took a reading and saw the high radiation. We began to wear lead-lined clothing.

"Finding out that the corpses were radioactive, the sanitary epidemiological station demanded that two of the graves be covered with concrete, like we do with nuclear reactors, so that the radioactive juices from the corpses would not reach ground waters. We had a long argument with them. Finally, we agreed that the highly radioactive corpses would be put in zinc caskets. That is what we did.

"In clinic No 6, 60 days later after the explosion, in July 1986 there were another 19 people undergoing treatment. Suddenly, in one of them, on the 60th day, burn spots appeared on the body although he generally felt well. The same occurred to me." Khodakovskiy pulled up his shirt and showed the differently shaped dark brown spots on his stomach. "These are burn spots from work with the radioactive corpses...."

**Testimony by V.G. Smagin:**

"Nikolay Maksimovich Fomin, the chief engineer of the Chernobyl AES, underwent treatment at Clinic No 6. He stayed there a month. After his release and shortly before his detention, he and I were having lunch in a coffee shop. He was pale and depressed. He asked me: 'Vitya, what do you think they will do to me? Will they hang me?' 'Why, Maksimych?' I asked him. 'Have courage, go all the way.'...

"Dyatlov and I were in the clinic together at one point. Before his release, he said: 'It is clear that they will try me. But if they let me speak and if they listen, I will tell them that I had done everything right.'

"Shortly before his detention, he met with Bryukhanov. He said: 'Nobody needs me. I am waiting to be arrested. I went to see the prosecutor general to ask him where I should be and what to do...' 'What did the prosecutor tell you?' 'Wait, he told me, you will be summoned....'"

Bryukhanov, Dyatlov and Fomin were arrested in August 1986.

"Bryukhanov was calm. He took in his cell textbooks to study English. He said that now he, like Frunze, was sentenced to death...."

Dyatlov too was calm and restrained.

Fomin collapsed. He went into hysterics. In his cell he tried to kill himself. He broke his glasses and with bits of glass opened his veins. He was detected on time and rescued. On 24 March 1987 the court declared Fomin unable to stand trial.

I looked for and met with the deputy chief of the turbine shop of block No 4, Razim Ilgamovich Davletbayev. He was at the BShChU-4 at the time of the explosion. He was exposed to 300 roentgen during the accident. He looked very sick. He was bothered by radiation hepatitis. His face was badly swollen. His eyes looked sick, bloody. However, he kept up his courage. He was restrained. Despite his disability he was working. That was a courageous person.

I asked him to describe what had happened on the night of 26 April 1986. He told me that the first department had forbidden him to discuss the equipment. I told him that I knew all about the equipment, even better than he did. I needed details about the people. However, Razim Ilgamovich was brief: "By the time the firemen appeared at the machine hall, everything had already been done by the operational personnel. During the repair work in the machine hall, on several occasions I ran to the block control screen to report to the chief of shift. Akimov was calm and issued clear orders. When everything started, everyone was calm, for by virtue of our profession we were ready for such a thing. Naturally, not to such an extent but nonetheless...." It was clear that Davletbayev was trying to keep within the limits permitted by the first department. I did not interrupt him. He described Aleksandr Akimov, his duty supervisor: "Akimov is a very decent and conscientious person. He is pleasant and communicative. He is a member of the Prityat Party Gorkom. He is a good comrade...." He refused to speak about Bryukhanov. He said: "I do not know Bryukhanov."

He expressed his view on the press which published reports from Chernobyl: "They described us, the operational workers, as illiterate people, virtual criminals. For that reason, it was under the influence of the press at the Mitinskoye Cemetery, where our boys were buried, that their photographs were removed from their graves. The only one spared was Toptunov. He was very young, inexperienced. They think of us as criminals. Yet, for 10 years the Chernobyl AES produced electric power. It is hard work, you know. We worked...." "When did you leave the block?" "At 5:00 a.m. I began to vomit violently. Nonetheless, we were able to do everything: We put out the fire inside the machine hall and removed the hydrogen from the generator and replaced the oil in the oil tank of the turbine with water. We were not simple performers. We reinterpreted a number of things. The process was already under way, however, what I mean is the technological process at the time of the switch of the shifts. It was impossible to stop it. However, we were not simple performers...."

Yes, I agree with Davletbayev about many things. Nuclear power operators are not simply performers. In the course of running nuclear power plants they must make a large number of independent and crucial decisions, frequently quite risky, to save a block, and come out honorably from an accident or a difficult transitional situation. The entire variety of all possible combinations of systems and faults, unfortunately, cannot be covered by instructions and regulations. What matter here are experience and professionalism. Davletbayev is right in saying that after the explosion the operators displayed miracles of heroism and fearlessness. They are worthy of reverence.

This, however, was after the explosion....

On the first anniversary of the Chernobyl catastrophe I visited the Mitinskoye Cemetery to pay my respect to the memory of the firemen and nuclear operators who had died. From the Planernaya Subway Station I took bus No 741 and 20 minutes later, directly past the town of Mitino comes the huge city of the dead.

This is a very new, clean cemetery. The graves disappear over the horizon.

I walked down the graves and stopped for a long time at each one of them. I put flowers. Firemen and six nuclear power operators died in terrible pain from 11 to 17 May 1986. Some were exposed to heavy doses of radiation. More among them absorbed radionuclei. Their bodies were strongly radioactive and, as I already wrote, they were buried in zinc caskets. This was required by the sanitary epidemiological station and I thought about it with bitterness, for the earth was blocked from doing its final work, that of turning the bodies of the dead into dust. Accursed nuclear century! Even here, in the age-old end of man, tradition thousands of years old was being violated. It was impossible even to give the people to the earth. That is what happened....

Nonetheless, I tell them this: May your dust rest in peace. Sleep in peace. Your death woke up the people, pulled them out of blind dull obedience.

Let us bow our heads to them, the martyrs and heroes of Chernobyl.

What was the main lesson?

The most important one was the feeling of the frailty of human life, its vulnerability. Chernobyl proved the omnipotence and helplessness of man. It gave us a warning: Man, do not become intoxicated with your omnipotence, do not joke with this, for you are both the cause and the consequence....

In the final account, this is the most painful: Those strings of chromosomes, cut off by radiation, and killed or distorted genes are now part of the future. They are gone....

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**A Course Toward Perestroika and Renovation**  
18020010k Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 4,  
Mar 89 (signed to press 22 Feb 89) pp 106-109

[Review by Sh. Nadirov of the book "Izbrannyye Stati i Rechi" [Selected Articles and Speeches] by Jambyn Batmonh. Politizdat, Moscow, 1988, 335 pp]

[Text] A collection of J. Batmonh's articles and speeches has come out in Moscow, extensively describing the domestic and foreign policy of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party and the life and activities of the working people in Socialist Mongolia; the book opens with the speech delivered at the MPRP Central Committee Plenum, in August 1984. The main concepts expressed at the plenum, which became programmatic, were confirmed and developed at the 19th Party Congress, which took place in May 1986.

In speaking of the unquestionable historical gains of the republic under the people's regime, the Central Committee general secretary also points out that they would have been immeasurably greater had the existing possibilities been used more fully. The idea of "providing an accurate and objective evaluation of the state of affairs" was in response to the demand of the time (p 4). At the 19th Congress, after being further developed and concretized, it became an appeal addressed to the entire party and all working people. "We must," Batmonh said, "resolve in a businesslike manner the existing problems in the development of society. We must expose shortcomings and omissions most frankly and exigently, with principle and party-mindedness. We must totally abandon anything that is obsolete and hinders our progress" (p 148).

After a long period of placidity and complacency in social life, in the course of which the activities of party, state and other organizations and citizens were strictly regulated, this was indeed a new approach. It virtually eliminated the old prohibitions and restrictions which fettered creative thinking and initiative and excluded any attempt at going beyond systems and dogmatic formulations.

The beneficial impact of this approach affected above all the work of the 19th MPRP Congress. For the first time in many years the party forum took place in an atmosphere of sharpest possible criticism and self-criticism, and high exigency toward the activities of party and state authorities, primary as well as central.

It is since then that a process of expanding glasnost and democracy and of increased sociopolitical activeness by the party members and working people, the scientific and creative intelligentsia above all, began in the country. An essentially important result of the all-round analysis of the country's socioeconomic problems and a search of ways to solve them and, on this basis, to reach



new heights in its development, were included in the MPRP conclusion: a restructuring must take place, which would encompass as a whole the economy, the political system and the social and spiritual areas. The press and other mass information media played a worthy role in these changes, describing the pressing problems of the country and showing their concern for the moral condition of the society.

The economic reform was initiated in the middle of 1987, after comprehensive discussions. It includes a conversion from the predominant command-administrative methods for managing the national economy to primarily economic methods and introducing in public production cost accounting and self-financing and increasing the autonomy of enterprises. However, many people in the country are still questioning the reality of the planned program for social change. Conservative forces, interested in preserving the old order, are greatly obstructing the developing process. Under these circumstances, making creative use of the experience of the CPSU and of the other fraternal parties, the MPRP is enhancing its activities and improving their quality.

In recent years great efforts have been made to upgrade the efficiency of the entire national economic complex. Good possibilities are appearing for the development of light industry. Demand abroad for goods produced by the Mongolian People's Republic is increasing. Full use is made of the industrial potential and the reconstruction and modernization of a number of important enterprises is under way.

Nonetheless, Today many scientists and specialists are linking the radical solution of these problems to substantial changes in the structure of the domestic industry and, in particular, the creation of a number of modern mostly small and medium-sized enterprises which would undertake the profound processing of mineral and agricultural raw materials and the production of goods ready for consumption and export. In order to attract the latest equipment and technology, possibilities are being studied for diversifying the foreign economic relations of the Mongolian People's Republic and developing cooperation with Western countries.

A difficult situation has developed in animal husbandry, a sector which determines to a decisive extent the living standard of the population and the possibilities of an upsurge in light industry and the country's export resources. In the assessment of the 4th Plenum of the MPRP Central Committee (1987) stagnation continues to prevail in that area. The size of the cattle herds has remained on the 1970 level. Yet, since the population here is increasing rapidly (2.8 percent annually), the chronic lag in animal husbandry has caused a tangible drop in meat consumption, and major difficulties in supplying the urban population with meat.

Having especially considered the problem of animal husbandry and improving cultural and living conditions for the rural population, the 4th MPRP Central Committee Plenum earmarked a broad program of economic and organizational steps to develop this sector. It calls, among others, for strengthening its scientific and material and technical base, extensive use of leasing and contracting, creating favorable working and living conditions for livestock breeders, and training cadres of specialists.

After emphasizing the significance of the intended steps, J. Batmonh stated that they cannot be implemented without waging a comprehensive struggle against anything which seriously hinders progress and against conservatism, bureaucratism, paper shuffling, a bureaucratic attitude toward the work and waiting for instructions. In this connection, the task was set to start by raising the work of the party organizations, which would implement the role of political vanguard of the society without taking over from state and economic authorities, to the level of contemporary requirements. Party work, as was pointed out at the 19th MPRP Congress, must support and encourage the activeness and initiative of economic organizations and cultural institutions. It must upgrade their responsibility for the implementation of the party's socioeconomic policy, control the end results of their activities and promptly identify and eliminate reasons for omissions and shortcomings.

Under the conditions of increasing glasnost and democracy, life has set for MPRP ideological work high and strict requirements. It is above all the theoretical problems of the building of socialism and the activities of the party and the country's state authorities that assume great importance. We know that the current MPRP Program, which was adopted in 1966, called for completing the laying of the material and technical foundations for socialism in the Mongolian People's Republic. It was pointed out, in particular, that by the end of the 1970s the Mongolian People's Republic would become an industrial-agrarian country, which would mean completing the building of a socialist society. However, as was emphasized at the 5th MPRP Central Committee Plenum (1988), "there was a wide gap between this stipulation and real life." It proved unrealistic and premature. That is why the decision was made to introduce corresponding amendments and supplements to the party program.

Having noted that the theoretical interpretation of the building of socialism is lagging behind contemporary requirements, the 19th MPRP Congress appealed to the social scientists to engage in creative scientific studies and to "enhance in scientific circles the method of creative discussions which would lead to the truth and encourage a taste for theory" (p 200).

It is a question of enhancing the socioeconomic sciences to a level consistent with the tasks of perestroika and

their orientation toward the profound study of the problems of building socialism in Mongolia, boldly identifying the contradictions in social developments and formulating measures for their solution, and actively contributing to the cleansing of society from remaining deformations in the country's life. Discussion were sponsored by the MPRP Central Committee. On some of the topical problems, articles which were of great interest in the republic and abroad were published in the central press and the journals.

The work currently being done by Mongolian social scientists confirms the potential opportunities for the scientific study of vital problems. As the newspaper UNEN pointed out last August, today the status of Mongolian society "is defined by the fact that it has already matured for a more profound knowledge of itself and for eliminating distortions in the fundamental principles of Marxism-Leninism. The steps being taken in the spiritual area are aimed at putting in motion social thinking, developing pluralism of views and broadening the ranks of those who can think and act independently."

Problems of the development of national culture and a careful attitude toward historical monuments trigger particularly great interest in the country. Cases of mechanical introduction in Mongolian social life of the experience of foreign countries, of belittling national values, which has harmed upbringing, above all that of the youth, and a disrespectful attitude toward the history and culture of the Mongolian people are criticized sharply.

Taking these aspects into consideration, in the course of its ideological work the MPRP is concentrating on developing in the members of society labor activeness, loyalty to the homeland and a thrifty attitude toward its natural resources. Particular attention is being paid to the study of Marxism-Leninism, the achievements of world culture and the development of internationalist views and convictions in the people. In the past the one-sided and dogmatic understanding of the ideas of internationalism led to taking hasty steps which hindered the development of important elements of national culture and the growth of national self-awareness. Today the negative consequences of this are being gradually eliminated.

Social thinking in present-day Mongolia is noted for its freedom, daring and aspiration to be rid of obsolete concepts and dogmas. An urgently raised question is that of making a deeper study of the history of the people, its accurate interpretation, revising assessments of individual stages in the establishment and development of the Mongolian People's Republic, and restoring the names of noted leaders, suppressed for reasons of circumstantial considerations.

The December 1988 MPRP Central Committee Plenum, at which the report submitted by J. Batmonh on the new tasks of organizational-party and ideological work was

discussed, provided answers to many pressing problems of social life in the country. The plenum condemned the cult of personality of H. Choybalsan, which developed under the influence of the cult of J. Stalin's personality. In the 1930s and 1940s, this distortion of democratic rule triggered arbitrariness in social life in Mongolia, as well as mass repressions, as a result of which many noted political leaders, military commanders and men of culture were physically eliminated. Violations of collective government of the country, and legality, and groundless settling of accounts with unsuitable people were continued in subsequent decades as well, when Yu. Tsedenbal held high positions in the party and the state.

Having exposed the roots of the deformations which were allowed to occur in the ideological and organizational activities of the party and state agencies, the MPRP Central Committee Plenum earmarked ways of improving the political system in Mongolian society. This meant above all the democratization of social life in the country, and the broadening of glasnost. A clear demarcation among the functions of party, state and economic authorities, strengthening the role of the people's assemblies on all levels, as the political foundations of the state, and periodical replaceability of leading personnel are stipulated. The task has been set of establishing a socialist state of law.

The successful implementation of the plenum's resolutions will accelerate Mongolian socioeconomic development and the creation within the country of a political situation in which the working person will be the true master of his country.

Large sections of the book deal with Mongolian foreign policy, distinguished by its consistency and principledness in the struggle for strengthening friendship and cooperation among the peoples and peace on earth. The MPRP bases its foreign political activities on the steady intensification and expansion of Mongolian-Soviet relations.

Soviet-Mongolian cooperation particularly expanded in the past 40 years. It encompasses virtually all economic and cultural sectors and the areas of military and international activities of the two states. It involves dozens of departments and social organizations, enterprises, farms and various detachments of working people. In describing relations between the Mongolian and Soviet peoples, in his speech at the 27th CPSU Congress J. Batmonh said: "Our friendship, in which we see an efficient guarantee for the blossoming of socialist Mongolia and its free and independent development, is a great constructive force."

The CPSU and the MPRP are intensively cooperating with each other. There is a constant exchange of experience between party organizations in the areas of organizational-party and ideological activities and the management of various economic sectors. Regular friendly meetings are being held between the heads of the two

fraternal parties, in the course of which the strategy of Soviet-Mongolian interaction, its further expansion and its intensification are defined; topical problems of international life are discussed and steps for the joint struggle for strengthening the peace and security of the peoples are formulated.

The Mongolian working people are showing great interest in perestroika in our country. Accepting with satisfaction the profound social changes taking place in the Soviet Union, the MPRP interprets their nature for the benefit of all strata of Mongolian society and directs the party members and the working people toward the creative utilization of Soviet experience in perestroika and renovation in the Mongolian People's Republic.

Cooperation between the CPSU and the MPRP in training cadres for Mongolian party and state agencies is of major importance. Mongolians attend party schools in Moscow and Novosibirsk. Every year between 60 and 80 leading Mongolian workers (first secretaries of aymak MPRP committees, chairmen of aymak managements of councils of people's deputies, ministers and senior personnel of the MPRP Central Committee apparatus) attend the short courses offered by the CPSU Central Committee Academy of Social Sciences. The programs for such courses stipulate, in addition to the study of the theoretical problems of Marxism-Leninism, the extensive study of the work of CPSU party organizations.

Economic cooperation between the two countries, the amount of which is steadily increasing, plays a major role in Soviet-Mongolian relations. The Erdenet Ore Mining and Concentration Copper-Molybdenum Combine, the Mongolsovtsvetmet Association, which are joint Soviet-Mongolian enterprises, and many other big plants and factories and modern farms, built with the technical and economic assistance of the Soviet Union, are making a substantial contribution to the development of Mongolian production forces.

However, as was pointed out in the course of the friendly talk between M.S. Gorbachev, CPSU Central Committee general secretary, and J. Batmonh, "a task which remains topical is that of further enhancing the efficiency of bilateral economic relations." Having noted that in this area available possibilities had by no means been activated fully, the leaders of the CPSU and the MPRP indicated the need to strengthen thrift and to ensure the most efficient utilization of material and financial resources.

In accordance with the Long-Term Program for the Development of Economic and Scientific and Technical Cooperation Between the Soviet Union and the Mongolian People's Republic Until the Year 2000, which was concluded in August 1985 by the heads of the CPSU and the MPRP, and the concept of development of economic relations between the USSR and the Mongolian People's Republic for the period until the year 2005, which was signed last July by the heads of the governments,

national economic relations between the two countries will be substantially expanded. These documents stipulate measures leading to the intensification of interaction in material production, science and technology, training Mongolian cadres, developing the nonproduction area and strengthening the material base for social services. The efforts will be directed toward the maximal utilization of Mongolian production potential, which increased with the help of the technical and economic assistance provided by the Soviet Union. The plans call for the retooling and expanding and modernizing of existing enterprises, installing contemporary machines and equipment and applying the latest technologies, and ensuring the full utilization of manpower in industry.

Progressive structural changes are taking place in Mongolian material production. In addition to the further development of the ore mining industry, the plans call for the creation of industrial processing sectors and developing in Mongolia a domestic base for the production of various types of machines, equipment and instruments based on specialization and cooperation with enterprises in the Soviet Union, mainly those located in Siberia and the Far East. This involves, above all, machines for animal husbandry and feed production, instruments, assemblies and parts for metal processing machine tools, individual types of electrical engineering goods and wind-powered electric power-generating plants. The possibilities of organizing the manufacturing of individual components of electronic equipment and means of communications will be studied.

These documents encourage the steady advancement of forms of cooperation and enhancement of its efficiency. In particular, they call for the organization of new joint enterprises, for establishing direct production relations between similar organizations in the Soviet Union and Mongolia, and for organizing cooperatives. They are distinguished by a clearly expressed social trend: Soviet-Mongolian cooperation is concentrated mainly on the development of economic units which determine the solution of urgent social problems.

Reciprocal coordination and dynamism are typical of cooperation between the Soviet Union and Mongolia in the area of foreign policy. Mongolia welcomed with satisfaction the new political thinking in international affairs suggested by the Soviet leadership. Through its own foreign policy relations and international meetings and fora, it actively supports the Soviet steps aimed at normalizing the situation in the world, eliminating hotbeds of military conflicts and wars, and developing friendship and cooperation among countries.

In turn, the Soviet Union supports Mongolian foreign policy initiatives. This includes, above all, the idea formulated at the 19th MPRP Congress on creating a mechanism which would exclude the use of force in relations among countries in Asia and the Pacific Rim. Mongolia shares the familiar peaceful initiatives of the



Korean People's Democratic Republic, Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia and the concept of collective security in the Asian-Pacific area, suggested by the USSR.

The consultative meeting among representatives of communist and worker parties of the countries in that area, which took place in July 1987 in Ulan Bator, on the initiative of the MPRP, was a significant contribution to the struggle for peace and cooperation among the peoples of Asia and the Pacific Rim. The ideas and spirit of the meeting, which was first of its kind in the history of the communist and worker movements in the area, met with a broad positive response throughout the world.

The creation of an atmosphere of reciprocal trust among countries in the Asian and Pacific areas is helped by the decision of the Soviet and Mongolian governments on the withdrawal from Mongolian territory three-quarters of the Soviet forces deployed in it.

Soviet-Mongolian cooperation, distinguished by its broad scale and major constructive force, is consistent with the basic interests of the Soviet and Mongolian peoples and the interests of strengthening the unity and cohesion among socialist countries. J. Batmonh emphasizes in his book. It is steadily developing and improving, and acquiring a new meaning.

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### What Is Security Worth?

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[Article by Yevgeniy Vasilyevich Shashkov, KOMMUNIST deputy editor, International Relations Department]

[Text] The practical steps taken by our country in the area of disarmament, proclaimed by M.S. Gorbachev from the rostrum of the 43rd UN General Assembly, which stipulates substantial reductions in the Armed Forces of the USSR over the next 2 years, were received throughout the world with tremendous interest. In most concise terms, the international significance of this decision is that it will provide a strong impetus to reducing confrontation in Europe and throughout the world as a whole as well as the military power of the Warsaw Pact and NATO for the sake of upgrading universal security. This is a major contribution to the steps aimed at the demilitarization of international relations and strengthening the new reality which has appeared of late: a turn from the principle of superarmament to the principle of sensible defense sufficiency.

This step is of tremendous importance in strengthening our national security as well for, in the broad meaning of the term, national security means not only the existence of suitably trained and equipped armed forces, which are capable of carrying out their mission assigned to them on

the basis of the military doctrine of the state. It also means economic power and the social well-being of the country and its people. A chronically unstable economy, protected by an oversaturated military machine, is hardly a normal phenomenon.

We have now decided independently to break the vicious circle of the arms race. The major reduction in the Armed Forces will be unilateral. This decision is unrelated to the talks mandated by the Vienna meeting. Finally, we shall no longer make limitations on our own military potential to the level of sensible sufficiency dependent on the "good will" of our partners in the talk. For 15 years we engaged in fruitless bargaining with the West on mutual reduction in conventional armaments but, as it were, we were unable to obtain its agreement to make any whatsoever changes in this area, although they would have been consistent with our interests and, in particular, would have substantially eased the burden of the military budget. For even since the age of the classical economists, such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo, we have known that diverting resources for unproductive military activities slows down economic growth and worsens inflation.

Data to the effect that the income earned by our state has fallen behind expenditures and that we shall fall short by several tens of billions of rubles in 1989 in order to meet them, were made public in October 1988. This announcement did not create a sensation either among economists or the general public. It was accepted as an acknowledgment of something that had long become obvious as the result of a long-practiced policy according to which most important domestic policy actions (the BAM, the Nonchernozem, reclamation, etc.) were being decided without any thorough analysis of the country's possibility or consideration of actual returns on their implementation. This political arbitrariness, which turned into economic squandering, has been repeatedly "anathematized" from high rostrums and in the press. However, "our" inflation has yet another component: foreign policy and military-strategic planning based on outlays, which became particularly apparent during the period of "stagnation," and the wasteful activities in the USSR defense complex.

The use of purely economic terms in this area may seem paradoxical. However, today it has acquired a most profound meaning and has become a pressing need. Anything we do in the international arena, and our entire foreign policy and military-strategic plans must be most strongly linked to domestic affairs, to domestic policy. Today, when the solution of the problems which have accumulated in society calls for harnessing all resources, as we list our options and submit decisions and recommendations aimed at maintaining the defense capability and protection of our international interests, we must also take into consideration material outlays. In short, all of our foreign policy and military-strategic actions must be oriented toward the anti-outlay principle and we must determine how they will be reflected on the situation of

the working people in the Russian Nonchernozem, the Soviet Baltic, the Transcaucasus and the republics of Central Asia, for instance. Today, no one has the right surreptitiously to spend the country's resources without counting, as was the case in the past.

having paid an incredibly high price for their freedom and independence during the Great Patriotic War, the Soviet people were sincere when they stated that "I shall spare nothing for the sake of securing the country's safety." We deliberately accepted certain deprivations for the sake of attaining strategic parity with the United States. During that period our involvement with the arms race was forced. For the sake of fairness, however, we must point out that at that time parity was understood quite simplistically although, it is true, not by us alone. The point is that the level of strategic armaments of the United States, a balance with which we eventually achieved, was the result of arbitrary decisions which were not supported by serious scientific developments and substantiations. Simply stated, the number of inter-continental ballistic missiles and nuclear-weapon carrying submarines was defined in "practical America" "by eye," based on a figure which would exert a more magical influence on the imagination of the American taxpayer and make him open his purse strings. This is incredible but a fact. This was subsequently mentioned by one of John Kennedy's close advisors, for it was during Kennedy's presidency that the most powerful impetus was given to the nuclear arms race.

The reaching of a strategic balance between the Warsaw Pact and NATO at the start of the 1970s made the continuation of the nuclear arms race senseless. The question of shifting the center of gravity to achieving the security of the state no longer by military but political means arose most urgently. The then Soviet leadership, however, was "trapped" by the "tricky military figure," and allowed our country to become involved in a new round of the arms race. Essentially, Washington's strategic task of economically exhausting the USSR through the arms race was countered by the familiar slogan according to which "We shall meet any challenge!" Aware of the fact that the gross national income of the Warsaw Pact members was lower than that of the NATO countries by a factor of 2.5, and that armament parity means that they would be spending approximately the same amount of money, one can easily see that, compared to the North Atlantic Pact the Warsaw Pact's expenditures were higher by a factor of 2.5.

We were short of realism and common sense in the area of defense building. We hurried in pursuit of quantitative parity, based on the "missile for missile" concept. In some areas, not only did we not fall behind our rivals but even "gained" the leadership. This is confirmed, in particular, by the fact that according to the INF Treaty, we will have to eliminate nearly twice the number of missiles and triple the number of warheads for them. We have 13 types of strategic missiles compared to only six of the Americans.

Presently the combat, the fighting strength of the Soviet SNV (strategic offensive armament) includes approximately 10,000 nuclear warheads. According to the Soviet scientists, with corrections in differences in terms of power and other factors, no more than 10 to 20 percent of the Soviet strategic armaments would suffice to inflict unacceptable damage to the "enemy." The situation on the American side is similar. This leads to the conclusion that the strategic balance has a huge "reserve of resistance" to efforts to achieve real superiority and resort to nuclear aggression with impunity.

What guided us, as we continued for the last 15 years, to "chase a 'chemical wave'," as E.A. Shevardnadze pointed out at the Practical Science Conference at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs? It cost us huge funds and diverted major production capacities, manpower and resources. This is not to mention the moral and political consequences which the stockpiling of chemical weapons caused to the reputation of a country which was one of the first to describe them as the most barbaric. How could, in general, the concept arise that the "chemical stockade" would strengthen our security? Even a basic technical standard (there was no need to attend the Chemical Defense Academy) would have sufficed to realize that chemical weapons are more dangerous both to us and the old world than they are to the United States. It was clear from the beginning that the competition in this area would develop to the advantage of the United States, for in this case geography as well was not in our favor. Today we must spend new considerable amounts and build special plants to destroy the arsenals of chemical weapons. Did anyone estimate how costly this entire "chemical defense" has been and is as yet to be for our country?

Although no price tag can be put on security, it too demands common sense, manifested in terms of entirely specific prices and cost indicators. Upgrading their efficiency and improving strategic "capital returns" are imperatives under the conditions of perestroika.

The appearance and development of the "socialist tank fleet" is a classical example of the priority of quantitative parameters in defense building or, in "civilian" language, worship of "gross output." Data from an extensive study, based on foreign sources, published in 1988 in MEZHDUNARODNAYA ZHIZN, the journal of the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs (No. 11) in 1988, stipulates that in the postwar period the Soviet Union manufactured some 100,000 tanks of five models alone, currently used by the Soviet Armed Forces (T-54/55, T-62, T-64, T-72 and T-80). Yet, in addition to Soviet tanks, within the Warsaw Pact tanks are produced by Poland, Czechoslovakia and Romania. Between 1946 and 1987 all NATO countries combined produced about 60,000 basic models of tanks. The United States accounts for 41,000 of this total (according to Warsaw Pact data the ratio in the number of tanks in Europe on 1 July 1988 was as follows: Warsaw Pact, 59,470 and NATO, 30,690).

The study concludes that "it is difficult to avoid the impression that the United States deliberately contributed to the intensification of the Soviet-American tank asymmetry, involving the Soviet Union in an economically ruinous and politically disadvantageous type of "tank offside." The following question is appropriate: What efforts and funds would have been required of us to update our "socialist tank fleet" had we not made the political decision to reduce it substantially?

For literally until very recently, there was not even a hint of the possibility of a unilateral step on our part to reduce conventional armaments, tanks in particular. This was despite the fact that it was openly being stated in North Atlantic Alliance circles but the final resolution of the question of updating tactical nuclear weapons in the European members of the bloc would depend on the progress made at the forthcoming talks on reducing armed forces and armaments in Europe and, to an equal extent, on the readiness of our country to limit the production of offensive systems, including tanks.

Could it be that until very recently the history of the deployment of medium-range missiles in Europe at the beginning of the 1980s had not been sufficiently profoundly analyzed? In terms of quantitative indicators, at that time we had strengthened our security. From the qualitative viewpoint, however, this was damaging. In order to come out of this impasse a real intellectual breakthrough was necessary, which led to the conclusion of the INF Treaty.

Today it is a question of developing a new model for ensuring not only national but also international security, not by increasing armaments, as has always been the case but, conversely, by reducing them on the basis of compromise. In order for this model to work efficiently, glasnost must penetrate the military area as well. For the time being, even Soviet publications on military-political problems, paradoxical though this might be, are still referring to American, British and West German sources when discussing our own defense programs. It is true that we too have our own estimates made by Soviet scientists, as is the case, let us say, with the yearbook "Razoruzheniye i Bezopasnost 1987" [Disarmament and Security 1987], which was published in 1988 by the USSR Academy of Sciences Institute of World Economics and International Relations. However, it provides only approximate figures which, furthermore, are once again based on Western computations.

By the end of January 1989, the Warsaw Pact Defense Ministers Committee took the major step of publishing figures on the size of the armed forces and number of basic types of armaments of Warsaw Pact members, as well as its own evaluation of the military strength of the North Atlantic Alliance in Europe and in adjacent water areas. Unfortunately, we still do not dare to make public information on the cost of serial deliveries of armaments and combat ordnance and the cost of scientific research and experimental design work on weaponry systems, and

data on the full military budget. As a result, it is not possible even to determine the amount which would be saved for the national economy of the country from the announced 14.2-percent reduction in the military budget, for the level on the basis of which we should make our estimates remains unclear. I can anticipate the objection that in the Soviet budget military expenditures are steadily fixed at 20.2 billion rubles annually, which is a rather modest amount compared to the \$300 billion in the United States. The point, however, is that this is only part of the expenditures for ensuring defense capability. How much money is appropriated to finance defense programs and how many combat systems will be produced remain deep secrets, hidden even from our members of parliament who approve the state budget at USSR Supreme Soviet sessions.

Soviet legislators regularly receive information from the press on the difficulty in financing the American SDI. They are familiar with the fact that the initial phase of the Space Shuttle Program cost \$10 billion and that each subsequent launching of the shuttle costs \$80 million. Our parliamentarians can see on Soviet television the supersecret V-2 "Stealth Aircraft," and read in the papers the cost to the U.S. taxpayer of the production of 132 such stealth aircraft and the number of hundreds of homes, schools and kindergartens which could be built with the funds spent on building the latest American nuclear submarine.

But, speaking honestly, are Soviet missiles, tanks and submarines not computed in terms of schools for our children, hospitals for our sick, and premises for our homeless? The reduction in the strength of the Armed Forces during the "Khrushchev thaw," for example made it possible to set up 100 house building combines, and to double old-age pensions. The absolute savings on budget funds as a result of the Soviet-American INF Treaty will be some 300 million rubles for the USSR. Such funds will be channeled into the social area. If used for housing construction, this amount would suffice to build 30,000 to 40,000 apartment units. The recently announced reduction in the Armed Forces will make it possible to release other hundreds of millions of rubles for purposes of social development. But why is it that the Soviet legislator becomes aware of such millions or, perhaps, billions, only when such funds are being released and not when they are being appropriated for military purposes? In the NATO countries, even during the period of the Cold War, the control rights of parliamentarians over military expenditures were not curtailed. The Western elected authorities openly discuss funds appropriated for military needs and data on the production of one combat system or another. Even corporate lobbyists, who profit from the manufacturing of weapons would not even conceive of questioning the right of members of parliament publicly to supervise the components of military budgets.

For the time being, our glasnost is not taking the risk of penetrating such areas. However, subsequent to the



Soviet Union's raising in the United Nations the question of converting from the economics of armament to the economics of disarmament, this is becoming inevitable. Naturally, it is not a question of real military secrets such as, for instance, the structural features and combat characteristics of systems. The resolution of the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference on the creation of a constitutional-plenipotentiary mechanism necessarily calls for the introduction of a legislative procedure according to which all departments engaged in military and military-industrial activities will be controllable by the higher national elected authority. This includes the use of military forces outside the national borders of the country, defense construction plans, and openness of military budgets in their essential aspects related to the problem of national security. Open control by Soviet legislators over the components of military appropriations, through their discussion by a special parliamentary commission on problems of national security and defense, for example, which we still lack, must, it seems to me, become an inseparable feature of democratic rule in a socialist state of law.

In the opinion of many Soviet scientists, such as Academician R.Z. Sagdeyev, objective experts should be given the opportunity to check suggestions and plans concerning various military budget items, including expert evaluations of scientific and technical developments in a given area. The need for this is confirmed also by the story related to the idea of the development toward the end of the 1960s of a Soviet particle-beam weapon to strike warheads in the sector of their approach to the target, described in July 1988 by Academician Ye.P. Velikhov at the Practical Science Conference held at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The spreading of non-dispersing beams of charged particles in the atmosphere, having the necessary power, is in itself a major problem and it became clear from the very beginning that this undertaking was almost certainly hopeless because of the difficulty of hitting a target which was especially designed to penetrate the dense atmospheric strata at space velocity, and was compact and fast moving. Furthermore, a different way of striking at warheads had already been experimentally tried, i.e., the particle-beam method was inferior in a number of parameters. Academician L.A. Artsimovich was the main critic of the extensive development of this project. However, his voice was not listened to and the work began. As it progressed, all such difficulties became fully apparent. Thanks to the persistence shown by Academician Yu B. Khariton, a document was sent to the government, providing a completely honest and principled analysis of the situation. It was only then that the decision to drop the project was made. To this day we are reminded of it by the mysterious neglected installations on the testing grounds near Balkhash Lake, on the subject of which the Americans ask periodically, and the appendix to the 1972 Treaty on Limiting Antimissile Defense Systems, which allows the surface testing of

antimissile systems, based on new physical principles, which complicated our talks on the interpretation of the treaty.

The practice of setting up public expert groups to study the prospects of military-technical projects has long been applied by our "potential enemies." Thus, the assessment according to which the SDI could prove to be a factor of exceptional dangerous destabilization of the strategic balance, was initially formulated by American scientists. Recently the California Legislature resolved to appoint a group of public observers of the activities of two defense laboratories working on the "strategic defense initiative," which are within the jurisdiction of the University of California: Livermore and Los Alamos. The group will be granted access to all secret documents and will see to it that "scientific research conducted in the laboratories is technically significant and promising for both the the military and civilian sectors, and information on results be unfailingly accurate and truthful."

The economic aspect of national security is becoming particularly important. Extensive openness in military and military-economic problems would make it possible for the Soviet public to have a true idea of the price which the country must pay for its security. Under the conditions of democratization and increased rights of the working people in terms of participating in all governmental affairs, the latter would be an act of social justice, for in the final account the power of our country rests precisely on the labor of simple people.

In the same way as the reductions at the end of the 1950s, the INF Treaty and the present reduction in the strength of the Armed Forces not only will not undermine but, conversely, will strengthen our national security, for the latter depends less on quantitative than on qualitative parameters. This is confirmed by the entire postwar experience, which introduced substantial corrections in the concepts of the limits of strength. Even if superior, it most frequently does not yield the anticipated results to the side which relies on it and, in some cases, turns into a kind of boomerang which strikes at the interests of those who do.

Today the question of how to put an end to the self-seeking nature of the arms race becomes particularly significant. We have made a thorough study of the factors which stimulate this process in the Western military-industrial complex. Particularly advantageous conditions which attract capital have been created there for the defense industry: higher profits, guaranteed market, and various benefits and indirect state subsidies or, in short, all that V.I. Lenin described as "legalized embezzlement of public funds." Our leaders of the defense industry do not show profit from the sale of weapons to the state. But does the possibility of obtaining astronomical funds from the state trough without hindrance not lead to the creation of "specific interest," distinct from the interests of the economy as a whole?

The structure of our defense complex began to take shape in the 1930s. "It was based on the 'pyramid' principle. The top of the pyramid was the production of a specific military item. The foundation was enterprises which procured the initial raw and other materials and complementing items. A separate 'pyramid' was created for each type of military ordnance. All of them were virtually autonomous from the other economic sectors," is the opinion of Soviet "defense industry" veterans. The rigid technological connections within the "pyramid" made it possible, if necessary, sharply to increase the production of weapons. Such a structure proved its efficiency under the extreme conditions of the Great Patriotic War.

In the postwar years this structure was expanded with new "pyramids." Today, to one extent or another, more than 15 ministries are involved in such work. The price we had to pay to develop our own nuclear weapons and missile technology is well known. It absorbed the lion's share of the country's resources and required the creation of one-of-a-kind equipment. For that reason the quality of military hardware is incomparably higher than that of goods produced for civilian sectors. The potential of the defense complex, acquired as a result of the privations and labor of several generations of Soviet people, must repay the debt it owes to the people and it is already gradually beginning to do so. However, if a substantial restructuring of the "pyramids" takes place, they would become a real locomotive in boosting the scientific and technical progress of the country in general.

Is conversion in defense production realistic? The USSR, as M.S. Gorbachev said from the rostrum of the United Nations, believes that yes, it is realistic. Our country is ready to draft and submit its domestic plan for conversion. It is anticipated that in the course of 1989, experimentally, plans for conversion of two-thirds of defense enterprises will be drafted; defense industry specialists will make public their experience in job placement and the use of defense industry equipment, buildings and installations for purposes of civilian production.

The implementation of this idea has already started, although in terms of our own economic science as well the "economics of disarmament" is something new. In this case practice is substantially outstripping theory. Missile manufacturing plants in Votkinsk, Petropavlovsk and Volgograd are being refitted. The production of the latest automatic metal-cutting machine tools is being developed at the Votkinsk Plant and the plans call for the production of 400,000 Feya washing machines and 260,000 baby carriages. Similar work is being done at the other enterprises as well.

The production of armaments and military hardware will be reduced by 19.5 percent. In turning the defense sectors to the civilian market, we shall have to abandon the principle of "results at all cost," which is prevalent in

a number of military production facilities. To them this will be a painful process, particularly if we bear in mind that, starting with 1 January 1989, the defense complex has also converted to self-financing and, as conceived, should subsist on the basis of its own money. A major restructuring will be required not only in technology, production management and marketing but also in the mentality of the people employed in these sectors.

This idea is confirmed by the letter written by S. Sukharev, a 25-year old engineer at a military plant, which was published in one of the central newspapers. He wrote the following: "During the period of the signing of the INF Treaty, in our laboratory we exchanged views about news coming out of Washington. Suddenly, the chief said something which flabbergasted me:

"God forbid that the reduction in armaments would go further...."

"Why?"

"The plant would lose one-half of its list of produced items," he explained importantly. He seemed to be a normal person, one of those about whom it is said that 'all Soviet people unanimously approve....' Now again he seemed to approve but also added: 'this would affect you personally and you would be laid off because of curtailed production caused by the disarmament, and what then?....'

Unquestionably, similar moods will exist among the military servicemen. Naturally, they are not threatened with unemployment. However, whether discharged in the reserve or resigning, even with a pension which is significantly higher than the average for the country, is a painful process.

Psychological reorientation and the inner readiness to sacrifice something and to abandon something for the sake of the country's interests and the needs of mankind is a difficult problem which cannot be resolved hurriedly. Here as well we cannot do without extensive glasnost, for it is necessary to explain to the people thoroughly and in detail the extent to which the tremendous expenditures for military needs are consistent with the tasks of strengthening the defense capability of the homeland and the entire socialist community and the extent to which they create grounds for the flourishing of departmentalism and support of the "vital interests of the company," and careerism.

Glasnost is also needed on the question of how to spend the funds released in the course of disarmament. If officers in the USSR Armed Forces, who are to be affected by the reduction, know that the thus released funds would go to housing construction, for instance (in the Armed Forces the question of housing is exceptionally grave and many military servicemen spend a considerable time of their service time in moving from one

private premise to another) and not for the financing of questionable "grandiose projects," they would find it easier to abandon the psychological well trodden paths.

Particular attention should be paid to the problem of reliable social guarantees for the personnel of defense plants who are being laid off and, naturally, to the military servicemen. As to the latter, obviously we should carefully study the lessons from the implementation of the set of measures drafted by the CPSU Central Committee and USSR Council of Ministers in connection with the conversion to civilian work by those who were dismissed from the Armed Forces during the reduction in the forces in the mid-1950s and beginning of 1960s.

We must draw a line under the era of huge figures and "ceilings" of military expenditures and come out of the vicious circle of the arms race if we wish for perestroika—and we have no other choice—to lead the country on the path of strong and fast progress.

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**Rostrum of the Italian Communist Party's Marxist Thinking: Leafing Through the Journal RINASCITA**

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[Review by L. Popov, candidate of economic sciences]

[Text] The objective of the 18th ICP Congress, the pre-congress document adopted at the November 1988 Italian Communist Party [ICP] Central Committee Plenum reads, is to initiate an original search for a new political course. A process of profound changes is taking place throughout the world. The congress, which is scheduled for the second half of March, faces the task of defining the main trends in such a search, thus acquiring the possibility of initiating a process of renovation in all leftist forces. It is necessary "to give a new impetus and a new content to the ideals of liberation, equality and solidarity."

These words indicate a profound dialectical understanding of the problems which must be solved by the Italian Communist Party both now and in the future: these are problems related to the political, economic and social situation of the country, ICP international policy and implementation of the party's strategic line. This will also indicate firm belief in the accuracy of the overall party course and its strategic objectives and tasks. Indeed, by starting a pre-congress discussion, the Central Committee is asking the entire party to take a new look at reality around it and, in accordance with all previous experience and contemporary conditions of the struggle, to formulate a line which will not deny but enrich past experience.

Such is the nature of the continuity in the course charted by the Italian Communist Party, which draws its origins in the theoretical developments and political activities of A. Gramsci and P. Togliatti. This also includes a search for elements of new developments, without which no dynamic progress is possible (let us note, even more so under contemporary circumstances) in a large party such as the ICP, which has repeatedly and successfully applied the method of innovative situational studies.

RINASCITA ("Renaissance"), the sociopolitical and theoretical journal of Italian communists, founded by Palmiro Togliatti in 1944, plays an important role in the formulation of the political views of the ICP and in its theoretical investigations. It is a weekly consisting, as a rule, of 32 pages (its format is similar to our own newspaper ZA RUBEZHOM); occasionally it may include special inserts. The topics of problems discussed in it are extremely varied, ranging from strictly scientific research to brief notes on the most popular music recordings.

Naturally, the main "slant" of RINASCITA is politics, both international and domestic, problems of disarmament and peace, perestroika in the Soviet Union and the building of socialism in Cuba, elections in the United States, the practices of neoconservatism, topical events of the parliamentary struggle and events in the south of Italy, internal party life and problems of the trade union movement.

Frequent contributors to the journal with political and analytical articles are the ICP secretary general and members of the party's leadership, noted Marxist scientists, followers of other trends of scientific thought, and trade union leaders. The editors hospitably offer their pages also to thinking people from other countries. Suffice it to point out that in 1988 it published an interview with the Polish Prime Minister M. Rakowski, a big scientific essay by W. Brandt, chairman of the Socialist International, entitled "The Idea of a World Government," and more than a dozen articles by Soviet scientists and journalists. Naturally, it has published dozens, if not hundreds, of articles by Italian authors on most topical subjects of Italian domestic policy and socioeconomic, cultural and other problems.

In such a sea of information, it would be difficult to voice a preference for any given topic or to find any kind of guideline without relying on the central features of the policy pursued by the Italian Communist Party itself. It is only by removing ourselves from the basic conceptual views in its policies that it is possible to identify the key topics which run through RINASCITA's analytical materials.

One of the most important trends in ICP international policy is the struggle for peace and disarmament, the prevention of nuclear and ecological catastrophes and



improving international relations through peaceful coexistence and the development of cooperation among nations. This is manifested by the large number of articles on problems of war and peace.

It is noteworthy that in assessing the state of affairs in the contemporary world and the condition and future development of international relations, the views held by the Italian comrades are close to and consistent with the familiar concept developed by the CPSU, to the effect that in the contemporary age "conflicting and socially and politically different relations may develop through the struggle of contradictions, but the world as a whole remains largely interrelated." It is interesting to trace the way in which, proceeding from the problems of disarmament, A. Occhetto, ICP secretary general, comes to a similar conclusion in his recent article in RINASCITA (No 43, 1988). "To us," he writes, "disarmament is the prime historical necessity, not only in order to prevent war but also to release huge resources which could and should be used to solve the biggest contradictions of our age, starting with the problem of the South of our planet.... We live in the final phase of the age of confrontation between the two systems. These systems could prolong their lives for a certain, longer or shorter, period of time which will depend on numerous as well as delicate circumstances of an economic, social and, particularly, political nature. However, their logic has become exhausted."

Naturally, the ICP secretary general went on to say, significant achievements were accomplished within the framework of that logic. However, it also led to a "restriction of human and social rights and to unfair models of development," and caused tremendous harm to the habitat. "The huge cost of armaments are the biggest macroscopic example of the harmfulness of this logic in the economic and political areas" (in this connection, A. Occhetto expresses the wish that the new American administration would "continue to follow the path of talks with the USSR on reducing armaments"). It is particularly important, the author goes on to say, "for the disappearing old logic of international relations not to lead us back to dealing with concepts through force and domination, or to looking for old or new superiorities. For, if we wish to solve the major contradictions of our time, those between peace and war, abundance and hunger, development and environment, quality and quantity of output and technology and employment, we must follow a new type of development, a more united, a more rational development based on cooperation and **interdependence**" (author's emphasis).

We believe that the similarity of conceptual approaches to universal human problems and understanding the priority of universal human and universally significant problems and the perception of the contemporary world as a unity within variety were what predetermined the greatest possible interest shown by the Italian communists in the ideas of new political thinking and perestroika, which are taking place in our country. This is the

main and basic but by no means only reason for the sincere interest shown by the ICP in the success of perestroika. Let us name, among others, the urgent need (for both the Italian and the other communist parties in the nonsocialist part of the world) to surmount, through their own efforts, a kind of static and "frozen" concept of socialism, to highlight its creative potential in the Leninist understanding of the term, and to assert the universal significance of democracy in socialist society. Unquestionably, the conversion from command-administrative to economic management methods plays an important role as well.

A great many things could be said on the way RINASCITA is covering the Soviet perestroika, the problems it emphasizes and what is of the greatest interest to the Italian comrades. Unquestionably, however, perestroika is the main, the leading topic in all international sections of the journal. Thus, in the first half of 1988 (22 issues), there were 56 articles on the Soviet Union. For the sake of comparison, let us point out that the Middle East (a conflict which is of interest to all Italy) was the topic of 26 articles; the United States of 25 and France (the elections), of 23. After the 19th All-Union CPSU Conference the number of articles on the Soviet Union increased significantly.

Let us try to single out the main assessments given in RINASCITA on the subject of CPSU policy and Soviet perestroika. Let us consider, for example, the different viewpoint from which A. Guerra, a noted scientist and ICP member, looks at the results of the 19th Party Conference. We cannot agree with all of his conclusions. Nonetheless, they are of interest to us, also because this is a view "from the outside."

In formulating the assumption that the results of the conference could not fail to be influenced by a compromise between supporters of the reform and people with a conservative way of thinking and between "innovators" and "intolerants," A. Guerra writes that "this compromise will take perestroika forward and not backward. Unquestionably, having adopted the draft for the reforms, as submitted by M. Gorbachev, the conference strengthened the views of the innovators." Nonetheless, the author points out, "not everything which was brought into motion—suffice it to name the "Pamyat" Society or nationalistic manifestations in the Transcaucasian Republics—is contributing to the processes of democratization." Then, formulating in a complex-hypothetical form the problem of the correlation between the establishment of a socialist state of law and the preservation of the one-party system in the USSR, Guerra concludes that part of the article on a moderately optimistic note: "In any case, everything which has now started moving makes a simple return to the old situation quite difficult."

The author positively assesses the foreign policy of the Soviet Union. "The success of the line which prevailed at the conference," he writes, "was helped by the international situation and the way the various capitals in the

world are currently looking at the Soviet Union." Everything indicates, he goes on to say, "that there is a clear link in Gorbachev's policy between the struggle for democracy within the country and foreign policy. This has already brought about a course of historical significance in the areas of disarmament, the withdrawal of troops from Afghanistan and a new European policy." In conclusion, he gives practical advice to "governments, and political and social forces" in Western Europe to formulate "the necessary but still all too distant new policy toward the East, consistent with the topics and problems raised with Gorbachev's challenge."

In another article, published in issue No 37 for 1988, dealing with the results of the September 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum, A. Guerra expresses, among others, the idea that "the steps taken by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Supreme Soviet are aimed at ascribing a new dynamism to perestroika, a process which, unlike glasnost, has encountered more difficulties rather than efficient results."

In the same issue, A. Rubbi, member of the ICP leadership, in analyzing the results of the September 1988 CPSU Central Committee Plenum and USSR Supreme Soviet Session, names "three obstacles" which, in his view, are obstructing perestroika. The first, he believes, is the food problem in the USSR. "It will be very difficult to surmount the passive attitude of the working people and the popular masses and to call upon them to make firm and active efforts on the front of perestroika if food and consumer goods are not guaranteed; and unless... there is a "revolution in the countryside." The second obstacle is the sensitive problem of relations among nationalities and the demand for the full satisfaction of national rights, which should be expressed through the structures and institutions of a real economic and cultural autonomy and political pluralism.

Finally, the third problem "pertains to the political reform. The new Law on Elections and the draft for the reform of the Constitution should contribute to the efficient democratization and true representation of the civilian society in the local authorities and all the way to the Congress of People's Deputies."

According to A. Rubbi, with the solution of such problems, "it is possible gradually to expand the support, the consensus of the masses, both of which are absolutely necessary if perestroika is to become irreversible." And whereas perestroika is a complex and lengthy process, the "solution of these problems is an immediate requirement." "We would not simply like to express a hope. We would like to express the conviction and belief that the Soviet leadership will be able to combine efficiency in solving the problems through the future development of perestroika."

Therefore, a large number of articles (let us note that they do not consist of enthusiastic evaluations but provide analyses and critical views and show the desire to

understand the essence of events) deal with the Soviet Union. This includes information on new phenomena in our life, an objective analysis of difficulties and detailed reports on the rehabilitation of noted party and state leaders. In short, the Italian communists who read RINASCITA gain comprehensive ideas on today's life in our country.

The journal pays attention to other international problems, countries and areas as well. Suffice it to follow, for example, the way RINASCITA reflected the course of the U.S. electoral campaign and the electoral results. Substantial information was published on the Middle East, Latin America, Western Europe (both problems related to integration and those of individual countries), Japan, the south of Africa and many socialist countries.

It is entirely natural, however, that domestic and foreign policy is dialectically interconnected in the activities of the ICP, as in those of any other party. This is also reflected in the topics of articles published in RINASCITA.

Many assessments of problems raised not only in this journal but in other documents of the ICP are imbued with the conviction that in the immediate future the political struggle in Italy, in Western Europe and, in the capitalist world as a whole, will be characterized by a clash, by a class confrontation between the moderate-conservative bloc of forces and the forces of democracy. This will be a confrontation which, most obviously, will take place "without barricades and bayonets," through purely political means and, sometimes, through political games, an area in which the bourgeois parties have been quite successful in establishing moderate-conservative blocs of forces. Hence, it is on the basis of the understanding of this future complex confrontation that many of the ICP views on domestic and international problems are reached.

Let us go back to the official views of the ICP and, in particular, to the problems of Western European integration. Thus, as early as the 17th Party Congress (April 1986) the significance of the Western European area in ICP activities and the role of the left on a regional scale were emphasized. As was pointed out at the congress, the ICP proceeds from the fact that Western European integration is based on the objective trends of economic development of the countries in the area and on a number of political factors. The position of the ICP, which favors Western European political integration, implies that it is only the autonomous and active role played by Western Europe in the system of international relations that would enable the countries in the area truly to influence progress in such relations and would make it possible to provide "adequately efficient opposition to the hegemonistic aspirations of the United States, including those in the economic area."

However, as RINASCITA points out, Western Europe will be able to play its active role only with the unification of all Western European leftist forces, of which the ICP is an inseparable component. In his article "How to Build European Democracy" (No 43, 1988) the ICP secretary general noted that the building of Europe (meaning Western Europe within the EEC) is a "challenge" to which the reformist forces of the 90s must address themselves. "Our entire policy has and tries to have an increasingly deep European perspective. Europe is and will always be our cultural and political horizon: a united democratic Europe, the Europe of citizens, the European people." A. Occhetto admits that there is a risk that the "Europe of merchants" will prevail over the Europe of nations, and that the power will be exercised and decisions will be made by small groups and castes of industrialists and financial and political personalities outside of democratic control. Nonetheless, the ICP secretary general emphasizes, one must not ignore the objective processes of internationalization and concentration. The question is who will control these processes and what is their purpose. "In the face of major processes of reorganization and concentration of economic and financial power," he notes, "a new democratic course must be charted. Our task, the task of all progressive forces is to create a new democratic power system." Hence the conclusion of the need for unity of action among left-wing forces on a Western European scale, particularly in connection with the forthcoming elections to the European Parliament, in 1989.

The considerations and views expressed by the Italian comrades are, in our view, for the time being of a theoretical nature and are as yet to undergo the "test of practical experience," initially in the course of the elections for the European Parliament and, subsequently, in actual political activities, subsequent to the creation of a single Western European market, in 1992. However, the formulation of the question of the unity of left-wing forces in all countries in the area, in the context of the further intensification of the political struggle between conservative and democratic forces, is entirely timely.

Our survey of the articles in RINASCITA would be incomplete without a discussion of the problems of internal policy of the ICP and of Italy, the more so since the domestic policy of the ICP is closely related to the concept of the confrontation between conservative and democratic forces.

As the journal points out, at the start of the 1980s Italian society entered a new phase in its development, characterized by profound changes in economic life, occurring above all under the influence of the scientific and technical revolution, further changes in the social structure of the population and the crisis within the theory and practice of the "welfare state."

The regrouping of the political forces of the bourgeoisie, increasingly leaning toward cooperation with the socialists, led to the establishment in 1983 (and, subsequently,

in 1987) of a new governmental coalition which became a promoter of the policies and practices of neoconservatism and neoliberalism in the economic and social areas.

Nonetheless, the latest discussions on internal political problems focused on the reason for the major defeats suffered by the Communist Party at the parliamentary elections in 1987 and the partial municipal elections in 1988. Let us recall that, after reaching a peak of 34.4 percent of the vote in 1976, gradually the ICP began to experience a decline in its influence. It garnered about 30 percent of the vote in 1983, 26.6 percent in 1987 and about 22 percent in 1988.

The party, including RINASCITA, provided a candid analysis of the reasons for its failures and defeats. "When a retreat in the elections is quite significant and comprehensive and, particularly, when it follows the already grave defeats of 1985 and 1987, the real significance of the numerous factors which predetermined it can be understood only if compared to the profound reasons for the negative trends of recent years," wrote G. Chiarante, member of the ICP leadership.

The first group of reasons for the failures of the ICP over the past 10 to 12 years includes, according to Chiarante, what he describes the "international crisis of forces, movements and parties which linked or link their activities to the communist tradition." This crisis "had a severe impact on the aspect and electoral influence of our party." Chiarante bluntly states that under the influence of the crisis phenomena in the Soviet system, "starting with the 1970s and, particularly, in the 1980s, negative views on the shortcomings and great difficulties in the countries of real socialism" prevailed in Western public opinion.

Chiarante includes in the second group of problems a set of domestic political reasons, among which he singles out "the drastic acceleration of social changes," which disrupted "the balance" and the system of alliances through which the ICP had previously strengthened its influence: such phenomena opened the way to an ideological crisis which, furthermore, was influenced by the offensive mounted by the neoconservative ideas which became widespread in the West in the 1980s." Chiarante considers as a solution to this situation "the need for the communist parties to define their place and role within the framework of European leftist forces, which must mount a decisive counteroffensive against the neoconservative policy of recent years."

Chiarante considers the third group of problems—those related to the activities of the ICP—in a spirit of self-criticism. "After the great Togliatti political line of democratic unity, which reached its highest point in the 1970s first with the idea of a 'historical compromise,' followed by the unsuccessful attempt at 'democratic solidarity,' exhausted its possibilities, our party was unable to formulate a different strategic long-term development policy which would be politically and culturally



as strong and would have the same power of attraction as the unitarian policy in which these features had been inherent over a long period of time.

"The suggested democratic alternatives appear, to this day, merely as a strategic outline."

However, according to Chiarante, such an assessment of the contemporary state of affairs is by no means a reason for pessimism. Conversely, the author believes, "one must not abandon the policy of alternatives. It requires more work and more activeness aimed at achieving a broader unity among leftist forces and encompassing within relations of unity both laic and Catholic centrist forces. It is a question of giving the prospect of a democratic alternative a substance and a meaning."

Furthermore, as Chiarante points out, the line of "democratic alternative" of the ICP could and should become a programmatic alternative to the contemporary structure of Italian society. "If all of a sudden," the author writes, "the idea that, in the final account, the capitalist society is the 'best of all worlds' would prevail in the universal common sense, and that it is a question only of a more or less indirect participation in its management, in that case the moderate left could have a place in that world; however, there would be increasingly less room for a party calling itself communist."

Chiarante appeals for precisely a fight against this, for developing a unitarian policy, for a "powerful political initiative," for firm opposition, and for mounting an "ideological, social and political struggle against the policy of capitalist reorganization."

The ICP has now entered the final stage of preparations for its 18th Congress. In initiating innovative ideas on domestic political or internal party problems, or else on problems of international affairs, ideas in the area of culture, and so on, RINASCITA, the ICP journal, acts as a catalyst in the political and theoretical work of Italian communists. Not all of its ideas may subsequently be confirmed by reality and not all of its suggestions are realistic or in the spirit of this specific historical time. One of the features of the Italian Communist Party is precisely the fact that it is able to accept and rework them, to "filter" them through its "brain centers," so that later, depending on the political (and sometimes purely practical) expediency, to apply them usefully.

Naturally politics, and Italian politics even more so, is by no means like a sidewalk on Nevskiy Prospekt or Via del Corso. Understandably, no one, not to mention such a large political force as the ICP, is protected from errors and blunders. Such have occurred, including in the most recent history of the ICP. How else can we explain the substantial decline in the party's influence on the voters and the appearance of some other negative aspects? On the other hand, however, one cannot advance without seeking new ways, promoting new ideas and, at the same time, learning from one's failures. Unquestionably,

RINASCITA helps the Italian communists to develop a broader vision of the world, become familiar with new ideas find new ways, and advance despite the the most complex conditions of the contemporary, exceptionally broad and differentiated capitalist society.

**Editorial note:** The Italian mass information media welcomed with great interest and, as a whole, positively, the article by V.K. Naumov "The ICP on the Eve of its Congress" in KOMMUNIST NO 1 for 1989. All main press organs in the country discussed the article in detail and many of them dedicated commentaries to the article; the article was reprinted in its entirety in RINASCITA. It triggered a widespread reaction in the left-wing forces in Italy and satisfaction with its tone and line of thought.

The ICP publications note that today relations between parties have become free or, to say the least, are in the process of becoming free from the negative accretions of the past, and have emerged on a new, fruitful and promising level. All of this has taken place within a short time, above all thanks to the daring and convincing policy of the present CPSU leadership.

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#### **School of Perestroika; Survey of the Journal MOLODOY KOMMUNIST**

*18020010n Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 4,  
Mar 89 (signed to press 22 Feb 89) pp 123-126*

[Review by V. Markov]

[Text] The accelerated progress of society, the purpose of which is the renovation of socialism, is inconceivable without the faster training of the young. Under constantly changing conditions, the boys and girls must learn how to think and act in a new way. They must be not simply supporters of but also active participants in perestroika and develop high civic and professional standards. The 19th All-Union CPSU Conference noted that "the party considers the young as an active and initiative-minded force of perestroika. The conference deems necessary the formulation of a strong integral governmental policy toward the growing generation, a policy which would provide the necessary conditions enabling the young people to become independent as early as possible, maximally to bring to light their capabilities and to achieve their life's objectives and be better prepared for promptly assuming economic, political and moral responsibility for the destinies of the country and of socialism."

Such is the initial point, the basic criterion for assessing both the overall problem of the education and upbringing and social development of the young generation as well as the efforts of organizations and individuals involved in this great project. It is the starting point also

for a discussion on the activities of the leading youth publication MOLODOY KOMMUNIST, the journal of the Komsomol Central Committee, which recently celebrated its 70th birthday.

This is a noteworthy journal with a broad readership and authority among which it enjoys a good reputation.

We believe some of the successes of the journal fully include the story of the start of the Komsomol, as seen through the articles published in the journal YUNYY KOMMUNIST, the first issue of which came out no more than 1 and a half months after the first RKSM Congress. Live testimony of those times is quoted in the series of documentary essays "The Beginning" (Nos 1-5). Naturally, the articles published during that time occasionally display excessive maximalism, a straight line of agitation and simplification and concepts, which make us smile today, as to what is "communist" and what is "bourgeois." Nonetheless, it would be more important to see something else: extremely young people unhesitatingly assuming responsibility for the solution of most difficult problems, not resting until they succeeded. Neither their age nor lack of knowledge and experience hindered them; conversely, the great aspiration to become involved in the work motivated the first Komsomol members to gain knowledge by all possible means, to plunge into learning in general and in political studies in particular.

A look at the history of the Komsomol is particularly interesting because some of the features of those times show a clear similarity with the present. The revolutionary perestroika, which started in April 1985, extends to all areas of life in our society and directly affects the young people and their working, studying and living conditions. It reformulates the question of their place and role in the implementation of the initiated changes. The activities of the Komsomol, its work methods and nature of ties between its organizations and committees and all youth strata and with the current numerous and newly appearing various independent youth associations are also being restructured (although, to put it frankly, so far sluggishly and not always consistently). This, however, requires a restructuring of the mind, of the ways and means of work of the Komsomol organizers and, consequently, inevitably draws greater attention to specific experience and to the searching in the local areas. It is no secret that a large number of Komsomol organizations find themselves literally in an impasse, which led the character of the essay by O. Muginova "The Past and Present of Yuriy Yavtushenko," the first secretary of the Syktyvkar Komsomol Gorkom, to say about the Komsomol that sometimes "it is viewed as a professional association of Komsomol workers" (No 4, p 11).

The journal discusses such problems in its various sections, noteworthy among which are "Competition," which consists of essays on Komsomol workers and activists and conversations with them. The topic of the studies in such publications is what is the main, the most

needed feature today: new social experience, the experience in rallying Komsomol members and young people around the specific projects on which perestroika is based. Such experience is as varied as are the characters of its initiators and, one could say, its designers. Following are some other articles on this level: "The Career of a Conflicting Man" by V. Panov (No 6, about B. Aki-mov, first secretary of the Lvov Komsomol Gorkom); "Solaris—Planet of Disinterestedness" by N. Koshelev (No 7, on the mixed-age detachment headed by Obninsk teacher A. Yurchenko); "Igor Gamazin Against the Mechanism of Suppression" by V. Zhukov (No 8, on the struggle waged by the Moscow trolleybus conductor, who became the chief of the station, struggling against group egotism); "This Inconvenient Kiselev" by A. Strunin (No 10, about that Komsomol leader). Perestroika in the organizational work of the Komsomol is considered on the basis of the experience of the Kuybyshev (No 11) and Sverdlovsk (No 12) Obkoms. One of the articles (survey of the youth press, No 5) is precisely entitled "Attention—Experiment." Nonetheless the need for describing, interpreting and analyzing specific social experience remains just as great today.

Incidentally, in this respect one of the sections of the journal is clearly inadequate. We are referring to the periodical summation of the results of the "Red Cloves" Competition for the journal's prize. It carries lists of winners and provides a short information on who presented the prizes and where. But why not describe the people and their contribution to perestroika and anything new and valuable in the life of the Komsomol organizations? Why not even simply describe the achievements which have led to winning the prize? This is obviously needed.

The pointed and difficult problems of the work and life of young people, which are important not only to them but to the entire state, are also raised in articles in the section "Club SEP" (Socioeconomic problems). For example, an article in No 5 deals with family contracting; another, in No 3, discusses the difficult working conditions at animal husbandry farms; the title of the article in No 8 "Personal Accounts With Cost Accounting" speaks for itself. Other articles deal with the gravity of the housing problem in a growing industrial city (No 9), settling the Extreme North (No 7) and the difficult social conditions of fishermen working in the Far East (No 10).

Although all such problems directly affect the young, the place of the Komsomol in their solution is left mostly, and unfortunately, unclear. However, it would be hardly justified to blame the editors for this fact: such is today's reality. The desire to change this reality is obvious: clear sharp dissatisfaction with and insufficient social weight of the Komsomol and lack of legal support of this influence. This is confirmed by letters to the editors and interviews with Komsomol officials; it is mentioned in articles by scientists and journalists. The draft law on youth is still not ready, although selected materials with suggestions about its content were published almost 1

year ago, in issue No 2. This impatience is fully understandable: all too frequently in the past youth initiatives have died out from insufficient material and legal support. Obviously, speeding up work on this law would greatly contribute to perestroika in the Komsomol.

Perestroika opened wide the road to civic movements which include the autonomous associations we mentioned, the so-called "informals." By the middle of 1988 there were 30,000 such associations (see No 8, "Together and Not Instead Of," by A. Dmitriyev). This is a great force, not only because of its size and variety, but also because it includes essentially people who are energetic and enthusiastic, not to say possessed. Unfortunately, some managers on different levels have a prejudice against all "informals" in general, a kind of deep mistrust.

According to P. Bolshedanov first secretary of the Saratov Gorkom, "from personal experience I realized that there are no informal associations which would categorically refuse to engage in a dialogue with Komsomol authorities. Most frequently we simply do not know how to approach them and sometimes do not consider this necessary" (No 1, pp 25-26). A similar view was expressed by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences I. Ilinskiy, who suggests that the center of gravity be shifted "from methods of prohibition, mistrust and intolerance of 'outsiders' and unusual forms and style of behavior of young people, to methods of 'total political trust,' tolerance and permission, which are necessary prerequisites and consequences of democratization of social life" (No 2, p 12). Finally, in the course of the public debate at the Moscow Palace of Youth on "What Type of Komsomol Do We Need?" (No 10) a very interesting idea was expressed: to coordinate the activities of all such associations with the help of the USSR Committee of Youth Organizations, in order to make their participation in perestroika more effective. These concepts indicate the constructive position adopted by the journal and one can only wish for it to be more active and purposeful.

Naturally, clear guidelines and scientific substantiations are needed in solving this and other youth problems. They are not always available. "Komsomol" and other social scientists working in those same areas are slowly advancing, but their progress is clearly insufficient. Something in the style of an accountability report on the level reached in research be found in the materials of the session of the Council for Coordination of Scientific Research on Youth Problems (No 5). A great deal of positive evaluations of achievements were made. However, we should nonetheless correct the view expressed in the report, according to which "there are no reasons whatsoever to think that subsequently matters will develop better by themselves. Everything depends on the extent to which we shall be adequately informed on the processes occurring in youth circles and, consequently, the extent to which and skill with which we shall be able

to control them" (p 47). Yet information on the real situation (naturally, full, reliable and streamlined) is merely a preliminary prerequisite, a foundation for further studies.

The more pressing the urgent problems facing society become (as well as youth, as its organic part) the more urgent becomes the need for intensive theoretical work and for arming public awareness with new scientifically tested ideas and spiritual values acting as intellectual and sociomoral instruments for practical action.

For the time being, the social scientists are accomplishing clearly less than our time requires, in their studies of specifically youth problems, drastically shifting social realities, and in the area of the ideological and theoretical education of young people (in any case of the journal's readers). Judging by the types of sections and number of articles published, the editors of MOLODOY KOMMUNIST try to fill the gap. However, there is a lack of good materials, not only from the "academic" viewpoint but also that of "hitting the target," materials which could be used in Komsomol ideological practices. Yet such materials are needed for several sections, such as "Theory," "Ideology," "Science" and some others. The article by A. Deryabin "In the Labyrinth of Prices" (No 9) stands out for its combination of scientific substantiation and clarity and strong link between the topical tasks of perestroika and vital mass interests. Other meaningful articles have been published, dealing with the history of party conferences, the relevance of Marx's ideas (both in No 5) and V.I. Lenin's theoretical activities in 1917 (No 4). However, the scarcity of such good quality materials, which would meet the demands of young people and answer their daily concerns and requirements, is entirely clear.

It was precisely the active efforts of the MOLODOY KOMMUNIST editors that once again clearly exposed the current "gap" in periodicals between social science and journalism, and a lack of either substantiation or, although less frequently, a cutting formulation of problems. It is hardly necessary to prove the need for combining, for synthesizing these spiritual means of influencing social practices.

Let us take as an example two articles on a topic of major theoretical significance (particularly in connection with the radical reform in the political system and the development of democratization processes) and which are also of immediate practical interest in the struggle against bureaucracy: the article by Ye. Pashentsev "Battle at the Pyramids" (No 9) and the article by Yu. Mogilevskiy "The Power of the 'Desk' or the Power of the People" (No 12). In our view, neither of them contributes anything new on such topics compared to what has already been accomplished.

Although accurately formulating a number of concepts, Ye. Pashentsev submits the following doubtful "law:" "Bureaucracy opens the way to open counterrevolution



but then is discarded as unwanted." The prospects of the struggle against bureaucratism are presented in quite somber colors; according to the author's estimates, there are just about 100 million bureaucrats together with members of their families and "all kinds of spongers, courtesans and 'insiders' in the press, without whom no self-respecting bureaucrat can do" (see p 47).

Not all ends meet in the second article as well, where the claim of the inevitability of the conflict between innovators and the "apparatus which is used to maintain tradition" is the starting point (p 8). The author ends his article with the conclusion that "one should not see in the bureaucrat our eternal enemy. The bureaucrat is our tomorrow's friend and assistant" (p 14).

Both articles ignore the tasks of restructuring the apparatus and cadre renovation, problems of improving and increasing the efficiency of managerial labor and the urgent need to set up a system which would control the work of the apparatus both by the elected authorities and "from below."

An annoying fault in this topic—the weak sociomoral assessment of bureaucratism, which distorts the mentality of people and relations among them—is compensated to some extent with the essay by Andrey Platonov "Che-Che-O," published in issue No 3. Let us quote one of the writer's thoughts: "Eventually the bureaucratism of institutions will be eliminated, for even mountains can be blown away by a light wind. But what to do with the type of bureaucratism which has entered the blood of an entire stratum of people? And who will be held responsible for having twisted the minds of these people who were once trusting, fresh and healthy? For bureaucratism has already become a biological feature of an entire species of people: it has gone beyond the walls of institutions. It is depriving us our friends and supporters. It has become our unaccountable grief" (p 90).

The aspiration of the editors to combine, in interpreting problems of relations among nationalities and international upbringing, a study of theoretical problems with a search for new ways and means of political and educational work by Komsomol organizations and committees is worthy of support. Such precisely was the meaning of the editorial roundtable "Old Errors, New Tasks," (No 6) and the talk "Together and Equally," published in No 12. The need for such work is tremendous. Here is one of the statements (by K. Sultanov, Karaganda Party Obkom Secretary, No 6, p 19): The Komsomol workers loyally 'sense' party policy but most of them are short of theoretical knowledge."

Naturally, the urgent need to increase one's ideological and theoretical baggage is felt not only in the area of relations among nationalities and not only by elected managers and members of the Komsomol apparat. The need for accurate and complete social knowledge, related to the specific realities of life, can be seen in a number of materials published in the journal: "There is a lack of

knowledge" (No 7, p 25); "We need a major upsurge in the political standards of young people. Their level, influenced by the narrowness of views on reality, limited to the framework of one's profession and poor general training in the humanities, is low" (No 11, p 22). The journal must not weaken its efforts in this area.

The journal has published significant articles on the ideological-theoretical, and conceptual upbringing of young people, on international topics (although, in our view, youth life abroad could be covered more extensively), and on the interpretation of our history (the sections "Globe," "Biography" and some other materials in other sections).

The journal actively follows a line of restoring historical truth about the first years and decades of the Soviet system and the difficult, complex and quite tragic period of laying the foundations for socialism. Thorough and pointed articles are noteworthy, such as "On the Eve of the War..." by V. Yezhov, "The Price of an Unfulfilled Behest..." by Ye. Vittenberg (No 10), and the sharply polemical selection of responses to the talk with Komsomol veteran A.P. Savelyev "Learn How to Hear the Truth" (No 7), which came out in No 3. The journal is rightly not carried away by mechanically switching from thoughtless "pluses" to equally groundless "minuses" in assessing all that occurred during those difficult years, although such "100 percent reevaluation" of the past is occasionally made. It is no accident that one of the authors of the selection of statements by Komsomol members made in the past, published in No 10 ("My Youth, KamAZ..." by Yu. Petrushin) cautiously stipulates that "possibly, any mention of the labor enthusiasm of those distant years may provoke a critical grin" (pp 13-14). Well, we should not be either embarrassed or forgetful of the enthusiasm and labor heroism. It would be useful for today's young to know that most of their fathers and grandfathers, when they were young, were honest, zealous in labor, and boundlessly loyal to the ideals of socialism. "Today, when we would like to give a new quality to our society," M.S. Gorbachev said in his meeting with the young people of Moscow and the Moscow area, "we must show great concern and respect for the activities and the labor of each generation of Soviet people." We hope that the journal will continue to pay attention to enriching the historical awareness of its readers.

One of the reliable ways for attracting the attention of the readers is the variety of topics provided in the sections "Position," "Culture," "Outlook," "Book World," "Poetry Tournament," and "Education." These sections themselves, however, could be made richer. For example, the last one we named is exceptionally limited to the professional concerns of teachers and major problems are ignored: the concept that the school is a specific social body, the links between school, and society and high school (and university student) self-management.

Variety in the journal is provided also by topics which in recent years were, if not banned outright, considered unsuitable for public discussion. Glasnost has rejected such prejudices and occasionally the description of social diseases is given virtual priority. Nor does MOLODOY KOMMUNIST avoid such problems. However, it tries to provide a specific study of the negative phenomena in our life, avoiding sensationalism: drug addiction (No 4) and prostitution (No 6. Here a very good article "...And 27 Kopeks In the Pocket" by Leonid Zhukhovitskiy was published), drunkenness (No 7), and juvenile delinquency (No 8). The journal published an interesting talk on problems of marriage and divorce with psychotherapist A. Yegides ("Two In the Same Boat," No 8). However, the view promoted in this article that married life is a variety of confrontation (naturally, this too may happen) seems to us one-sided; thus, a great variety of reasons for getting married are considered, other than love and the desire to raise a family and have children. Actually, in their contemporary interpretation all such most complex problems are as yet to be investigated.

Perestroyka has faced all mass information media with the rather pressing task of showing greater concern for strengthening ties with the readers and making better use of their views. We see that in recent years the popularity of a number of newspapers and journals has greatly increased thanks to skillful work with letters: properly compiled selections and surveys of editorial mail, and letters with comments are possibly the most popular readings. Letters are not very noticeable in MOLODOY KOMMUNIST. Instead, we read responses to the journal's publications. This is not the right ratio. The journal itself, in tracing the history of YUNYY KOMMUNIST, properly emphasized the conclusion of its predecessors: this must be not an organ for young people but an organ by young people. MOLODOY KOMMUNIST has all the necessary grounds for representing the public opinion of young people and Komsomol members. All that is needed is to listen to such views more closely and to ensure them extensive publicity. Obviously, the lack of attention paid to editorial mail lowers the efficiency of the journal's initiatives, such as polling its readers and inviting them to engage in debates, something which the editors themselves reported in a self-critical spirit.

The journal has done a great deal of positive work but possibilities to improve it further are tremendous. By making use of them, unquestionably the collective of MOLODOY KOMMUNIST will contribute to increasing the contribution of the Komsomol and the young people to perestroyka.

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#### Short Book Reviews

18020010o Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 4, Mar 89 (signed to press 22 Feb 89) pp 127-128

[Text] "Franklin Roosevelt." Problems of domestic policy and diplomacy: historical-documentary essays by

V.L. Malkov. Mysl, Moscow, 1988, 350 pp. Reviewed by N. Yermoshkin, candidate of historical sciences.

There are periods and events in world history which have their own profound "subtext," thanks to which, long after they have passed they are still close to our present.

The 1929-1933 economic crisis and the protracted depression which followed it shook up world capitalism down to its foundations and triggered the greatest economic and political "disturbance" in its history.

It was against that historical background that events developed in the United States, which found itself in the epicenter of the global economic catastrophe or, metaphorically speaking, literally on the brink of the precipice. At that point the American ruling class was given a choice: to continue to drift in the same direction set by the process of political development during the period of "prosperity" in the 1920s, or to choose a new course, turning sharply against the current and changing pilots. This problem of choice in its internal and international aspects, as it faced America during the prewar decade and, subsequently, during World War II, is the point on which V.L. Malkov focuses his attention. This is the pivot of the monograph under consideration, its central axis to which a number of other sidelines are connected. Nonetheless, all of them deal with that comprehensive research task formulated in the introduction: to provide a political portrait of an outstanding state leader of the United States in the context of the complex historical situations in the course of which his unusual talent as a politician and attractive human qualities were brought to light.

Strictly speaking, it is not Roosevelt who is the main "character" in the study. The scientist focuses above all on the conflicting historical circumstances in the course of which Roosevelt's views were shaped as did his attitude toward domestic and international problems and his concept of the role and place of the United States in a radically changed world. At that time the situation of the capitalist economic system, undermined by a total crisis and feeling the constant growth of the threat of war, seemed hopeless to many people. Personally, the national problem of making a choice was interpreted by Roosevelt, elected U.S. president in 1932, as the need, literally in the course of events, radically to change his viewpoint on the development of capitalism and self-critically (although, true, by no means consistently), to acknowledge the inability, of ensuring the normal functioning of the system as a whole without any serious interference on the part of the state. The author convincingly proves the way the pragmatic views of Roosevelt and the supporters of the "New Deal," surmounting the widespread ideological conservatism, succeeded through the method of trial and error to apply their new philosophy for the survival of bourgeois society during a period of historical change. The merit of this book is that the author considers these changes along with the foreign

policy course which Roosevelt adopted. This was a dual and conflicting course which bore the mark of the global ambitions inherited from Theodore Roosevelt and Woodrow Wilson. Tactically, it agreed with the overall line of the Western countries of "pacifying" the fascist aggressor.

Nonetheless, Roosevelt's far-sightedness as a politician and diplomat was manifested in that he realized the possible new role which the international community could play in settling global conflicts and solving global political contradictions. The author justifiably notes that it was precisely this approach that enabled Roosevelt, in particular, to see in a new light the significance of the "Soviet factor" as a potential counterbalance to the growing fascist menace. In turn, it was thanks to this that major points of contact developed between the United States and the USSR in World War II.

The main conclusion drawn by the researcher on the basis of extensive documentary data, is that under the conditions of a radically changed global situation and the increased threat to all mankind by the aggressors' bloc and, later, the war it unleashed, Roosevelt made his choice. He had been leading to it from the time of preparations for restoring relations between the USSR and the United States in 1933 to his views on the principles of postwar settlement, on the eve of and after Yalta. The sense of these principles is best clarified by the following statement included in his "final message," which he had drafted but did not deliver on 13 April 1945: "Today we are facing a fundamental factor, the essence of which is that if civilization is to survive, we must cultivate to this effect the science of human relations, the ability of all people, however different they may be, to live and work together on the same planet, under conditions of peace."

Not surprisingly, the author has not been totally successful. This means, above all, that not all the problems have been noted and that many aspects of the President's activities have not been touched upon. This is explainable, however, for the book is structured on the basis of the fullest possible use of previously unpublished archival sources. In order to make maximal use of the new documents, which became necessary, to a certain extent some of the thematic variety has had to be sacrificed. However, the reader does not lose from this, for he is given a factually rich and good quality study of U.S. history.

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#### Chronicle

18020010p Moscow KOMMUNIST in Russian No 4, Mar 89 (signed to press 22 Feb 89) p 128

[Text] A roundtable on problems of relations among nationalities, jointly sponsored by the editors of KOMMUNIST and the journals KOMMUNIST

SOVETSKOY LATVII, KOMMUNIST (Lithuania) and KOMMUNIST ESTONII was held in Riga. Participating in the discussion were noted economists, jurists, historians, sociologists, philosophers, and philologists of the Baltic republics, and representatives of the Central Committees of the Communist Parties of Latvia and Lithuania and a number of public organizations, including the People's Front and the Joint Council of Estonian Labor Collectives, the People's Front, Interfront and Baltic-Slavic Latvian society, the Lithuanian Sayudis Movement, and the unions of writers and journalists of the Baltic republics. The roundtable materials will be published in one of the forthcoming journal issues.

A meeting between editors and the propaganda aktiv of Moscow and Moscow Oblast was held at the Political Education House of the Moscow and Moscow City CPSU Committees. The participants in the meeting concentrated on the course of the electoral campaign and the forthcoming elections of USSR People's Deputies. A wide range of problems related to the economic and political reforms, the renovation of ideology and of shaping the new thinking were discussed.

The editors met with propagandists from the Rotor Scientific-Production Association (Moscow). An exchange of views was held on the tasks of the party press at the present stage of perestroika and the trends in the work of KOMMUNIST. Problems related to the course of the electoral campaign in the public organizations and electoral districts and the tasks which arise in connection with the reduction of armaments and the forthcoming conversion of production facilities serving the defense sector were discussed as well.

A conference of readers of KOMMUNIST was held at the Academy of Sciences of the Latvian SSR, addressed by social scientists from the republic and members of the journal's editorial board.

The editors were visited by W. Ivanicki, editor of the PZPR Central Committee journal NOWE DROGI, and W. Wolodkiewicz, editor of the journal's culture department. At their meeting with KOMMUNIST they discussed problems of the further development of cooperation between the two fraternal publications, problems of perestroika and renovation in various areas of life in the USSR and Poland. The Polish guests studied the research work being done at the USSR Gosplan NIEI and the USSR Academy of Sciences IEMSS, and visited Leningrad.

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